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ABSTRACT 
This study aimed to find out how early grades learners express their thinking about some of 
the themes in the school science curriculum. In a cross-sectional, qualitative study, with data 
from Grade R and Grade 3 children at a primary school in Soweto, it was evident that the 
learners had not advanced in their thinking beyond naïve conceptions of vitalist biology 
('living and non-living objects) and observational astronomy. The research was 
undertaken to fill a gap in the knowledge of local children's emergent concepts of the natural 
world and how these are elicited in the classroom. It is a problem space because natural 
science is not explicitly included in the foundation phase curriculum. It only occupies a 
marginal, and often 'concealed' space, within the life skills subject strand known as 
‘beginning knowledge’. I argue that this exclusion, along with the absence of suitable science 
content teaching (and pedagogy) in initial teacher education programmes, need to be 
addressed in research. I argue that it is important for student teachers and teachers in 
practice to know as much as possible about how children see the natural world. With such 
knowledge, curriculum and instruction can be designed to suit the children.  
 
The study comprised two phases: interviews were conducted in informal discussion format 
after all the learners (n=53) had watched a series of classroom demonstrations. The second 
phase consisted of a smaller sample (n=20), when individual, clinical, task-based interviews 
were conducted about two topics, namely 'living and non-living things’, and 'earth, sun and 
moon'. The findings show that there is limited progression over the three-year period (from 
Grade R to Grade 3) of the participating children’s concept development. This study shows, 
also, that, although many of the participants may lack normative science concepts, they 
were able to reason sufficiently to understand some of the causal relationships in natural 
phenomena. But overall, the detailed analysis of the children's discourse and activities show 
that they need systematic instruction and language advancement to express their 
understanding.  
The study was conducted as an exploration of conceptual change and the work of theorists 
in the field, such as Susan Carey, Alison Gopnik, Elisabeth Spelke and others formed the 
framework of the study. Science learning and conceptual change theorising of specialists 
such as Stella Vosniadou and Andrea diSessa complemented the literature framework. The 
analysis of the video and audio data were analysed qualitatively, coding and categorising the 
content, and selected data for discourse analysis. The research was conducted with an 
interpreter who could serve as back and forth translator for isiZulu, which was utilised by 
children and the interviewer in code-switching.  
vi 
My thesis was that teachers are unlikely to invest in the science teaching in the early grades 
if they do not have a good understanding of what children's beginner knowledge is. I argue 
that teachers' apparent lack of knowledge of children's understanding of the natural world 
may be one source of the limited attention given to science education in the foundation 
phase. It may be that teachers' own knowledge of vitalist biology and observational 
astronomy is limited. The study concludes with recommendations for teaching of science in 
the foundation phase and also for suitable initial teacher education and for professional 
teacher development (in-service) training programmes. The question this research poses as 
a suggestion for future research is: ‘How can some basic science concepts be woven into 
the curriculum of the entire foundation phase, integrating it with not only the life skills subject 
but also the language and literacy, as well as the mathematics subjects?’ I argue that 
teachers need firmer conceptual knowledge of science as well as greater comprehension of 
conceptual development of science concepts in early-grade children in order to improve their 
pedagogy of science teaching. 
 
Keywords: Science education, conceptual change, conceptual development, vitalist biology, 
observational astronomy, primary school education, elementary school science 
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CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Teachers of the early grades of the primary school in South Africa usually do not 
encounter research on young children’s science concept development in their pre-
service education, or in professional development programmes. This may be because 
the school curriculum for the foundation phase does not emphasise science education 
(Kok 2017). The latter leads to a naïve understanding of the tenets of science among 
student teachers (Cronje 2015; Pretorius 2015). Abd-El-Khalick, Bell and Lederman 
(1998) point out that a relationship exists between teachers’ views on the nature of 
science, and how they teach. There may be an underlying assumption that teachers 
will be able to incorporate the teaching of science concepts systematically into the life 
skills curriculum in the section referred to as ‘beginning knowledge’ 
(https://bit.ly/2Lm2qoi) in the foundation phase.  Apart from the limited space in the 
curriculum, teachers also find it hard to teach science concepts, such as ‘floating and 
sinking’, which is a topic in the school curriculum, competently (Kok 2017). The reason 
for this is that foundation phase teachers often lack both subject knowledge 
(substantive knowledge), as well as knowledge of the nature of science (syntactical 
knowledge). In addition to the two mentioned limitations for teaching science, most 
teachers find it hard to explain, for example, the concept of density, although they may 
successfully present a demonstration. Learners may use terminology and even do 
some practical ‘experiments’ without grasping the concept. I argue that if teachers 
have some knowledge of developmental aspects of children’s forming of science 
concepts, they may be better able to teach the (few) science topics in the foundation 
phase curriculum conceptually. However, if they do not know about the intricacies of 
how children develop concepts of the natural world, and what children’s prior 
knowledge is, it is unlikely that they will be able to teach well and to integrate science 
teaching with the rest of the curriculum.  
It is with this notion in mind that I decided to investigate foundation phase 
learners' concepts of the natural world as a possible contribution to early grade 
teacher’s pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) (Shulman 1987).  I reasoned that 
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such a contribution would take note of research in science education, which has been 
at the forefront of studies about what Gardner (1987) refers to as the ‘cognitive 
revolution’. Science education research has been a leader in the field of conceptual 
development and conceptual change theory for the past four decades. Research on 
conceptual change in early grades science learning has been conducted in various 
parts of the world (see, for example, Vosniadou 2009), but very little has featured in 
South African studies, where high school science has featured more strongly in 
research. Rollnick et al. (2008); Lelliott and Rollnick (2010); and Ogunniyi and Rollnick 
(2015) are examples of such studies.  I agree with Duit and Treagust (2003:1), who 
hold the view that “research on students' and teachers' conceptions and their roles in 
teaching and learning science has become one of the most important domains of 
science education research on teaching and learning during the past three decades.” 
To contribute to the body of knowledge of the learning of science in the early 
years of schooling, I designed a study in which I could investigate a component of 
young children’s science concept development, with the aim of making this known to 
the teacher community – especially of schools where children may have had little 
exposure to science knowledge in their pre-school years. I posed the research 
question, framed by conceptual change theory (Posner, Strike & Hewson 1982; 
Vosniadou 2009) and planned to investigate what naïve concepts children in the 6-9 
year age-group hold with regard to concepts in observational astronomy and vitalist 
biology, both of which feature in the foundation phase ‘life skills – beginning 
knowledge’ curriculum in the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement as it 
currently stands (Department of Basic Education 2011).  
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1.2.1 The ‘beginning knowledge’ conundrum 
In this paucity of knowledge about early grade children’s conceptual knowledge (or 
their ‘theories’) of the natural world, I identified a research problem. The supposition 
on which the formulation of the problem is based is that children enter school with 
views of natural phenomena that they have constructed from their experience in pre-
school years.  The problem is that teachers mostly do not know what this knowledge 
is. Researchers in the field of South African educational research do not know much 
either and are faced with the “learning paradox” (Bereiter 1985).  Bereiter formulated 
this paradox of constructivist epistemology: The (unknown) complexities of prior 
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knowledge on which new knowledge is to be constructed assumes that existing 
knowledge is ‘prepared’ for new knowledge. Yet, in my piloting discussions with 
teachers at the research school they suggested randomly what they thought children 
may have theorised about astronomy and life. There was no consistency in what they 
had mentioned. My sense was that they had not given it much thought before. I 
reasoned that this may be why many foundation phase teachers that I have 
encountered approach the teaching of science with the assumption that they need to 
impart ‘new’ content knowledge, with little attention given to the nuances of early 
scientific ‘literacy’ or the concepts and theories that young children have formed by the 
time they enter formal education (Kok 2017; Magnusson, Krajcik & Borko 1999; Duschl 
2008).  I would say that the likely reason for this approach to science teaching stems 
from a lack of understanding how children build their concepts of natural phenomena, 
compounded by the teachers’ lack of science content knowledge (Magnusson, Krajcik 
& Borko 1999). In this problem space I found the ‘gap’ in the local literature and in the 
practice (Snow 2015) - the void in South African publications.  
Thus, in this thesis I investigated the nature of foundation phase children’s 
science concepts to address the issue of ‘beginning knowledge’ of science in the 
rather skeletal national curriculum of ‘life skills’ for the foundation phase. There is, 
according to Gopnik (2012) an urgent need for knowledge about how children in the 
first years of schooling conceptualise the natural world as a basis for further learning.  
Neither educational studies, nor the research field of cognitive development in 
psychology in South Africa has yielded in-depth evidence of what children express, be 
it linguistically, through tasks with objects, or through their reactions to science 
experiments that they witness, or their interpretation of content of books or electronic 
media content. I argue that this void poses a multifaceted real world problem; it may 
even be one of the reasons why there is nothing more than a somewhat haphazard 
foundation phase curriculum for science teaching; there may simply be too little 
understanding of what children know and are able to learn and how these could be 
integrated across the curriculum of the foundation phase. 
  
1.2.2 Sociocultural perspective 
The problem reaches further than the issue of descriptive knowledge of children’s 
concepts, because the children of this country grow up in diverse social-, economic- 
and cultural-, as well as linguistic settings; I have not encountered research about how 
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these factors feature in learning science in the early childhood years. Developmentally, 
it is known that children’s theorising develops through stages (Carey 2009, 1985; 
Vosniadou 2008; Gopnik & Meltzhoff 1997; Astington & Gopnik 1991; Gopnik & Graf 
1988; Gopnik & Wellmann 1992), yet there is little available data of what happens, for 
example, in pre-school years in nursery schools and day care centres and nothing 
about science in the homes, except for middle-class homes and their presence on the 
internet. I also argue that teachers and researchers should know more about the 
possible ‘stages’ of  conceptual development that are typical and how children’s 
learning may differ in a South African ‘township’ context (Spaull 2013).  
 
1.2.3 Expectations of the intermediate phase curriculum 
In addition to what has already been argued in the discussion of the problem so far, 
the expected knowledge that the intermediate phase curriculum assumes about what 
children actually know by the end of the foundation phase is of great concern.  There 
is an observable gap between what is expected of learners in the foundation phase 
and what they are expected to know when they enter the intermediate phase. Keeping 
in mind the theory of Vygotsky (1978) on conceptual development, which proposes 
that learning in school comprises the meeting of ‘spontaneous’ and ‘scientific’ 
concepts through mediation (by teacher, tools, such as media, first-hand experience, 
with semiotic guidance), the limited part played by science learning in the foundation 
phase is of concern to this study.  
Although the foundation phase curriculum includes some teaching of concepts 
in life sciences and astronomy, there is hardly any explicit reference to teaching of 
concepts of chemistry and physics. Mindful of such discrepancies, one could ask if the 
foundation phase can then prepare learners sufficiently for learning science in the 
intermediate phase. This study presupposes that the national, regional and 
international comparative studies of science knowledge and skills of older learners, 
such as the various TIMSS studies (Reddy et al. 2015), reflects that there may be 
missing building blocks in science learning on the one hand, and the unrecognised 
developmental capabilities of young learners on the other hand may go unrecognized. 
Evidence of extremely limited science knowledge of South African learners is pertinent 
in the report on the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS 
2015). TIMSS instruments are a measure for assessing what learners have learned in 
mathematics and science in school by the time they reach Grade 6. TIMSS also 
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captures background information on students, teachers, schools, curricula and official 
policies to allow cross-national comparison of educational contexts that may be related 
to student achievement.  
A report from the International Study Centre of Boston College (Martin et al. 
2012) confirmed that 10 countries namely Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, South 
Korea, England and Wales, Taiwan, Finland, Belgium, USA and Russia are the most 
consistent in the global rankings as top in the global competition assessment above 
all their counter parts from other nations. South African learners performed well below 
average. A preliminary comparison of some of the top achieving countries’ curriculums 
with the South African foundation phase curriculum reveals that the majority of these 
countries place greater focus on science learning in the lower primary school phase. 
This could potentially be one of the key factors why these countries consistently 
perform well in global benchmarking tests like the TIMSS. 
 
1.2.4 Children as theorists 
Yore and Treagust (2006) notes that the nature and extent of learners’ understanding 
of scientific concepts and phenomena depend on key components of a science 
curriculum. However, one cannot design a curriculum in a vacuum that excludes 
psychological knowledge of learning and conceptual development.  I argue that to 
design a science curriculum or plan a science lesson, one needs to know some basic 
developmental theories of cognitive development. More than 30 years ago already 
(before the wave of laboratory studies of young children started with methods of 
habituation studies and in neuroscience studies), research showed that by the time 
learners are taught formally in science classes, they already have idiosyncratic notions 
regarding science concepts and that these views are not aligned with the views 
accepted by the scientific community – they are naïve concepts (Osborne et al. 1983). 
These idiosyncratic concepts can have a significant effect on new learning as they 
could either support or impede the scientific conceptual development (Ausubel et al. 
1968; Duit & Treagust 1995; Pintrich et al. 1993) as these views could be deeply rooted 
and could be impervious to traditional teaching. From contemporary developmental 
cognitive psychology it is evident that young children theorise their world (Gopnik 
2012; Tenenbaum et al. 2011; Carey 2009; Gopnik & Meltzhoff 1997). Susan Carey 
has shown, already in her first major publication (Carey 1985) that there is a 
progression in what she later refers to as ‘intuitive theories’. Along with theorists such 
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as Gopnik (2012) and Spelke (2010), she sees children in their development as 
‘makers of theory’, learning to adapt their theories as they experience/experiment and 
as they learn through cultural tools. One such tool is language, which forms a gateway 
to much of initial   learning when they enter the world of symbolic learning (Henning & 
Ragpot 2015). 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION, AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
In the investigation about the ‘conundrum’ of ‘beginning knowledge,’ the research 
question that I addressed is about the naïve concepts children in the 6-9 year age-
group hold. I asked, “What theories do children in Grade R and Grade 3 hold with 
regard to concepts in observational astronomy and vitalist biology?  
The immediate aim of this study was to make the theories children hold explicit 
by way of the following objectives. In addition to studying relevant literature, I planned 
to: 
1. Crystallise principles of design for an analytic instrument to interpret data 
about children’s concepts. 
2. Explore children’s theories regarding observational astronomy and 
vitalist biology in classroom settings as well as interviews with children 
outside of a classroom setting.  
3.  Employ activity system analysis to interpret the findings. 
4.  Utilise the custom designed heuristic tool to interpret the theorising of 
the children. 
 
1.4 DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
The research was designed to investigate the theories that early grade learners hold 
qualitatively, as a case study (Henning et al. 2004; Stake 2008; Yin 2013) with specific 
parameters. This type of design aims to gain a rich and descriptive understanding of 
how people construct meaning from their experiences (Merriam & Tisdell 2016). This 
research modality is typically employed when an exploration of a phenomenon about 
which little is known (Creswell 2007) in a specific context. Furthermore, the study was 
conducted as ‘practitioner research’ (Cochran-Smith & Lytle 2009), because I wished 
to investigate part of my practice as science teacher educator. I argue that foundation 
phase teachers need to ‘know the learner’ as part of their pedagogical content 
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knowledge (PCK) as described by Shulman (1986, 1987)  so that they can adequately 
design learning opportunities that would facilitate science concept development.  
Various approaches to qualitative research has been developed and includes 
research designs such as basic qualitative research, phenomenology, ethnography, 
grounded theory, qualitative case study and narrative analysis (Merriam & Tisdell 
2016). This study is simply designed as a qualitative case study. In the ‘bounded 
system’ of foundation phase children’s expression of understanding of science 
concepts I recognise that their understanding is nested within a sociocultural and 
educational reality that influences the development of conceptual structures. For this 
reason, I use activity system analysis (ASA) as an analytical and interpretive device in 
addition to the tool I designed and which I have named the hierarchy of mental entities 
(see Figure 2.3). In planning the study, I decided that the participants should not only 
express their conceptual understanding through talking about natural phenomena, but 
should also be given the opportunity to see some (science) demonstrations of natural 
phenomena in classroom ‘science shows’ and also create and interact with objects in 
clinical tasks  to explain their concepts.  
I opted to include these science events and task-based interviews as modalities 
for data collection, while sampling children from Grade R and from Grade 3. I wished 
to obtain data that could generate insight into the participants’ conceptual structures 
and delve into their understanding of natural phenomena, and ultimately my 
interpretation of their understanding. The reasoning for the design of the study, 
specifically the approach to data analysis, was guided by an overview of qualitative 
data analysis process as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994).  
The unit of analysis (Trochim 2006) of the study was foundation phase 
children’s expression of their understanding of observational astronomy and vitalist 
biology. Generation of data occurred during two separate iterations of interviews at an 
urban primary school in, Soweto, Johannesburg. The full cohort of isiZulu classes in 
Grade R and Grade 3 participated in science demonstration classroom interviews as 
part of the first iteration of data collection. The analysis of this data informed the 
creation of task-based interview protocols, with randomly selected individuals from the 
Grade R and Grade 3 isiZulu cohort. Both data sets were translated, where necessary, 
and transcribed. The utterances and actions of the participants were analysed using 
inductive coding (Henning et al. 2004; Strauss 1987; Strauss & Corbin 1999) to reduce 
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the data into coherent and manageable entities. In Chapter 3, I explain the design of 
the study more explicitly.        
 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
I have opted to structure the report of this study according to the traditional APA style 
for doctoral and master’s dissertations, which consists of five chapters. In this section 
I describe the layout of each of the chapters.  
The first chapter describes the background of the study as well as the research 
problem. The research question, aims of the research and design of the study is also 
described in this chapter. The theoretical framework of the study is presented as part 
of a study of relevant literature in Chapter 2, focusing on theories of conceptual 
development and conceptual change as well as studies of children’s learning of the 
two science topics I have selected for study. In the third chapter I describe the research 
design and methodology that I utilised to collect, reduce and analyse the data. I also 
focus on issues related to ethics in this chapter. The results of the data analysis are 
presented in Chapter 4, where the themes that emerged during the coding and 
categorising are explicated. Chapter 5 comprises a discussion of the findings of the 
study wherein I draw conclusions from the intersect of the findings and the theoretical 
grounding of the study. I also make recommendations in Chapter 5, and critically 
reflect on the contribution of this study.        
 
1.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the research problem as it relates to the specific context of 
science learning in the South African foundation phase curriculum in a ‘township’ 
school. I set out the research question and associated aims of the study, namely to 
describe the conceptual development of children in the early grades of schooling as 
pertaining to the science themes of observational astronomy and vitalist biology. The 
research design, including the data collection and analysis, that I have employed to 
answer the research problem has been explained.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SCIENCE LEARNING IN THE EARLY GRADES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: TEACHERS AND LEARNERS ALIGN 
The central argument of this chapter is that for foundation phase teachers to teach 
science and to align their pedagogy with early grades learners’ existing knowledge, 
they need to have some insight into what learners already know. In the parlance of 
cognitive developmental psychology (Carey 1985, 2009, 2011), this means that 
teachers should have some sense of children’s conceptual systems of specific topics 
listed in the curriculum. In other words, they need to ‘diagnose’ children’s conceptual 
development in some assessment format, before attempting to design lessons. The 
development that I refer to includes both biological development and the development 
of mental representations of concepts. To assist children in the learning of new 
concepts, teachers need to have some sensitivity for the nuances of the existing 
conceptual structures of the young learners in their class. This type of teacher 
knowledge is a notion described by Shulman (1987) as ‘knowledge of the learner’ 
which is an essential component of a teacher’s pedagogical content knowledge (PCK). 
To put it in curriculum terms – I argue that as a first step in designing a work plan for 
a few weeks, as well as an individual  lesson, the starting place is ‘the learner’. This 
is, of course, not a new idea. Reform pedagogists in different times of the history of 
formal education have accentuated this beginning point (Langeveld 1960; Barnard 
1859; Froebel 1885; Dewey 1956; Comenius 1887).  Yet, in the time when young 
school-goers in South Africa struggle to cope with the demands of the curriculum, the 
dominance of ‘curriculum cover and compliance’ is noticeable in studies about 
foundation phase education (Radebe 2018; De Villiers 2016; Mabalane 2013; Graven 
& Venkat 2014). 
Even though the curriculum propounds ‘constructivism’ as a principle of 
teaching and of learning, the pace of the curriculum makes it hard to truly find out 
‘where the learner is’ before designing a work plan. From the first day of school 
children learn mostly new things and they are assessed in ‘formative assessment’ 
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mode, but it is unclear to what extent individual learners are given support when 
needed.  From a constructivist epistemology position, it is important for a teacher to 
establish which foundation has been laid by a child’s historical interactions with her 
home environment and the social structures of the community. Encounters with the 
natural world in a child’s everyday life are also important to take into account before 
attempting to build on this foundation with new concepts. Connections with what a 
child knows is fundamental to teaching (Caine & Caine 1991). I invoke the often-cited 
image of Vygotsky (1978) to illustrate this point of developmental readiness of a 
learner and the role of a teacher. A child is unlikely to grasp the ‘outstretched hand’ of 
a ‘Vygotskian teacher,’ attempting to guide the child through the zone of proximal 
development (ZPD), if said teacher does not comprehend the intricacies of cognitive 
and conceptual development; knowing how concepts develop in young children can 
give a teacher at the very least some developmental norm of how children form 
concepts (about the natural world). This chapter serves to explore some of the 
literature of early science concept development and the contextual factors that 
influence the development of these science concepts. 
Many disciplines have long attempted to identify ways in which we can 
determine the state of a child’s conceptual development. These disciplines stretch 
through the academic spectrum from philosophy and developmental psychology to 
neural imaging techniques and standardised testing, each exploring different aspects 
of the same phenomenon. What is important to this study is how the education 
community approaches this important aspect of the educational agenda, pertaining to 
the teaching of science in the foundation phase. The foundation phase curriculum in 
South Africa does not sufficiently frame how science should be taught to young 
children and includes very little formalised science topics, especially when compared 
to other disciplines such as mathematics and language and literacy. This is worrying, 
seeing that the Grade 4 natural sciences and technology curriculum expects of 
learners to have obtained certain science concepts during the foundation phase. This 
is further problematic because of the attitude most foundation phase teachers have 
towards the teaching of the life skills subject. Sheldon (2015) found that foundation 
phase teachers regard the teaching of the ‘life skills’ curriculum as a secondary priority 
and spend most of their time teaching mathematics and language. I argue that the 
scientific literacy of all South Africans could be greatly improved if the robust teaching 
of science is included in the foundation phase. Researchers in science education, such 
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as Lavonen (2013) and Charlesworth and Lind (2010) accentuate early learning of 
science process skills as the ignition of the extensive process of conceptual change 
from naïve science concepts and intuitive theories towards normative, or scientifically 
accurate concepts of the natural world.  
I further argue that teacher training institutions should also include the teaching 
of scientific literacy more prominently to equip foundation phase teachers with the 
knowledge and skills to teach science concepts. Foundation phase teacher training 
curricula usually include one semester module on science pedagogy over a four-year 
degree programme. The pedagogy is science content-based and in this there is no 
mention of post-Piagetian theories of conceptual development of natural phenomena.  
In this chapter I will discuss some theories of conceptual development which 
will include “the origin of concepts” according to Susan Carey (Carey 2009) and the 
theory-theory of concept development as described by Gopnik and Metlzoff (1997). 
Since these authors introduced the notion of the ‘theory’ of conceptual development, 
many protagonists have been investigating its validity (Barner & Baron 2016), while 
others have discarded it (Rips 1995). This study specifically investigates the work that 
leans mostly to the side of Susan Carey’s work on the continuum of children’s 
development of concepts.  
I hold the view that science teachers and educational researchers who work in 
this field can be placed in a quadrant of two themes in a matrix (Figure 2.1): knowledge 
of conceptual development (y-axis) and knowledge of science (x-axis), which can be 
used to classify how appropriate a teacher’s knowledge is to teach science. 
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Figure 2.1: Knowledge of science and knowledge of conceptual development 
 
If one were to assess teachers on their knowledge of cognitive and conceptual 
development as well as their knowledge of science and the teaching thereof, I 
hypothesise, that one would be able to ‘plot’ a teacher in one of these four quadrants. 
I will argue that all science teachers should fall in Quadrant 1 to teach science 
effectively. From what I have observed in numerous schools is that most science 
teachers in the primary school in South Africa fall in quadrant two and three. In the 
academic discourse of publication in South African journals and at conferences this is 
evident too. This might be the reason for the sub-standard science knowledge of South 
African children.  
This chapter comprises discussion of a selection of the literature pertaining to 
conceptual change and the development of conceptions that children hold about 
natural phenomena. For now, I will broadly define natural sciences concepts or 
conceptions as a person’s mental representation of a natural phenomenon. This 
definition holds many assumptions and requires a nuanced understanding of various 
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aspects as described by a myriad of authors. Figure 2.2 is a heuristic devised to create 
a visual road map through the arguments that I posit in this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 2. 2: A roadmap of the chapter 
 
In Section 2.3 I discuss the nomenclature that is often used to describe the nuances 
of mental representations. The (cognitive) development of concepts as held by 
children in the early grades of primary school as well as conceptual change theory will 
form the core of the discussion. I first argue that science teachers should have 
knowledge about the cognitive structure of concepts that children hold about natural 
phenomena as well as some knowledge of the mechanisms involved in the change of 
these concepts. Here I invoke the writing of Shulman (1987), Carey (2009), and Barner 
and Baron (2016). Secondly I describe the processes involved in the acquisition of 
initial concepts and then the views of leading authors on the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in conceptual change.  
As the first focus of the discussion in this chapter I argue for the notion that 
science teachers should have an awareness of the prior knowledge of the children 
whom they teach, before attempting to design a suitable teaching event.  
 
2.2 TEACHING AND THE RECOGNITION OF CHILDREN’S PRIOR KNOWLEDGE: 
SHULMAN’S TYPOLOGY 
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Lee Shulman’s typology of teacher knowledge (Shulman 1987) includes the often-
cited notion of PCK which is defined explicitly as: 
 
(t)he transformation of subject matter for teaching occurs as the teacher 
critically reflects on and interprets the subject matter; finds multiple ways to 
represent the information as analogies, metaphors examples, problems, 
demonstrations and classroom activities; adapts the material to students’ 
abilities, gender, prior knowledge, and preconceptions (those pre-instructional 
informal or non-traditional ideas students bring to the learning setting); and 
finally tailors the material to those specific students to whom the information will 
be taught (Cochran, DeRuiter & King 1993:264).   
 
Before being able to teach others, a teacher needs a good understanding of not only 
the subject matter but also an appropriate way in which to teach/transform the content 
pedagogically. The problem is that to choose an appropriate teaching method, the 
teacher first needs to identify learner characteristics. This, in itself, is challenging. 
School classrooms are diverse in every sense of the word.  But one aspect that is 
often overlooked by teachers is that to teach a concept to another person you first 
need to determine what it is that that person already knows about a concept. This is 
true whether one teaches an individual or a large group. These factors, among others, 
form the essential structure of most teacher training institutions’ curricula. Comenius 
already wrote his Didactica Magna (Keatinge 1967; Petker 2018) in the 17th century, 
with the ‘didactic triangle’ as organising principle (Henning 2012), with teacher, learner 
and content as the three points of the triad.   
Shulman (1987) argued for teaching that accentuates comprehension and 
reasoning, transformation and reflection. He argued that at the time of writing there 
were a multitude of studies that described effective teaching from a classroom 
management point of view but that there were few studies that describe how teachers 
manage ideas. More than 30 years after Shulman’s article, the landscape of education 
research in South Africa remains similar  
After several iterations of the national curriculum in the past 20 years there is 
still emphasis on the content that teachers have to teach but very little is said regarding 
the prior knowledge of children. In the instances where teachers are encouraged to 
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determine this prior knowledge very little guidance is given on how teachers should 
approach going about gauging this prior knowledge. 
In comparing the practice of student teachers to that of expert teachers we see 
where the students struggle with knowledge, comprehension and skills drawn from the 
collective understanding of the body of knowledge in teaching. A teacher’s practice is 
a direct result of the knowledge or lack of knowledge. In an attempt to define the body 
of knowledge for teaching Shulman (1987) studied the practice of expert teachers and 
described the relationship between content and pedagogy in the minds of teachers. 
He identified the categories of the teaching knowledge base as follow: 
 
 Content knowledge; 
 General pedagogic knowledge; 
 Curriculum knowledge; 
 Pedagogical content knowledge; 
 Knowledge of learners and their characteristics; 
 Knowledge of educational contexts; 
 Knowledge of educational ends, purposes, and values and their  
   philosophical and historical grounds; 
 
Even though Shulman (1987) predicted that these categories will be refined, his work 
is still considered by some as the foundation of teacher education and these 
categories has remained relatively unchanged. He offers the following sources of the 
teacher knowledge base: 
 
 Scholarship in content disciplines; 
 The materials and settings of the institutionalized educational process; 
 Research on schooling, social organizations, human learning, teaching  
     and development, and the other social and cultural phenomena that  
     affect what teachers can do; 
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 The wisdom of practice itself.  
 
It then stands to argue that for teachers to be competent in teaching they will gain 
knowledge in each one of the seven categories mentioned above by engaging in 
practices associated with the four sources of these knowledge. 
The knowledge category that is of particular interest to this study is that of 
‘knowledge of the learner and their characteristics’. More specifically, knowledge of 
the prior knowledge of the child. I argue that that this is the fundamental category and 
that it means teachers should have basic knowledge of conceptual change theory. 
 
2.3 CONCEPTUAL CHANGE THEORY 
The human phenomenon of learning through the use of signs and tools has been 
studied widely. The neural structures that can facilitate it are innate, although some, 
like learning to read, are ‘recircuited’ (Dehaene 2009) for this purpose and depend on 
instruction. It is also known that certain ‘core knowledge’ is already present in the infant 
mind and that this knowledge changes as life progresses (Dehaene 1997, 2009, 
2011), depending on what is learned from the environment. Carey (2009) and other 
cognitive developmental psychologists such as Spelke (1994, 2011) and Gopnik 
(2012) have written extensively about the changes that happen in the cognitive 
structures of infants when they begin to respond to the world around them, forming 
and changing concepts all the time. What an adult knows just prior to the end of life is 
vastly different and more complex from that what is known in infancy. Even though it 
is possible to describe this change in knowledge, the challenge lies in explaining the 
mechanisms and cognitive processes through which these changes occur. Many 
developmental psychologists have dedicated their work to exploring the nuances of 
learning and have attempted to adequately describe the initial state of the human mind 
following birth. For the purposes of this chapter, I first describe what researchers write 
about innate knowledge of an infant before mapping the development of their learning.  
Xu (in Barner & Baron 2016) argues that innateness has been ‘pugnacious’ in 
the field of developmental psychology as it poses the challenge of accurately 
characterising the initial state of infants’ minds. It is difficult to determine what it is that 
infants know, what they are capable of thinking and learning and what kinds of 
‘knowledge monomers’ are in place at or shortly after birth. Xu (2016) says that it would 
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be near impossible to comprehend the nature of learning and developmental change 
if we cannot characterise the initial state. Most notably, scholars such as Piaget 
(1954), James (1890) and Quine (1969) have posited the initial state in various ways 
and have also proposed several stages of children’s cognitive development. Most of 
the work of Piaget about stages of cognitive development is now widely called into 
question and a contemporary view of the initial state of the human mind comes from 
scholars such as Carey et al. (2015), Spelke (1994), and Gelman (2003), Gersten 
(1999), Sarnecka & Lee (2009), Dehaene (1997) and others. These authors, who 
propose that infants are born with certain core knowledge systems that have innate 
concepts at the centre of the developing mind of a child.  
Such core knowledge systems are also evident in closely related species, 
suggesting that this knowledge arose early in the human ancestry and therefore has 
evolutionary survival value. Carey (2009) proposes that infants have a rich set of 
reasoning principles and core cognition systems in place by the age of one year. These 
core knowledge systems include innate concepts such as object, number, agent, 
causality, mind and space. Each system comprises a vast network of interrelated 
mental representations that allow the individual to ‘recreate’ the natural world in her 
mind. Barner and Baron (2016) explain that humans get to know their world by creating 
a ‘copy’ of the world in our minds. It is through mental representations of objects, 
occurrences, properties and ideas that experience is constituted. Being able to 
recreate the physical world in one’s mind holds many advantages in that it allows for 
thought activity that does not require the individual to be physically located in the actual 
environment  about which thought is happening (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997). These 
mental representations are often prefaced in language in that single lexical terms, such 
as nouns and verbs, can hold a wide range of semantics that are often difficult to 
express otherwise. Language, from this view, serves as representative agent, apart 
from being a communicative agent.  Barner and Baron (2016) argue that the 
interactions between mental representations and vocabulary give some explanation 
on how thought and language are related – much as posited by Vygotsky (1986). 
Nouns, such as leaf, water, bird, etc. immediately evoke a set of mental 
representations of objects, whether it manifests as images, sounds or feelings, or a 
combination of these, and creates a common understanding between individuals who 
are communicating via language. Verbs such as walk, beg, laugh, etc. capture the 
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actions that occur during interactions. The wide range of mental representations are 
commonly referred to as concepts. 
In the introductory chapter to the volume, Core Knowledge and Conceptual 
Change, the editors (Barner & Baron, 2016) highlight the challenges facing 
researchers in the field: Firstly, we need to describe the initial state of the human mind. 
Secondly, we need to explain how new concepts are acquired. Lastly, the mechanisms 
involved in constructing new knowledge has to be explicated.  
In this section of the chapter I will attempt to address these challenges, as 
presented by some key authors in the field of conceptual development and conceptual 
change. I begin by clarifying some of the varying vocabulary used by the scholars of 
conceptual change theory to present some form of unity in terminology. 
 
2.3.1 About ‘concepts’ and related terms 
diSessa (2002) argued that classifying all mental representations as concepts is 
problematic because several diverse mental entities are involved during the changes 
that occur in humans’ representation of the world. Several scholars in the field of 
developmental psychology have attempted to describe these diverse mental entities, 
which has resulted in a smorgasbord of classification systems. Such systems attempt 
to find some hierarchy of mental entities. Authors use different terminologies when 
referring to these initial mental entities. Such terminologies include ontologies (Chi 
2008), beliefs (Hofer & Pintrich 1997), models (Vosniadou & Brewer 1992), theories 
(McCloskey 1983; Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997) and intuitive theories (Carey, 2009). In 
many cases these terms can be used interchangeably but for the most part refer to a 
similar mental entity. For ease of reference diSessa (2002) uses the term, ‘concept’ to 
refer to these mental entities and representations. He describes the lack of well-
developed technical terms as one of the difficulties of the current views on conceptual 
change theory. He further argues that the term ‘concept’ is too vague and has become 
a colloquial ‘catch-all’ term. In its broad sense it has become a blanket term used to 
group all mental entities in the same category. diSessa and Sherin (1998) examined 
the literature of conceptual change and argue that even the best and most widely 
recognised researchers use inexplicit definitions that could implicate ill-defined 
meanings.      
This raises the question on what the definition of a concept could be and how 
one can differentiate a concept from other mental entities. If authors in the conceptual 
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change field are to move away from superficial explanations of conceptual change, 
there should be a list of types of concepts and guidelines on what sets one mental 
entity apart from others. Towards achieving at least a small part of this goal, I would 
argue that one first has to determine what types of mental entities are described in the 
literature and, secondly, collate these descriptions in an integrated discourse. 
Seeing that ‘concept’ has become a colloquial term and is used to refer to all 
mental entities and representations (Margolis & Laurence 2014; Kok 2017), it is 
important to describe mental entities using terminologies that are not colloquial, but 
that are descriptive of the characteristics and structure of mental entities and 
representations. In the literature that I have studied so far there is one common 
characteristic of all conceptual change or cognitive development theorists, namely that 
they propose some hierarchy and network in their propositions. After having 
synthesised relevant studies, I have consolidated the views of various scholars and 
constructed a hierarchy of mental entities (Figure 2.3) in which I present a heuristic for 
a discussion of proto-conceptual primitives and similar ‘level-attributed’ mind tools, 
moving to subnetworks, concepts and then, theories. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Hierarchy of mental entities 
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This hierarchy of mental entities was created, based on the work of Wiser and Smith 
(2016) about the relationship between the various mental entities as described by 
various scholars in the field of developmental psychology, such as Baillargeon (2004), 
Chi (1992), diSessa (2002), and Gelman (2003). To develop this hierarchy, I 
considered three assumptions of conceptual change that frame Wiser and Smith’s 
(2016) model of deep conceptual change in science learning. They propose that these 
assumptions explain why few children achieve deep conceptual change in traditionally 
taught classes. The assumptions also explain why novel curricula support deep 
conceptual change and why learning from these curricula should not be hurried. I relay 
these assumptions whilst also explaining the interactions between the various mental 
entities in the hierarchy in Figure 2.3.  
Wiser and Smith (2016) argue that conceptual change should be understood in 
the context of evolving complex knowledge systems. They propose, in a similar way 
to other authors such as Strike and Posner (1992), diSessa (2002), Brown and 
Hammer (2008), Vosniadou (2013), and Carey (2009), that all concepts form part of a 
bigger knowledge network, with connections to various kinds of  the ‘elements’. These 
elements (as seen in level 1 of the hierarchy in Figure 2.3) include p-prims, precepts 
and image schemata, internal representations of linguistic and mathematical systems, 
and concepts expressed as single words. These elements express the relationship 
between words and symbols; propositions that express relationships between 
concepts; and models that integrate proto-conceptual primitives and the propositions 
to provide explanations of phenomena. A child may find the statements intelligible or 
unintelligible; the propositions could be deemed true, false or worthy of consideration; 
and the models could prove useful to the individual or it could not. It is these elements 
that determine the beliefs (as seen in level 2 of the hierarchy) that an individual holds. 
These beliefs could be ontological commitments, epistemological beliefs or 
generalisations about phenomena. The knowledge systems of children include all 
these previously mentioned elements but are conceptually ‘light weight’ and comprise 
concepts (level 3 of the hierarchy) that are different to the knowledge systems of 
scientists. Deep conceptual change, mirroring that of the major changes in historic 
scientific theories, is needed for children to overcome the incommensurability in their 
own knowledge systems. 
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The second assumption on which Wiser and Smith (2016) base their argument 
is that concepts are both embedded in beliefs and constituted by beliefs. The way in 
which they phrase this assumption may seem paradoxical but can be resolved by 
distinguishing between what they term the ‘unitary mental symbol’ of the concept and 
the semantic (linguistically coded) meaning of the concept, hence the reason that I 
have placed this type of concept as a ‘single word concept’ in level 1. The notion of a 
‘unitary mental symbol’ refers to the word or the placeholder structure as an empty 
shell that participates in the construction of the belief (see also Carey 2009). The 
interrelation between the belief with other elements in the knowledge network 
constitute the concept (as seen in level 3) as a structure filled with meaningful content 
that can be used to explain natural phenomena. The symbol is seen as a “node in the 
knowledge network, which subtends a subnetwork of relations with other elements in 
the network.” (Wiser and Smith 2016:31) 
According to Wiser and Smith (2016) time scale plays a role in conceptual 
change insofar as the degree of incommensurability between conceptual systems (see 
Section 2.3.2) depend on time scale. They posit that small changes that are carefully 
sequenced and directed over a long period of time could amount to large changes in 
the structure of a conceptual system without destabilising the system and causing 
confusion and disbelief.1 Achieving deep conceptual change is difficult because 
adding new placeholders and elaborating on existing placeholders is a complex and 
lengthy process and also requires the reconfiguration of existing subnetworks that 
would allow the integration of existing elements into the structures provided by the 
linguistic placeholders. The interconnectedness of the concepts on level 3 give rise to 
theories (level 4 of the hierarchy) that the individual holds and uses to interact with the 
natural world whether it is explanatory or exploratory interactions.  
Before further explaining the structure of this hierarchy I discuss the work of 
some of the scholars on whose theories I have built my understanding of conceptual 
development and conceptual change. In the sections that follow I discuss the work of 
Lev Vygotsky, Jean Susan Piaget, Carey and Andrea diSessa as proponents of 
specific views. Thereafter, I explore the learning mechanisms that allow for the change 
in the network of knowledge systems of an individual, before returning to the hierarchy 
                                               
1 This has implications for the pacing in pedagogy – an aspect of the South African mathematics 
curriculum in the early grades which is of great concern for its fast pace and it disparate topics   
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of mental entities, in Figure 2.3, where I will argue for the use of this hierarchy as 
analytical lens of this study. 
 
2.3.2 Conceptual acquisition and development as described by various scholars  
Lev Vygotsky 
One of the earliest psychology scholars of the 20th century, Lev Vygotsky, argued that 
conceptual development and the ability to reason is mediated through signs and 
symbols that are embedded within cultural practice and language (Vygotsky 1978; 
Reiber 1997; Kozulin 1990). He emphasised the importance of word meaning as the 
unit of analysis for studying the development of concepts (Smagorinsky et al. 2003), 
‘precursing’ what Carey (2009) would later refer to as ‘placeholders’ in the case of the 
word as a beginning towards understanding and forming concepts. Language is a 
cultural tool and simultaneously also a main, communicative sign system that children 
learn through their interaction with their immediate community; this means the 
meaning they attribute to words are socially embedded. He argues that ‘‘the speech 
of those who surround the child predetermines the paths that the development of the 
child’s generalisations will take’’ (Vygotsky 1978:143). The meaning attributed to 
words not only represent the literal, denotative meaning, but also represent the values 
of the immediate community. The words that a child learns, in essence, become 
cognitive placeholders for the mental representations that the child formulates while 
interacting with his environment. These placeholders are represented in the hierarchy 
of mental entities (Figure 2.3 on level 1 - ‘concepts expressed as single words’).   
Vygotsky described two types of concepts, spontaneous concepts and scientific 
concepts, proposing that spontaneous concepts develop through cultural interaction 
and exposure to natural phenomena that occur within the individual’s context. Due to 
the context specificity of spontaneous concepts, individuals struggle to apply them 
when encountering and explaining novel situations. Scientific concepts, on the other 
hand, are those learnt during formal instruction and are more readily applied when 
explaining novel phenomena because these concepts are based on general principles 
as supposed to being context dependent. 
Vygotsky argued that humans travel, cognitively, on a journey towards unifying 
concepts on a “twisting path” (Vygotsky 1986:156) that starts at spontaneous concepts 
and moves through life, learning along the journey (also through instruction) not 
reaching the final destination (ever). Along this journey of learning and development 
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he identified two approximate concept types that show conceptual progress, but not 
yet achieving full ‘scientific’ conceptual status.  He referred to these initial stages of 
development of concepts as ‘complexes’ and ‘pseudoconcepts’. According to his 
theorising, a ‘complex’ is characterised by some representations that are unified with 
some related representations of a concept but not all representations are unified in a 
shared general principle. Vygotsky (1986) argues: 
 
If empirically present, any connection is sufficient to lead to the inclusion of an 
element in a given complex. The concept is based on connections of a single, 
logically equivalent type. In contrast, the complex is based on heterogeneous 
empirical connections that frequently have nothing in common with one another 
(Vygotsky 1986:137). 
 
Pseudoconcepts are characterised by representations that appear entirely unified but 
contain internal inconsistencies. Vygotsky (1986:144) refers to a pseudoconcept as a 
“shadow of the concept” because it appears to be the concept but connects the 
elements of the concept on simple association. These approximate concepts might be 
better understood using an example. If a child learns to classify a fish and proceeds 
to classify all aquatic animals as fish the approximate concept would be a complex. 
However, if the child learns that all fish have fins and proceed to classify all aquatic 
animals with fins (including mammals like whales, dolphins and sea lions) as fish, the 
approximate concept is classified as a pseudoconcept. The full scientific concept 
would allow the child to differentiate between the notion of fish and aquatic mammals.   
Vygotsky’s brief oeuvre, captured in the volumes in the Complete Works of Lev 
Vygotsky (Vygotsky 1997) includes most aspects of child development, but his 
contribution to developmental psychology and human activity is especially in how he 
integrated knowledge of signs and tools as semiotic mediators in the forming of 
concepts (Davidoff 2001; Chaiklin & Lave 1996; Alvarez 1994). 
 
Jean Piaget 
Piaget, a zoologist who became a developmental psychologist and epistemologist, is 
regarded as one of the pioneers of constructivism as a theory of knowledge. In his 
theory of cognitive development, he identified two challenges. Firstly, that of explaining 
the full repertoire of human conceptions, how one acquires specific concepts, 
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discovering which conceptual primitives are innate, and which processes are involved 
in the transformation, through learning, of concepts to reach an adult state of knowing. 
In other words, he attempted to answer the question of how new conceptual content 
is acquired. The second challenge is the characterisation of domain general cognitive 
resources that enable the construction of concepts as well as explaining the 
developmental changes that occur in the cognitive architecture. These two challenges 
influenced each other in that the development of domain general cognitive resources 
in our biology would constrain the acquisition of new concepts and therefore inhibit 
learning for domain specific knowledge. For Piaget it was clear that the biological 
development of the nervous system had to precede cognitive development and this is 
where his stage theory came into play. As children matured they would increasingly 
be able to expand their conceptual repertoire. Even though the specifics of his stage 
theory are now called into question, the basic premise of stage theory remains relevant 
as most contemporary developmental psychologists agree that changes in domain 
general cognitive resources are vital for conceptual change. 
To understand the development of knowledge, for Piaget, it was imperative to 
describe the essence of knowledge which he termed an ‘operation’. An operation as 
a mental entity could be useful actions such as classification, ordering things into a 
series, and counting. He defined an operation as “a set of actions modifying the object, 
and enabling the knower to get at the structures of transformation” (Piaget 1964:177). 
He further explained that operations are never isolated and form an interconnected 
network of actions that form a total structure. These operations formed the basis of 
knowledge that would aid in understanding the development of knowledge by 
elucidating the “formation, elaboration, organisation, and functioning of these 
structures” (Piaget 1964:178). He termed the larger conceptual structures, such as 
realising object permanence, as ‘’schema. Learning as the process by which existing 
knowledge is transformed into new understanding is driven by the processes of 
equilibration of assimilation and accommodation.  
During learning processes, a person’s current ideas or concepts will interact 
with the new information that he is being taught or engages with through investigation. 
It is not uncommon for the person to reach an understanding that is fraught with errors 
and misconceptions that are difficult to replace with more accurate concepts due to 
the robust nature of, what Posner et al. (1982), refers to as ‘alternative frameworks’. 
Piaget (1964) believed, as many current scholars still do, that learning needs to be an 
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active enterprise in which novel experiences and information interact with the current 
ideas. It means, thus, that a person’s schema  will fit with new learning and that  new 
‘content’ will be assimilated into the conceptual framework, or will be so contradictory 
that the schema either, rejects the new information or the structure of the schema 
should be reorganised in order for the new information to be accommodated. Piaget 
states that in the ‘act of knowing’, the learner active. This means that faced with an 
‘external disturbance’, he will respond to compensate for the disturbance and will 
‘equilibrate’. The conceptual framework of the individual is therefore reorganised in 
such a way as to move away from ‘disequilibrium’ towards a more stable state of 
equilibrium. Learning of subsequent concepts that require a stable ‘ancestral 
conceptual framework’ will not occur if equilibrium has not been achieved in the 
‘ancestral conceptual framework’ first.                   
The research field of conceptual change has progressed significantly since the 
collective work of Vygotsky was published in 1987 and the contributions of Piaget and 
has spawned two competing theoretical perspectives on knowledge structure 
coherence (Ozdemir & Clark 2007). Recently two schools of thought have emerged 
about the nature of knowledge construction. Some scholars propose ‘knowledge-as-
elements’, and others refer to knowledge construction as the revision of theories, the 
so-called ‘knowledge-as-theory’ proponents. In my reading of the literature I have 
understood there to be a consolidated view of knowledge construction that includes 
both these views and have incorporated this consolidated view in the hierarchy of 
mental entities as depicted in Figure 2.3. In the following section I will compare these 
two seemingly opposing views as an overview and subsequently describe the two 
views first, by referring to the work of Susan Carey as a proponent of the knowledge-
as-theory perspective and lastly, referring to the work of Andrea diSessa as a 
proponent of the ‘knowledge-as-pieces’ perspective.  
 
A brief introduction to and overview of knowledge-as-theory and knowledge-as-
elements  
The proponents of the knowledge-as-theory perspective argue that a child’s 
knowledge is most accurately represented as a coherent framework of theory-like 
structures (Carey 2009; Chi 2005; Ioannides & Vosniadou 2002; Wellman & Gelman 
1992; Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997; Nersessian 2008). This view is also known as the 
‘theory’ theory of conceptual change. The proponents of the knowledge-as-elements 
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advocate that a child’s knowledge is an ecology of virtually independent elements 
(Clark 2006; diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly 2004; Harrison, Grayson & Treagust 1999; 
Linn, Eylon, & Davis 2004). These theorists do not necessarily agree with Fodor’s 
(1975) view of modularity, but they also do not support the theory theory of knowledge-
making, 
Ozdemir and Clark (2007:352) attempted to clarify the foundations of each 
perspective and have noted that knowledge-as-theory builds on aspects of Piagetian 
learning theory and is also strongly influenced by the study of the philosophy and 
history of science. They explained the essence of knowledge-as-theory as follows: 
  
To explain a conceptual shift, proponents of knowledge-as-theory perspectives 
often present analogies between Piaget’s concepts of assimilation and 
accommodation and Kuhn’s (1962) concepts of ‘normal science’ and ‘scientific 
revolution’ (e.g., Carey 1985, 1999; Wiser & Carey 1983). While some of these 
researchers have explained conceptual change in terms of framework theories 
and mental models (e.g., Vosniadou 1994; Vosniadou & Brewer 1992), others 
have focused on higher level ontological shifts (Chi 1992). 
 
The opposing perspective proposes that children’s understanding can be 
characterised as collections of various, virtually independent, elements that function 
as an ecology. The interactions and relationships between these elements are seen 
as the building blocks for conceptual comprehension. Ozdemir and Clark (2007:353) 
summarises the views of the most prolific authors in the Knowledge-as-elements 
perspective as follows: 
 
Anderson (1993) and Thagard (1992) provide relatively 
mechanical/mathematical examples of this perspective. Clark (2006), diSessa, 
Gillespie, and Esterly (2004), Hunt and Minstrell (1994), and Linn, Eylon, and 
Davis (2004) maintain more organic perspectives that focus on collections of 
elements including, but not limited to, phenomenological primitives, facts, 
facets, narratives, concepts, and mental models at various stages of 
development and sophistication. diSessa focuses more on the nature of the 
elements, Clark focuses on longitudinal processes of change, Minstrell focuses 
on the facets students use in the classroom, and Linn focuses on the process 
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through which students reorganize, revise, and connect these elements. 
Learning occurs through a process of restructuring and reorganizing these 
ideas.   
 
In their comparison of the two perspectives Ozdemir and Clark (2007) note that there 
is agreements on some aspects of conceptual development. These include 1) children 
acquire knowledge from their daily experiences; 2) children’s naïve knowledge 
influences their formal learning; and 3) naïve knowledge is highly resistant to change, 
thus implying that conceptual change is a time-consuming process. The 
disagreements, however, are rife and would best be compared as follows: 
 
Table 2.1: Knowledge-as-theory and knowledge-as-elements (adapted from Ozdemir 
and Clark (2007)) 
Knowledge-as-theory Knowledge-as-elements 
Naïve knowledge is highly 
organized in theory, schema, or frame 
forms. 
Naïve knowledge is a collection of 
quasi-independent knowledge elements. 
Naïve knowledge in a coherent 
form has explanatory power to 
consistently interpret the situations 
across broad domains. 
Consistent application over time 
for individual contexts, and 
systematicities will be present, but high 
contextual sensitivity. 
More focus on revolutionary 
replacement of naïve knowledge in a 
manner similar to Kuhn’s perspectives 
on paradigms in science. Significant 
coherence between ideas at any given 
point in time. 
More focus on conceptual change 
involving evolutionary revision, 
refinement, and reorganization. Multiple 
conflicting ideas may coexist 
simultaneously at any given point in time. 
Explanations involve the creation 
of mental models constrained through 
the overarching framework theories or 
ontological categories. 
Explanations involve the p-prims 
and other elements within the learner’s 
conceptual ecology that are most 
strongly cued by the context. 
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I now continue by exploring the nuances of the two perspectives by focussing on the 
views of the two prominent authors as mentioned earlier. 
 
Susan Carey and other proponents of knowledge-as-theory 
Susan Carey is a professor of psychology and a contemporary theorist of childhood 
cognitive development and is known for the impact she has made in the field of 
childhood cognition. Her work touches on the main trends in this field and highlights 
contemporary ideas of conceptual change theory. In 1985 she published Conceptual 
Change in Childhood in which she analyses young children’s biological knowledge. 
Her latest book The Origin of Concepts (2009) is an extensive study on how concepts 
develop as children mature. 
Carey (2009) refers to initial concepts as ‘intuitive theories’. She defines these 
theories “as theories that ground the deepest ontological commitments and the most 
general explanatory principles in terms of which we understand our world.” (Carey 
2009:26). Children attempt to make sense of the world around them from an early age 
by unconsciously employing basic informal empirical activities. It is through the 
repetition of these activities that they form these early intuitive theories. Gopnik (2011) 
would argue that this process is inductive and that Bayesian theory can explain some 
of it. 
Carey writes that concepts are “units of mental representation, roughly the grain 
of single lexical items, such as object, matter, weight” (Carey 1992:89). These mental 
representations are part of many computational processes, such as inferences, 
predictions and explanations of phenomena. A child can form an initial concept that 
could be consistent with the generally accepted formal empirically-based explanation 
of that concept or could form a concept that is far removed from the general view of 
that specific concept2. In other words, young children form mental representations 
according to what they encounter and observe. Carey (2009) and Gopnik (2011) 
describe the acquisition of the initial concepts in terms of the theory-theory of 
conceptual development. Intuitive theories of natural phenomena are built by 
combining a myriad concepts and unconsciously postulating a relationship between 
these concepts until they make logical sense (at least to the individual child). Because 
                                               
2 This would be similar to what Lev Vygotsky referred to as ‘spontaneous concepts’ and ‘scientific 
concepts’. 
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of this almost haphazard combination of concepts, a child’s intuitive theory of a natural 
phenomenon might not be entirely consistent with the generally accepted (adult) 
explanation of said phenomenon. Added to that, a child forms concepts that are not 
mediated by language at first and the concepts/representations adapt as language 
and other forms of symbolic representation increase (Henning & Ragpot 2015).  
Carey (2009) as well as other authors (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997) that are 
proponents of the knowledge-as-theory perspective argue that children’s conceptual 
structures are theories that are comparable to those of scientists. They further state 
that theory formation and change forms the basis of children’s conceptual 
development and that these theories guide the child’s semantic development – 
awarding meaning to words. They propose that both children and scientists seek truths 
regarding the natural world by forming theories. Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) shows 
similarities between scientists and children as theory formation in both instances are 
based on observation of the natural world and making sense of phenomena by 
conceptualising possible causes. These observations and conceptualisations are 
central to the cognitive development of the child as it is central to the formation of 
scientific theories (Carey 2009; Carey & Spelke 1996; Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997). 
Henning (2012) explains that the similarities between the theories children form and 
scientific theories are that conceptualisation of reality includes the identification of a 
concept’s most important characteristics, the representation of explicit and 
explanatory knowledge, as well as the support of explanatory assumptions.   
Just as scientific theories can change, based on new empirical evidence, so too 
can children change their theory, based on new empirical knowledge gained about a 
phenomenon, and which can aid in making more accurate predictions and explain the 
phenomenon. A scientific theory needs to be falsifiable for it to be regarded as a theory 
(Popper 1957). Therefore, when counter evidence is presented, contrary to the 
premise of the held theory, the theory needs to be adapted to include an explanation 
of how the counter evidence can fit the theory. If this is not possible, the theory is 
abandoned, and a new theory has to be developed taking all the empirical data into 
consideration. 
A currently held theory need not be true for anyone except the child herself. It 
merely has to make sense within, what Carey (2009) refers to as a child’s conceptual 
systems. If new evidence is presented that does not fit the conceptual system, 
conceptual change has to occur in order to assimilate the new evidence.  There has 
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to be, in Piagetian parlance, some ’disequilibrium’, when ‘assimilated’ knowledge 
cannot be ‘accommodated’ (Piaget 1964). Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997:41) argue that 
when children employ the skills of prediction, interpretation and explanation, it is an 
indicator of the existence of theoretical structure and, thus, the ability to recognise the 
need for ‘change’ (of a theory). In this way, children build various theories, using 
information they have available and which they, intuitively, connect to what they 
already know. After intuitive theories have taken shape, and when a child enters formal 
schooling, the challenge arises to adapt the intuitive theories to fit the theories held by 
teachers and the curriculum.  
If teachers do not know the ‘theoretical state of mind’ of children, they may 
introduce standard theories (such as additive relations in mathematics, of a vitalist 
view of biology, or observational astronomy), without cognisance of what children 
know and believe. This is the eternal challenge for education from the viewpoint of a 
constructivist epistemology. 
 It is, then, during the child’s schooling that most of the initial concepts (whether 
‘naïve’, or ‘intuitive, as described by Carey (2009) and diSessa (2002)) have to be 
explored by teachers. I would argue that most teachers assume certain knowledge (or 
a ‘blank slate’) and teach the curriculum somewhat ‘blindly’. However, if a teacher were 
able to ascertain what children know and believe, and what their theorising about, for 
example, a phenomenon about ‘living and non-living’ objects is, she may have a better 
idea about the conceptual systems from which children draw. Carey has suggested in 
her oeuvre, which it is not only individual concepts that change, but that a shift also 
takes place in what she refers to as ‘conceptual systems’ (Carey 2009:364). She 
argues that when various components of understanding conjoin and form 
understanding, that this process of “bootstrapping” seems as if a child has ‘pulled 
herself up by her bootstraps’, but that it has more to do with the gradual linking of 
components of understanding that lead to conceptual change and thus of a change in 
the conceptual system. According to Carey (2009:414), the  Quinian term, 
‘bootstrapping’ refers to a process through which new conceptual ‘primitives’ are 
introduced into thought. Quinian bootstrapping stems from the metaphor developed 
by the philosopher Quine (1966) who used metaphors, such as that of “Neurath’s 
boat”, to explain the idea of learning processes. The metaphor of bootstrapping is an 
analogy that means “to pull oneself up by one’s own bootstraps” which is physically 
impossible (Carey 2009:20). When applied to conceptual change, to pull yourself up 
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by your bootstraps will mean to create new “representational resources that are not 
entirely grounded in forerunner representations” (Carey 2009:20).  
The metaphor of Quinian bootstrapping is a functional lens to view the ability of 
humans to create theoretical knowledge that surpasses innate knowledge, often 
referred to as ‘core cognition’. This is achieved by using external symbols, such as 
words, as placeholders for concepts that do not yet resemble the normative concept. 
Meaning is gradually assigned to these symbols as the explanatory power and 
problem-solving abilities of concepts lead to failed predictions and contradictions. 
Carey (2009) refers to this change as a move from the ‘old’ conceptual system 
as conceptual system 1 (CS1) to the ‘new’ conceptual system as conceptual system 
2 (CS2). I would then argue that teachers must have some insight in what children’s 
CS1 is in order to mediate/ teach/ instruct with the aim of getting children to build CS2. 
In science teaching the pedagogical mechanisms for this are not prescriptive. Through 
systematic instruction children can ‘reform’ or adapt their initial understanding to ‘fit’ 
the scientific accurate concept. 
The mechanisms used in this ‘re-formation’ or change process are grouped in 
a broader theory known as ‘conceptual change’ theory (see Vosniadou 1994; Carey 
2009; diSessa 2002; Barner & Baron 2016). Conceptual change is an extremely 
difficult process in most cases as the semantics of the ‘new’ concept is mostly 
incommensurable with that of the ‘old’ concept. When enough learning has taken 
place, and when substantial individual concepts have changed, a ‘new’ conceptual 
system comes into being. The process of moving cognitively from CS1 to CS2 requires 
conceptual change to occur with single concepts and with groups of concepts that are 
interrelated to form understanding. Coupled with conceptual change is the use of 
symbolic representation, such as is captured in language. In Figure 2.4 the diagram 
shows the relationship between certain concepts and the conceptual system they form 
part of.  
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Figure 2.4: The combination of and relationship between various concepts forms the 
conceptual system 
 
Carey refers to the change from CS1 to CS2 as a form of bootstrapping. By this she 
means that when a number of conceptual changes have taken place in, for example 
a child’s understanding of the concept ‘growth’, there may be a substantial conceptual 
shift in the conceptual system of a child’s theory of vitalist biology. (See Figure 2.5) 
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Figure 2.5: The tipping point in conceptual change 
 
As concepts get altered, or new concepts are added into a conceptual system, gradual 
change occurs until a tipping point is reached that completely alters the entire 
conceptual system. This view of learning, where initial concepts are altered after new 
information has come to light, suggests that change requires complicated interactions 
between the initial knowledge and the new information (Chinn & Brewer 1993). 
Ohlsson (2011) refers to this type of learning, where the child must replace or reject 
his initial concept, as ‘non-monotonic’: This results in the growth as well as the 
recession of the child’s knowledge base. Monotonic learning occurs when a child adds 
new knowledge to his memory where there is little to no change to the existing 
knowledge base (Ramsburg & Ohlsson 2016).  
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Somewhere along the road to clear understanding of science concepts, children 
build and expand on their intuitive theories, going through the processes that Carey 
(2009) and the other proponents of knowledge-as-theory describe. It is at this point 
where various conceptual systems integrate and learning is forcefully expanded and 
a child can use symbolic means, such as language, to explain her understanding, that 
mental representations are articulated. The various learning mechanisms that facilitate 
the bootstrapping process will be further discussed in Section 2.3.3. 
 
Andrea diSessa as proponent of knowledge-as-elements 
This section summarises the arguments and postulates of Andrea diSessa and other 
authors who are proponents of the ‘theory-as-elements’ perspective, regarding the 
elements of conceptual change theory. According to diSessa (2002) a major critique 
of the state of conceptual change theory is the lack of theoretical accountability 
regarding the nature of the mental entities involved. He further argues that the 
complexity and diversity of conceptual change phenomena is vastly underestimated. 
In his opinion, research during the late 20th century and early 21st century into 
conceptual change has taken a vastly oversimplified view of the process. It was mostly 
seen as the transformation of a single mental entity and this transformation was often 
described as a concept that starts off as a superficial mental representation of a natural 
phenomenon and then evolves into a clearer more nuanced representation of the 
phenomenon that resembles the common understanding of a community, which 
diSessa (2014) refers to as the normative concept. As an example, he refers to how 
children have an innate understanding of objects that are alive by categorising these 
objects, invoking characteristics such as movement and breathing as the determining 
factors of their classification. (A more detailed discussion on the naïve theory of vitalist 
biology follows in Section 2.4). As their concepts of movement and, more particularly 
the mechanisms of movement, become more nuanced, they distinguish between 
autonomous movement and that of movement caused by external factors, for instance, 
a leaf blowing in the wind versus actively contracting muscles that allow animals to 
move. This new understanding of movement allows children to reclassify objects that 
they have previously described as living to the new category of non-living. The 
transformation is thus from a simplified superficial understanding to a more nuanced 
and deeper understanding.  
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Figure 2.6 shows how many authors draw a simplistic assumption when describing 
conceptual change. 
 
Figure 2.6: Simplistic assumption of the change of a concept that occurs when 
learning 
 
The representation of concept A that leads to concept B more or less implies that there 
is only one naïve concept for every expert concept. It fails to acknowledge that expert 
concepts could be formed due to a combination of several naïve concepts. diSessa 
(2002) proposes a ‘complex knowledge system’ view of conceptual change, in which 
multiple naïve concepts gradually change and these changes lead towards 
conceptually competent expert conceptual ecologies. He echoes the sentiments of 
Brewer (1989): 
 
In the long run, a proper understanding of the human mind will require that we 
recognise a large number of very different forms of knowledge and associated 
psychological processes (Brewer in Vosniadou & Ortony 1989:537). 
 
He argues that many naïve scientific ideas are inarticulate and not easily expressed 
in words. This stands in stark contrast with professional science, where complex, 
careful and symbolically augmented expression is almost always evident.  In 
professional science the externalisation of ideas allows for reflective scrutiny and 
careful reformulation of hypotheses. Teachers cannot see naïve theories of children 
directly and therefore struggle to assist young children in reflection that will allow them 
to reformulate their naïve theories.  
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diSessa (2002) argues that scientific concepts are best considered as complex 
systems and proposes that conceptual change be viewed as ‘conceptual ecologies’ 
that involve many diverse kinds of knowledge that are organised and reorganised into 
complex systems. To comprehend the nuances of these ecologies, we first need to 
describe the ‘monomers’ of these systems. In his view, these ecologies consist of two 
types of mental entities: ‘phenomenological primitives’ (p-prims) and ‘coordination 
classes’. Simply put - p-prims can be described as elements that are generally taken 
as a fact of life and requires no further explanation (diSessa 1988). P-prims are small 
and numerous intuitive elements that are often context specific in their activation. 
When encountering a specific phenomenon, one does not employ all p-prims to aid in 
comprehending the causes of said phenomenon. It is only the p-prims that are relevant 
to the phenomenon that are deployed to attempt to understand the causes of this 
phenomenon - hence the context specific nature of p-prims. ‘Coordination classes’ are 
large systems that entail a high degree of coordination across diverse contexts. The 
comprehensions of a novel phenomenon can be achieved by employing the 
coordination classes that have previously been constructed. From this we start seeing 
polarisation in the hierarchy of conceptual ecologies, with p-prims as the ‘monomers’ 
and coordination classes as the ‘polymers’. diSessa (2014) claims that p-prims 
constitute the bulk of intuitive physics. Throughout diSessa’s work he attempts to 
describe the properties of p-prims. He determines these properties using clinical 
interviews.  
diSessa (1993, 1996) identifies the characteristics of p-prims in interviews, in 
which the subjects have to predict and explain physics phenomena. One aspect of his 
argument is that no other authors account for the changes in ‘many and little’ elements, 
like p-prims. The ‘large,’ intrinsically difficult to change entities, like concepts, theories 
and ontologies provide no explanation for commonplace cognitive phenomena. 
Learners’ descriptions of physics phenomena emerge on the basis of intuitive 
resources and their properties. When they describe phenomena, the descriptions are 
at first semi-stable configurations of known entities with known properties, even though 
these are constructed on the spot. Such descriptions show a cognitive entity that is 
not yet a theory, but does show how p-prims penetrate into the details of process data. 
He argues that clinical interviews are one of the best empirical tools as it allows 
repeated episodes, involving a particular mental entity, and allows triangulation on the 
properties of the entity. Other advantages of clinical interviews include the allowance 
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of a nuanced setting of the context that allows for the investigation of contextuality; it 
elicits the participants’ levels of commitment as their certainty or ambivalence is 
evident in their responses; it exposes paths of reasoning that lead to answers whilst 
extricating answers from the ideas that spawn the answers. Furthermore, clinical 
interviews allow for the opportunity to investigate small changes in learning that 
contribute to conceptual change. This final advantage addresses one of diSessa’s 
biggest criticisms of conceptual change research: In his view, conceptual change 
research is mostly concerned with macro changes, because sampling of the change 
in mental entities mostly occur at the initial phase, prior to instruction or intervention, 
and again following instruction or intervention. This form of ‘snapshot’ conceptual 
change studies’ lenses are fuzzy and can be improved by decreasing the grain size of 
these studies (diSessa 2002). Clinical interviews aid in tracking the micro changes of 
mental entities and therefore allows for a more nuanced description of the mental 
entities themselves. It is these clinical interviews that allowed diSessa to describe the 
properties of p-prims. In the following sub-section I will list the properties of p-prims as 
diSessa describes them: 
 
Small and monolithic 
diSessa refers to p-prims as ‘being small’ and describes them as ‘being simple’ 
knowledge elements. He compares the size of p-prims to that of atoms. It is therefore 
the smallest functional structure of a mental entity and is invoked as a part of the 
whole. P-prims are different to scientific concepts, as these concepts can only be 
accounted for with a systems analyses. 
 
P-prims are numerous 
There are possibly thousands of p-prims and the full set of p-prims exhibit some 
degree of systematicity but the nature of this systematicity is fragile and the bonds 
between p-prims are loose. When compared to other mental entities like theories they 
exhibit deductive relationships and little degree of systematicity. 
 
Work by recognition 
The simplest model for the activation and use of p-prims is recognition. They are 
activated only in certain instances and therefore can be recognised only when 
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activated. One can argue that the absence of a p-prim in the discourse of an individual 
that is usually prominent in a specific situation, is, in itself, meaningful. 
 
Feelings of naturalness; judgements of plausibility 
The function accomplished by p-prims is to provide a sense of obviousness and 
reassures the necessity to events. By example, you are not surprised when an event 
plays out in the same way that you predicted the outcome of the event. You are not 
surprised when a pulling force is exhibited on an object and the object proceeds to 
move in the same direction as the pulling force. The resultant movement correlates 
with the naturalness of the prediction as it matches the intuitive p-prim related to the 
circumstance at hand. Similarly, there would be great surprise if the resultant 
movement was contradictory to the envisaged outcome. This could possibly explain 
the surprise that children experience when they observe chemical reactions or when 
they witnesses illusions used in the repertoire of illusionists.   
  
Explanatorily primitive 
The causes of the behaviours prescribed by p-prims are unknown. diSessa (2002) 
claims that there is no ‘covering theory’ or articulate reasoning that explains the causes 
of the behaviours of p-prims at this stage. 
 
Fluid, data driven; lack of conflict resolution 
Often, p-prims might be less firm in their activation, even though they are strongly 
queued by a situation. In these cases, individuals may have an intuition about what 
might happen but then lose it as their attention shifts. In certain situations, many 
conflicting p-prims may be called upon but it is unlikely that there will be any means of 
resolving the conflict. 
 
Problematic connection to language 
Describing p-prims linguistically is nearly impossible as p-prims cannot be fathomed 
as constructs such as words or word senses.    
 
Origins in “minimal abstractions” 
It is not rare or difficult to generate new p-prims. Often, they are abstractions of familiar 
events such as an object that is pulled would have a resultant movement in the same 
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direction as the force pulling on it. These abstractions are easily accomplished and 
are determined by an extended developmental process.  
 
Development by reorganisation 
The learning of scientific concepts does not extinguish or replace p-prims. Instead, the 
different p-prims find a useful position within the greater system of the concept. An 
individual p-prim could become an effective special case of a particular scientific 
principle and could be used in the place of said principal when the opportune 
circumstances present itself. In this case the p-prim will no longer function as 
explanatorily primitive. This evolution of a selection of p-prims can be described as 
“shifting priorities” in a particular useful context. 
These properties of p-prims are not to be viewed in isolation but the full 
combination of these properties are mutually dependant as many properties provides 
causal fodder for the existence of subsequent properties. An example of such mutual 
dependency is the properties of small grain size and large amount of p-prims. The 
mere fact that a p-prim is small allows for the large numbers of p-prims. This is also 
further aided by the property that p-prims are easily generated. 
Now that I have discussed the properties of p-prims it is imperative that we 
discuss certain examples of p-prims that have been studied. diSessa (2002) discusses 
a few examples of basic p-prims, p-prims associated to the concepts of balance and 
equilibrium and mentions one less important p-prim. 
 
Basic P-Prims: 
Ohm’s P-prim 
Briefly, ‘Ohm’s p-prim’ explains that more effort leads to more results and that more 
resistance leads to less results (Genter & Stevens 2014). There are three elements 
involved in many natural interactions: impetus, resistance and result. Naude (2015) 
shows how young children use this p-prim when predicting what would happen if 
vinegar is added to a balloon filled with bicarbonate of soda. When asked what would 
happen when more reagents are used in the demonstration most of predictions came 
almost instantly as the class ‘sang’ spontaneously that the balloon will inflate more 
than during the demonstration where they used less reagents. Even though the 
resistance that the balloon provided remained the same, it was clear to the children, 
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who noticed the relationship between the increased impetuses leading to an increased 
result. 
 
Force as a mover 
Objects move in the direction that they are pushed in. This p-prim relies on the intuitive 
notion of resultant forces. The interaction of one object on another results in a change 
in spatial position of both objects.  
  
Dying away 
This p-prim relies on the phenomenon that invisible forces, for instance friction, 
impedes in the continuous motion of an object. In essence it states that induced motion 
dies away or simply put that something that starts moving due to an external force will 
not continue moving indefinitely but will gradually stop.  
 
P-prims for balance and equilibrium: 
Dynamic balance 
This p-prim shows that the result could be cancelled out when there is conflicting effort. 
When two forces of equal magnitude interact in opposite directions there is no 
resultant movement and the effects have been cancelled out. 
 
Overcoming 
When one of the conflicting parties increases the effort or the effort of said party wanes 
it yields a result that is different from the instant when the effort was in equilibrium. As 
an example, the team that is victorious in a tug of war wins the competition if the effort 
they employ is greater than that of the opposing team. 
 
Return to equilibrium 
When a system is “out of balance” it will return to a state of balance and reach 
equilibrium. This is most notable when a balance scale is disturbed by placing weight 
on the one side of the scale. When the weight is removed the scale returns to a 
balanced state. 
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Generalized ‘springiness’ 
This p-prim shows that the magnitude of disturbance influences the displacement from 
equilibrium. The greater the magnitude of the disturbance the more perturbed the 
system would be.  
 
Less important p-prim: 
Contact conveys motion 
Small objects that are in contact with larger objects will move with the larger object. 
This p-prim does not inherently assume the mass of the object but rather isolates the 
size of objects. It is for this reason that you intuitively assume that a bag of apples 
placed on the back seat of your car would travel with the car. 
 
Another term that diSessa (2002) uses in his attempt to produce accountable 
theoretical terminology is that of coordination classes. Coordination classes have 
properties that are for the most part polar opposites of p-prims. The contrast is due to 
these classes being large, complex systems, as opposed to the atomic nature of p-
prims. The coordination classes are made up of numerous p-prims - and p-prims are 
seen as the fragments of coordination classes. Coordination classes therefore 
constitute a model or mental representation of a certain type of scientific concept. Due 
to the amalgamation of different p-prims in varying instances, coordination classes 
have a range of parameters that imply that the construction of a coordination class 
may be different in one case compared to another. diSessa (2002) argues that 
coordination classes do not exist in naïve thinking but rather that p-prims are the 
evident mental entity during naïve thinking. 
The function of p-prims is to provide a sense of ‘naturalness’ in familiar 
situations, surprise and possible learning-inducing attention in situations not 
understood, and expectations that can be instrumental. Coordination classes have a 
very different functionality. Coordination classes provide a means to collect a certain 
class of information from the world. The fundamental assumption of coordination 
classes is that information is not transparently available in everyday reality and that 
we therefore have to learn how to access the different kinds of information when it is 
uncovered. In varying circumstances, we employ different means to determine the 
same kind of information, because the varying circumstances in themselves recall 
different p-prims. 
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I compare this construction of coordination classes to that of protein synthesis. 
There is a limited number of amino acids available to serve as the building blocks for 
protein synthesis. When amino acids are sequentially bonded they form a chain that 
eventually results in a protein with certain characteristics. When the sequence of 
amino acids change it results in a protein with different characteristics than the initial 
protein. This change in structure has a definite influence on the morphology of the 
protein and consequently an influence on the function of said protein. This leads to the 
diversity of all known proteins which by extension leads to the diversity of life. This 
diversity is achieved due to variance in the sequence of only 22 amino acids. When 
you compare the construction of coordination classes as proposed by diSessa to this 
example of protein synthesis it becomes evident why the mental entities of one 
individual could be vastly different to those of another. If the number of available 
‘monomers’ (amino acids in the case of protein synthesis and p-prims in the case of 
the construction of a coordination class) increase it leads to greater diversity of the 
polymer (the protein or the coordination class).         
Coordination classes have substantial internal structure and therefore large-
scale partitioning of coordination classes can be made. diSessa (2002) distinguishes 
between the methods by which relevant information is gleaned from the world, which 
he calls ‘readout strategies’ and the collection of possible inferences that can be drawn 
from available information which he calls the ‘causal net’. 
One example that diSessa (2002) uses to illustrate the functioning of a 
coordination class stems from Piagetian studies of children’s concepts of time (Piaget 
1969). “Time interval” is the coordination class he uses as example. The problem 
posed to children is that of two trains that leave the station at the same time. One train 
(the blue train) is slower than the other (the red train). The red train stops before the 
blue train stops. Due to the difference in speed the blue train does not catch up to the 
red train by the time that it stops. When asked to choose which train “went on for 
longer” most children answer that the red train went on for longer. When probed about 
the scenario it is evident that children can extract substantial information, showing that 
they have adequate ‘readout’ strategies. Adults, on the other hand, can extract the 
needed causal information related to the relative stopping of the trains and also know 
that information pertaining to relevant position has no bearing on the question at hand,  
indicating  that adults have a ‘causal net’ that contains the appropriate inference on 
the basis of relevant observations. 
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This does not imply that children do not have a ‘causal net’, but rather that 
children’s causal nets are different to that of adults. The inference that they make is 
that an object that travels for a longer time equates to greater distance travelled. The 
children aren’t aware of the applicable conditions of this inference and that it is only 
true for objects that move at the same speed.      
The development of coordination classes is an extended and complex process. 
‘Coordination’ refers to multiple pieces that must be put in place to achieve an effective 
coordination class. This process, however, is riddled with challenges like the example 
explained above. One must use both ‘readout’ strategies and inferences in the causal 
net that is sufficient to include all contexts of the needed information if you want to 
extract the information of interest. diSessa (2002) refers to this state as achieving the 
appropriate ‘span’. When particular ‘readout’ strategies and inferences are combined. 
diSessa (2002) refers to it as ‘integration’, because it appropriately integrates several 
pieces of knowledge to serve the needs of a particular context. Due to different 
‘readout’ strategies, different inferences and different combinations may be used in 
differing circumstances, and a properly formed coordination class must be ‘aligned’. 
Alignment is only achieved if the same information is ‘read out’, regardless of the 
context and regardless of the ‘readout’ strategies and inferences that were used. It is 
this alignment that teachers strive to achieve when teaching. 
The prominence of a particular p-prim prevents alignment in coordination 
classes. If the principles applied to explain phenomena in varying contexts result in 
deviating explanations alignment is not achieved. This therefore could be an indicator 
that teachers could use to diagnose the learners’ comprehension of a phenomenon. 
diSessa (2002) claims that p-prims and coordination classes are more specific 
than dictionary definitions of concepts and theories and postulates that p-prims and 
coordination classes are plausible knowledge types that play distinct roles in 
conceptual change and account for different conceptual change phenomena. He 
argues that p-prims account for intuitive predictions and judgements of plausibility and 
that coordination classes provide a specific model of a type of full-blown concept which 
entails a lot about the difficult and easy parts of conceptual change. diSessa (2002) 
argues that, in theory, p-prims are distinctly different from coordination classes but 
empirically very difficult to identify and requires great scrutiny to determine which of 
these knowledge types are involved. diSessa (2002) predicts that one would need to 
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identify many different kinds of knowledge if we are to fully comprehend and describe 
the transition of the naïve student to the conceptually competent physicist. 
On the road towards becoming conceptually competent learners will exhibit 
failure of alignment in coordination classes. This could be an indicator to teachers on 
the progress of the conceptual journey of the learner. diSessa (2002) postulates that 
p-prims explain many wrong expectations that learners hold of the working of the 
natural world, and he continues to propose that they also explain phenomena like ‘data 
fluidity’ and the general richness and detail found in intuitive thought. When p-prims 
are in a relatively stable configuration for a particular class of contexts, they form 
‘macro-constructions’ (which may be similar to Carey’s notion of conceptual systems).  
However, diSessa (2002) sees p-prims as sub-conceptual, sub-theoretical or sub-
model like. They are too small to be a macro-conceptual structure and he proposes 
that the development path from naïve p-prims and any of these macro-conceptual 
structures is “incorporation as a limited part” of an emergent complex knowledge 
system. This is why I incorporated p-prims on Level 1 of the hierarchy of mental entities 
(See Figure 2.3). 
He proposes that coordination classes be a refinement of the idea of ‘concept’. 
Theories are seen as even larger conceptual structures encompassing several related 
coordination classes, hence the inclusion of theories as the mega-conceptual 
structures in the hierarchy of mental entities as depicted in Figure 2.3. diSessa (2002) 
believes that language introduces important properties that may not hold in dominantly 
inarticulate knowledge systems. He further proposes that mental models should 
involve strong well-developed “substrate” knowledge systems such as spatial 
reasoning. It should also allow explicit hypothetical reasoning whilst involving only a 
small well defined class of causal inference (diSessa 1996). These mental models 
would require the ability to house hypothetical reasoning. 
In the preceding sections I discussed the various views of conceptual 
development and conceptual change as found in the literature. What is evident is that 
there are certain agreements between all scholars that guided me in the creation of 
the hierarchy of mental entities as depicted in Figure 2.3. This hierarchy shows the 
relationships between all the various types of mental entities but does not adequately 
show how learning occurs. In the following section I discuss the possible learning 
mechanisms that allow for conceptual change to occur. 
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2.3.3 Mechanisms of Learning 
Many processes have been postulated in the literature on how concepts are altered. 
One such mechanism known in the literature as ‘cognitive conflict,’ is proposed by 
Hewson and Hewson (1984); Posner et al. (1982); and Strike and Posner (1982), who 
were all early proponents of conceptual change theory. These are likely to have 
emanated from Piagetian theory. These authors proposed that before a child can 
acquire a new concept they have to be ‘dissatisfied’ with their current concept. This in 
turn is caused by a gradual increase of a child’s awareness of inconsistencies in the 
explanatory power or problem solving ability of their currently held concept (Ramsburg 
& Ohlsson 2016). 
Other theories that offer descriptions of the mechanisms of conceptual change 
include the categorical shift theory, where a child’s current classification of a 
phenomenon is not viable and needs therefore to be reclassified under a different 
ontological category (Chi & Brem 2009); as well as the construction and revision of 
mental models (Vosniadou & Skopeliti 2013). Piaget (1977) described the imbalance 
between assimilation and accommodation, known as ‘disequilibruim’ as the driving 
force in cognitive development. Carey (2009) describes the processes involved in 
conceptual change in terms of the three processes of coalescence, differentiation, and 
Quinian bootstrapping (Ramsburg & Ohlsson 2016).  
The processing of counter evidence is seen as an important aspect in theory 
change. Gopnik and Meltzoff go as far as to state that: “One particular critical factor 
[for theory change] is the accumulation of counterevidence to the theory.” (:39). 
Ramsburg and Ohlsson (2016) summarises the knowledge-as-theory perspectives: 
 
… the multiple knowledge-as-theory perspectives hypothesize different 
conceptual change processes, but they share the principle that those processes 
are triggered by negative cognitive outcomes. The latter include direct 
contradiction or refutation by someone else (e.g., teacher, text, etc.); inability to 
explain a phenomenon; mismatches between current beliefs and direct 
observation; unfulfilled expectations; failure to solve a relevant problem; and so 
on. In general, the difficulty in making a conception ‘work’ is the main condition 
that triggers the search for, or the construction of, a new conception. 
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They therefore refer to the construction of a new theory through falsifying the previous 
held theory by processing counterevidence as ‘cognitive conflict’. Inducing cognitive 
conflict is seen by the proponents of the knowledge-as-theory perspective as a 
deductive reasoning tool whereby falsification and contradiction is a prerequisite for 
theory change to occur. The argument here is that a child will not attempt to alter 
existing concepts unless the application of the theory encounters difficulty in 
application to explanations or problem solving. This would lead to a waste in cognitive 
resources that could be put to better use. Teachers could therefore make use of 
cognitive conflict as a pedagogy deliberately to create conditions conducive to ‘conflict’ 
and thus anticipate (or plan) instead of waiting for these conflicts to present 
themselves spontaneously. These pedagogies range from simplistic strategies like 
merely informing a child that his currently held concept is incorrect (Ariasi & Mason 
2014); or using demonstrations that exemplifies the flaws in the currently held concept 
by exposing its inability to account for presented evidence and failed predictions of 
these demonstrations (Lee & Byun 2012; Lin & Chiu 2007); to more complex methods 
including animations and simulations (Calik, Kolomuc & Karagolge 2010; Dega, Kriek 
& Mogese 2013). 
The efficacy of these strategies is strongly debated in the literature. Strike and 
Posner (1992) reviewed intervention studies conducted in the 1980’s and noted that 
the common finding from these cognitive conflict studies are that misconceptions are 
highly resistant to change. Limon (2001) reviewed the intervention studies of the 
1990’s and found that inducing cognitive conflict has positive benefits but noted that 
these benefits were smaller than expected and that in most cases these benefits were 
so small that it wasn’t measurable and did not lead to a deep understanding of the 
new information. Heddy and Sinatra (2013) showed that the effects of cognitive conflict 
interventions were weak in comparison to other types of intervention. 
The lack of substantial benefit shown by the research into cognitive conflict 
strategies led to studies that explored the influence of other factors on conceptual 
change which resulted in a more nuanced understanding of the processes involved in 
the conceptual change process. These studies included the influence that motivation 
and affect have on learning; individual differences within a sample of participants; 
metacognition; epistemological beliefs; and a person’s intention to change (Cordova 
et al. 2014; Heddy & Sinatra 2013; Kang et al. 2010; Sinatra & Pintrich 2003; Trevors 
& Muis 2014; Zohar & Aharon-Kravetsky 2005). Ramsburg and Ohlsson (2016) argue 
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that the lack of substantial benefit of cognitive conflict interventions shown by this wide 
range of studies falsifies the cognitive conflict hypothesis and states that “the difficulty 
of conceptual change must reside elsewhere than in conflict, or rather the lack thereof, 
between misconceptions and normatively correct subject matter.” It is therefore 
imperative that researchers also attempt to explain the mechanisms leading to 
conceptual change in terms that do not include cognitive conflict. 
Xu (2016) proposes a thesis statement for her work on preliminary thoughts on 
a rational constructivist approach to cognitive development and posits that there are 
three major types of learning mechanisms as revealed through research on cognitive 
development; 1) conceptual learning driven by language and symbol learning; 2) belief 
revision through Bayesian learning; and 3) generation of new hypotheses through the 
organisation of factual knowledge using explanation, analogy, and thought 
experiments; can be considered as both rational and constructive. In describing which 
learning mechanisms are involved in developmental change, Xu (2016) identifies three 
learning mechanisms that are rational and constructive. She proposes that, 1) 
language is a medium that provides ‘’placeholder structures and  constrains 
representational formats; 2) Bayesian inductive learning can explain how rationally 
combining evidence and prior knowledge leads to belief revisions, and that this in turn 
cumulatively leads to conceptual change; such change allows peripheral concepts to 
become core concepts; and 3) larger conceptual structures can be constructed by 
‘learning by thinking’ tools to extrapolate from everyday life ‘data’ input  as ‘evidence’. 
These three learning mechanisms may describe how new experiential concepts are 
formed spontaneously (according to Vygotsky 1978), but have to become ‘scientific’ 
theories through mediation and instruction.  
Language, in the case of science education, would most likely refer to 
terminology and new vocabulary (and not limited to nouns), which provides the primer 
for the child that a new concept needs to be constructed. These new words (Level 1 
on Figure 2.3) provide the placeholder structure which in itself does not provide the 
content of the concept but allows the child to create new mental symbols that leads to 
the acquisition of a new belief (Level 2 on Figure 2.3), a belief that is most likely derived 
from the acquisition of the relevant core beliefs from peripheral beliefs or proto-
conceptual entities as described in the hierarchy of mental entities as depicted in 
Figure 2.3. During the revision of these beliefs we see a change in that some smaller 
beliefs could grow and become more central to reasoning. During development of 
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concepts (Level 3 on Figure 2.3) some larger beliefs could become less prominent 
and make way for the new concept to take a more prominent place in the network of 
interrelated concepts. These initial belief revisions are caused by Bayesian inference 
mechanisms. Learning through thinking mechanisms such as analogy, explanation, 
mental simulation and thought experiments also facilitates new connections between 
previously unrelated concepts. 
The preceding section presented conceptual change theory in a generalised 
manner using examples and citing authors who work in various field. Even though 
much of the relevant literature on conceptual development that has been cited thus far 
stem from the field of science in general it is necessary to also discuss conceptual 
change as it pertains to the selected topics of the vitalist theory of biology as well as 
observational astronomy. The following section describes the conceptual development 
of these two topics.     
 
2.4 SCIENCE EDUCATION AND THE PREDICAMENT OF LEARNERS’ BELIEFS 
AND THEORIES 
One of the more pertinent challenges in science education is that the conceptual 
structures of children are vastly different, depending on their everyday life interactions 
and experiences (Gopnik & Metzhoff 1997) and at odds with those of scientists. If 
science education endeavours to improve the scientific literacy of children, it would be 
prudent for teachers to consider this and to make sure that they know about the 
processes of change in children’s conceptual development; this means that they would 
know how children learn. I argue that teachers could benefit greatly by knowing about 
conceptual development and change in specific areas of science learning, such as 
how children build their knowledge of vitalist biology and of observational astronomy. 
The conceptual systems that adult scientists have constructed are incommensurable 
with the naïve conceptual systems of a child. Science education in schools has to 
foreground teaching that accounts for this incommensurability of concepts. I would 
suggest that the teaching of science could run the risk of individual concepts being 
distorted or ignored and left to fossilise, unless directly addressed.  
Wiser and Smith (2016) argue that conceptual change in science education is 
complicated, due to some terminology in science having different normative scientific 
meaning than what is generally understood by the use of that term in lay conversation. 
These semantic ‘misconceptions’ may violate deeply held beliefs that jeopardises the 
49 
stability of the conceptual system that someone holds. Some examples of these would 
include concepts such as weight and mass; heat and temperature; and theory and 
opinion.  
Another challenge to bridge the incommensurability gap between naïve and 
normative science concepts lies in the constraints that children’s own beliefs or 
presuppositions place on their ability to reform their conceptual understanding in such 
a way that will allow them to progress towards a normative understanding of the 
specific concept. Examples of these constraints will be discussed in the sections that 
follow, in which I will discuss examples of how conceptual development and 
conceptual change relate to specific domains in science education. For the purposes 
of this study I focus on the acquisition of a theory of biology referred to as ‘vitalist 
biology’ as well as the construction of a theory of observational astronomy. Both of 
these theories are included, or at least implied in the South African foundation phase 
curriculum and were the focus of the data for the study (see Chapter 4). Leading 
researchers in science education have also explored these topics. 
 
2.4.1 Vitalist biology 
Carey et al. (2015) argue that children start acquiring a theory of biology from around 
the age of five and that none of the conceptions related to vitalism are innate, as are 
a host of other ‘core knowledges’ such as an approximate number system, a theory of 
mind, and of agency. Vitalism can therefore be seen as an example of theory creation 
in young children. By studying many communities globally, it has been shown that 
children tend to journey on the conceptual road towards an adult conception of vitalism 
between the ages of five and 12. Vitalist biology is regarded as the first biological 
theory in the childhood years and underlies thinking about health, life and death 
(Zaitchik et al. 2016).  
In this theory (in its normative form), environmental elements such as air, water 
and nutrients in the form of food are sources of vital energy necessary for the 
maintenance of all body parts. These vital energies must enter the body and disperse 
throughout the body in order to supply this (vital) energy to the various organs that are 
responsible for sustaining life, growth and health. All organs and metabolic processes 
are specialised, yet, cooperate in physiological structures known as organ systems. 
For the vitalist, that has come to understand the normative concepts of the theory of 
vitalist biology, life is understood to be the maintenance of homeostasis in metabolism 
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and death to be the cessation of these bodily processes. The naïve vitalist is 
challenged by the incommensurability of her naïve concepts in that these 
underdeveloped conceptions do not yet show an understanding of physiology and 
anatomy and that most metabolic processes are unobservable. Naïve theorists 
typically view organs as containers. Zaitchik et al. (2016) argue that the acquisition of 
a normative vitalist biology theory is difficult and prolonged, due to the existence of a 
competing intuitive theory, ‘the agency theory of living things’. 
Scholars in developmental psychology, such as Piaget (1929), Carey (2015), 
and Zaitchik et al. (2016) have conducted interviews with children, probing their 
understanding of vitalism and have found that preschool children define being alive in 
terms of movement or the ability of an object to be active, a phenomenon that Piaget 
termed animism. Preschool children attribute life to inanimate objects such as the sun, 
wind and moving vehicles. They often also deny life to plants seeing that plants are 
not observed to be moving. The contrast between the concepts ‘alive’ and ‘dead’ is 
often mistaken with the contrasts of the concepts ‘animate’ and ‘inanimate’. For young 
children, being alive is equated to being visible, real, existing or present. Their naivety 
goes further - they deem death to be the opposite of their conception of life. In other 
words, they equate death ‘not being visible’, to ‘go away’ or to ‘stop doing things’. A 
more advanced concept of death is observed in some young children who understand 
death to be the end of existence. This, however, is not the same as the normative 
concept of death in that death is the cessation of life. These examples of preschool 
children’s naïve concepts of vitalism show that they don’t have any understanding of 
the body as a conglomerate of organ systems and biological processes that cooperate 
to maintain homeostasis and sustain life.  
The incommensurable difference between a naïve vitalist biology and the 
normative one, lies in concepts that seem analogous in their semantics, yet allow for 
a nuanced differentiation such as the difference between the concepts of ‘dead’ and 
‘inanimate’. Dowker (2014) refers to this type of mismatch as ‘linguistic 
conceptualisation’.  Until children have learned the meaning of ‘animate’ and ‘alive’ 
and how the terms differ, they are likely to be guided by their (still limited) vocabulary 
and semantic categorisation.  A deeper understanding would mean that a child grasps 
that only organic objects can be ‘dead’ as such objects had been able to have been 
alive before. A child would then also grasp that inanimate, or non-living, refers to 
objects that have never had the ability to be alive. For the naïve vitalist, life is identified 
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with animals in so far as animals are fundamentally conceptualised as causal and 
intentional agents. It is only when conceptual change has occurred that children 
subvert this agency of animals with a more mature theory of vitalist biology.  
Carey (2015) shows how the mere accretion of facts does not lead to the 
acquisition of a vitalist theory of biology: She employed the same battery of tests (see 
Chapter 3) on patients suffering from Williams syndrome, comparing the results to the 
results of studies done on children’s acquisition of a theory of vitalist biology. Patients 
who suffer from Williams syndrome have a genetic disorder that leads to mental 
retardation, affecting the sufferer’s ability to learn new facts, but does not hinder the 
sufferer’s language ability, though. In these cases, they were able to retain factual 
information about life and the characteristics of living organisms, but did not achieve 
a vitalist theory of biology as the children from the other studies had done. Actually, 
these adult patients with Williams syndrome responded the same as normally 
developing four-year old children. From these results Carey et al. (2015) has argued 
that domain general mental resources play a role in the acquisition of a vitalist theory 
of biology - seeing that sufferers of Williams syndrome have severely underdeveloped 
domain general cognitive resources, despite their acquisition of language. Domain 
general resources for learning of science are crucial and have been the object of many 
studies (Section 2.5). 
 
2.4.2 Observational astronomy 
Many authors of conceptual change have conducted research on children’s 
understanding of astronomy. Although research studies on this topic in European 
countries as well as the United States and elsewhere are numerous, very little is known 
in the literature of South African children’s conceptual development in the domain of 
observational astronomy. Studying the available literature on children’s understanding 
of astronomical phenomena reveals that not only children, but also adults, have naïve 
conceptual systems and exhibit difficulty in explaining these phenomena (Pfundt & 
Duit 2006; Dove 2002; and Küḉüközer 2007). Trumper (2006) has shown this to be 
the case for many primary school student teachers also. Such naïve concepts of 
observational astronomy are a result of many challenges in the teaching of astronomy. 
These challenges include 1) the representation of massive three dimensional objects 
in space, such as planets, moons and stars, using diagrams drawn on two dimensional 
surfaces such as blackboards and paper (Parker & Heywood 1998); 2) incorrect or 
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misleading diagrams used in learning materials, where the text and diagrams do not 
correspond (Vosniadou 1991; Ojala 1997); and 3) the use of confusing terminology 
that puzzles children and lead to distortion of concepts within their conceptual systems 
(Parker & Heywood 1998).  
The magnitude of the various celestial objects studied in astronomy is so large 
that many people have difficulty relating it to their own experience. This is 
understandable, given the small number of humans who have had the opportunity to 
travel to space and observe these objects and phenomena first hand. Educational aids 
such as simulations, animations shown in 3D cinemas or excursions to a planetarium 
remain limited as access to these resources are constrained by socio-political factors.  
Several researchers have suggested possible solutions to these challenges by 
studying the impact of teaching interventions such as three-dimensional modelling, 
demonstrations, class discussions and projects (Bakas & Mikropoulos 2003; Trundle 
et al. 2007; Barnett & Morran 2002). I argue that these interventions will only prove 
fruitful once the individual learner’s naïve concepts of observational astronomy have 
been identified and the teacher could design learning opportunities that address the 
deeply entrenched beliefs and presuppositions that constrain the development of a 
normative concept. 
Vosniadou (2014) and her research associates have conducted several studies 
on the identification of the naïve concepts that children of varying ages hold in respect 
to their construction of mental models of the shape of the earth as well as their 
understanding of the day/night cycle. She posits that the conceptual development of 
observational astronomy is constrained by the naïve theory of physics that children 
construct, based on their own experiences. Vosniadou (1991) shows that such naïve 
theory of physics is based on a set of beliefs or presuppositions that children hold. She 
asserts that this has been observed in a multitude of international studies. Firstly, 
young children believe that space is arranged in an up/down configuration. For them 
movement of celestial bodies, such as the sun, occurs only on this ‘vertical’ plane. 
Secondly, they believe that gravity works in an up/down gradient which leads to the 
assumption that all objects that are not supported will fall downward in space. 
Therefore, if the earth is not supported, for instance, by a body of water or with soil, it 
will fall downward in this ‘vertical’ plane. The last presupposition as described by 
Vosniadou (1991) is that children believe that all physical objects are solid and cannot 
move autonomously. These presuppositions cause young children (and uneducated 
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adults) to construct mental models of the cosmos that are incommensurable with the 
scientifically accepted explanations and models of the cosmos and might be the effect 
of their constraints, due to underdeveloped causal reasoning and causal inferences 
needed for Bayes net learning algorithms (Gopnik & Schulz 2004). Vosniadou and 
Brewer (1994) note that the typical intuitive theory or naïve mental model that is 
constructed of the earth is that it is flat, motionless and supported (either by water, 
sand, an elephant, four pillars, or a turtle, depending on contextual influences of the 
community); people live only on the top surface of the earth; and the sun and moon 
are located above the earth and cause the day/night cycle due to their movement. This 
is in contrast with the Copernican view of a spherical earth that orbits the sun, which 
Gopnik and Wellman (2012) would argue is learned through the mechanism of 
probabilistic causal models and Bayesian learning. Vosniadou (1991) posits that the 
child’s framework theory of physics constrains the ability to change the naïve mental 
model of the earth to become commensurable with the normative view and that 
children often construct synthetic models that serve as an intermediate model whilst 
cognitively traveling towards the normative model.  
When a child learns new facts that contradict his experience, such as the earth 
being a sphere as opposed to being flat, the child will attempt to assimilate the new 
information in a way that accounts for both sets of information. Vosniadou (1994) and 
her research associates have identified several of these ‘synthetic models’.  
 
Rectangular or disc earth 
Children who construct the naïve model of the earth represent it as a flat rectangle or 
disc that is supported by ground underneath and is surrounded by the sky and other 
celestial objects above. These models are consistent with the experience of the 
children and show little influence from the normative concept.  
 
Dual earth 
In this representation the child constructs two earths. The first being a flat earth on 
which people live and simultaneously a spherical planet suspended in the sky. This 
model allows the child to interpret and attribute the scientific information to another 
planet in the sky whilst not relinquishing their presuppositions based on their own 
observations and experiences and thus construct the second earth as the flat ground 
upon which people live. This model is an example of how accretion of facts leads to 
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the assimilation of the new information into the previously constructed mental model 
and therefore creates a misconception as the new information is inconsistent with the 
naïve model. 
 
Hollow sphere 
The hollow sphere model is another synthetic model that resembles that of a fish bowl. 
The outer ‘layer’ is spherical which contains an inner ‘layer’ that is flat, deep inside the 
sphere. People live on top of the flat piece inside of the sphere. The hollow sphere 
model as well as the flattened sphere model are examples of misconceptions that are 
produced following partial changes in the subnetwork of beliefs and presuppositions. 
There is limited accommodation that occurs in the child’s conceptual system that 
produces these synthetic models. In order to construct the hollow sphere model the 
child suspends the belief that the earth needs to be supported and also releases only 
the earth from the belief that gravity works in the up/down plane. Vosniadou (1994) 
explains that the suspension of presuppositions is the mechanism that restricts the 
range of applicability of the presupposition and thus does not constrain a certain class 
of entities of a domain. The suspension of gravity in the up/down plane is the first step 
in conceptual change that a child undertakes on the journey towards the normative 
concept. The children who construct the hollow sphere model of the earth accept that 
the earth is suspended in space but still attributes the operation of gravity in the 
up/down plane to all objects on the earth. They can therefore not comprehend how 
people (and other objects) can be located on the surface of the sphere without falling 
off the surface. They therefore construct a level ground layer within the sphere on 
which all objects are found.   
 
Flattened sphere 
The flattened sphere has a level top and bottom where people live, but bulges at the 
sides. This model resembles a thick pancake like structure. This misconception is 
formed because of the suspension of multiple presuppositions such as the up/down 
plane that gravity operates on, but they do not suspend the belief that the ground that 
they walk upon is flat. Therefore, people will live on the flat surfaces of the earth. They 
flatten out the top and bottom of the earth to allow for both concepts, that of their naïve 
belief as well as that of the culturally accepted scientific explanation of a spherical 
earth. 
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These synthetic models act as intermediary models that could, with instruction, be 
reformed and revised by suspending or replacing presuppositions to become the 
normative model of the earth. It is difficult for children to construct the normative 
spherical model of the earth because this model violates deeply entrenched 
presuppositions of the framework theory of physics. Vosniadou (1994) states that 
children categorise the earth as a physical object as supposed to an astronomical 
object, and thus apply their presuppositions of general physical objects to the earth. 
In addition to studying the mental models of the shape of the earth, Vosniadou 
and her research associates also studied the mental models children construct with 
regards to the day/night cycle. Vosniadou (1994) posits, as with the case of the shape 
of the earth, that children’s framework theory of physics would constrain the 
development of a normative concept of the day/night cycle. She predicts the initial 
explanation that children would give for the day/night cycle in terms of the movement 
of the sun and its occlusion behind clouds and mountains. She further predicted that 
the process of conceptual change with regards to the day/night cycle would be gradual 
and that many misconceptions or synthetic models would be constructed based on the 
presuppositions that children hold in terms of their framework theory of physics. The 
initial model as constructed by children often range between a small range as children 
explain the day/night cycle either in terms of 1) the sun being occluded by darkness 
or clouds during the night; 2) the sun moves out into space along the up/down plane; 
or 3) the sun and the moon alternate by moving antagonistically. These initial mental 
models were often observed in children that also held the initial model of the shape of 
the earth. Vosniadou (1994) did not find any instance of a child that constructed a 
normative model of the day/night cycle who also constructed a flat earth model. The 
intermediate synthetic models that she observed mostly showed a geocentric 
disposition and ranged from the sun and moon moving up and down to the opposite 
side of the spherical earth; the sun and moon revolving around the spherical earth 
once per day. In some cases she observed a heliocentric model of the earth where 
the earth and the moon revolved around the sun every 24 hours or models where the 
earth rotates either up/down or east/west. 
The presuppositions that originate from children’s framework theory of physics 
also constrains the development of a normative concept of the day/night cycle caused 
by the rotation of the earth on its own axis. These presuppositions are the origin of the 
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initial ‘flat earth’ model constructed by children, which, in turn, constrains the 
acquisition of the normative day/night cycle concept. Vosniadou’s research on 
children’s representations of the day/night cycle has revealed two factors of the 
process of conceptual change; firstly, that there appears to be a sequence in which 
concepts are acquired; and secondly, that the mental model constrains knowledge 
acquisition. My argument, therefore, is two-fold: It is imperative for the authors of 
science curricula to first establish in what sequence concepts should be taught 
throughout schooling; and teachers should then identify the mental models of the 
children as to inform their lesson design. 
The following section discusses the impact of domain general resources such 
as executive functions on the development of domain specific concepts.                
 
2.5 DOMAIN GENERAL RESOURCES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A THEORY OF 
VITALIST BIOLOGY 
Determining the initial state of an infant’s mind has long been the focus of research in 
developmental psychology and many challenges, specifically with regards to 
conceptual change, have been identified. One such challenge is to describe the 
processes and learning mechanisms involved in the acquisition and subsequent 
change of naïve concepts, or intuitive theories. Intuitive theories (as discussed in 
Section 2.3.2) are unique to specific domains and provide explanatory and predictive 
reasoning that allows children to make meaning of their observations and interactions 
with their environment. They establish frameworks for conceptual development. These 
framework theories constrain conceptual development. As shown in Section 2.4.2 the 
framework theories (or synthetic mental models) such as the earth being flat or the 
antagonistic movement of the sun and moon during the day/night cycle will constrain 
the development of other normative concepts such as gravity, the hemispheres of the 
earth, and seasonal changes.  
With regard to this issue, I have argued that teachers should identify these 
domain specific intuitive theories that learners hold before designing lessons. Domain 
specific learning mechanisms can alter intuitive theories and drive conceptual 
development.  Such mechanisms, however, are supported by a range of domain 
general cognitive resources. The domain general cognitive resources that hold value 
for conceptual change are executive functions (EF) which are cognitive processes that 
are involved in all cognitive work that demands novel and innovative thinking as well 
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as non-automatic operations (Diamond 2013). EF’s bring about cognitive actions such 
as planning, self-control, sustained attention and cognitive control. Thus, a young 
learner may have a sturdy domain specific intuitive theory that is not easily swayed, 
unless teachers have some idea of what else is involved in a child’s cognitive activity 
– such as EFs. 
Three core processes of EF have been identified: Working memory which 
comprise the processes responsible for sorting and updating information; inhibition 
which refer to processes responsible for constraining the activation of competing 
responses or conflicting representations; and set-shifting which are processes 
responsible for the flexibility to select from a multitude of relevant sources of 
information. Other processes, such as reasoning, deliberate and conscious planning 
and problem solving are thought to be combinations of the three core EF processes. 
Zaitchik et al. (2016) explains that EF plays a role in the academic success of children 
and posits that EF can be a greater indicator of school readiness than other factors, 
such as reading skills, maths skills or IQ. They explain this finding by proposing that 
children with better developed EF pay more attention at home and in school, which 
allows them to process more information than their peers, who have less developed 
EF. It is also possible that children with better developed EF are able to express what 
they know better than the other children. Well-developed EF are regarded as the driver 
of self-regulation in learning. 
EF competence can be used to predict the conceptual reasoning performance 
of children (Pagani, Fitzpatrick & Barnett 2013). EF are regarded as one of the 
essential components that allow for conceptual change, given that the mechanisms of 
conceptual change, such as ‘bootstrapping’ (see Section 2.3.3); the generation and 
evaluation of hypotheses; construction of mental models; and flexibly shifting between 
theories as a result of changing context, rely on processes such as working memory, 
inhibition and set-shifting. If we are to address the challenges that children face when 
learning, it is important that teachers have a nuanced understanding of not only the 
domain specific learning mechanisms, but also of the influence that EF would have on 
the ability of children to change existing theories. I argue that teachers who have this 
nuanced understanding of the interrelationship between domain general cognitive 
resources and domain specific learning mechanisms would be able to design learning 
opportunities that may hold more promise for conceptual change. 
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In science education, and of interest to this study, Zaitchik et al. (2014) 
conducted a series of tests to determine whether EF could predict a child’s theorising 
of vitalist biology. The participants in these studies were asked to complete a battery 
of tests that attempted to identify their acquisition of a theory of vitalist biology as well 
as a battery of tests that attempted to describe the state of the participants’ EF’s 
development. It was found that the participants’ score on the EF battery of tests 
significantly predicted their performance in the vitalist biology tests. Zaitchik et al. 
(2014) posit that children with higher EF scores will be able to advance more rapidly 
in constructing a theory of vitalist biology, given that EF supports theory-building 
learning mechanisms (in general). To further investigate the possibility that EFs 
support domain specific learning mechanisms, Bascandziev et al. (2015) conducted 
an intervention study that showed that individual differences in EF predicted children’s 
benefit from theory-relevant (specific domain) training, such as for understanding of 
the characteristics of  ‘living objects’. In this study the authors conducted an 
intervention study that tested children, using the biology battery of tests (see Chapter 
3) as well as a set of control questions on ‘fun facts’ in the subject of biology.  
During the intervention the children were instructed on vitalism, using a 
curriculum designed to focus on basic anatomy and physiology of organ systems and 
how these systems function cooperatively to support and facilitate movement, health 
and growth. During the post-tests the participants completed the same set of biology 
and fun fact tests that were administered during the pre-test. In a subsequent post-
test the participants completed EF and semantic fluency tasks as well as a receptive 
vocabulary test. The researchers found that the individual differences in EF predict the 
benefit the participants would gain from training that is relevant to the specific theory, 
in this case a theory of vitalist biology. The majority of participants showed 
improvement, some to a lesser degree, while some participants improved 
substantially.  
From this study the authors argue that EF plays an important role in conceptual 
change and attribute the improvement in the participants’ biology test scores to their 
ability to pay better attention during the training sessions. This is a case that exhibits 
the benefits of curriculum design that values the specific instruction of one of biology’s 
‘big ideas’ and shows that the mere accretion of facts do not lead to conceptual 
change. The South African foundation phase curriculum does not explicitly include the 
teaching of a theory of vitalist biology, just as it doesn’t include the explicit teaching of 
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a theory of physics and I argue for the inclusion of these theories in not only the school 
curriculum but also in the curriculum of teacher training programmes. 
Other studies have attempted to determine what the role of EF is in the 
expression of an individual’s theory of vitalist biology. Carey et al. (2015) hypothesise 
that EF are employed in the recall of vitalist information in that mature ‘vitalists’ would 
be required to inhibit their intuitive responses to a set of questions on animism and, 
thus, have a delayed response to these questions. Thomson-Shill et al. (2009) found 
that college students make the same errors under speeded conditions as their 
elementary school counterparts under non-speeded conditions. These errors include 
the attribution of life to inanimate objects and denied life to plants. It was also found 
that professors of biology show a delayed response to questions that require them to 
attribute life to plants compared to their response time to attribute life to a dog. This 
shows that intuitive theories remain in cognitive structures throughout our lifetime and 
require EF to inhibit the expression of these naïve theories in favour of the normative 
theory.  
Zaitchik and Solomon (2008) found that the ‘health’ of an individual’s EF also 
has an influence on the expression of vitalist biology. In a study that researched the 
understanding of vitalist biology of patients in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease, 
they found that impaired EF leads to a worse performance on the battery of vitalist 
biology tests. The same was found when comparing the performance of elderly 
subjects to young adults, showing that the degradation of EF leads to the inability to 
express a theory of vitalist biology adequately (Tardiff et al. 2015). From these studies 
it is evident that instruction, based solely on the subject content (such as fun facts of 
biology), without considering the influence of not only domain specific learning 
mechanisms, but also the associated domain general resources, such as EF, that 
support these mechanisms, could prove fruitless.  On this view, I argue for the 
inclusion of EF along with domain specific learning mechanisms, and how these 
domains interact, in science teacher education training programmes.   
Except for these domain general resources, language also contributes vastly to 
the development of concepts. It manifests at the intersect of general- and specific 
domains of cognition.           
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2.6 A LINGUISTIC ‘GAZE’ ON CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND CONCEPTUAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Much of communication for learning takes place through language in both its tools of 
sounds and written symbols in a multitude of configurations. The sound system 
(phonology) is at first a child’s only linguistic tool. Brink (2017) and Shingenge (2017) 
have shown how the written symbols of language (its orthography) depend on the 
child’s knowledge and use of the smallest unit of phonology, namely its phonemes. 
Dehaene (2009), in neuroscientific studies, has found that these smallest units, when 
represented in a graphemic form of meaning, originate in what he has termed the 
brain’s ’letterbox’ and that these graphemes are the building blocks of children’s 
reading competence.  But, first they have to know the sounds of the language, which 
they learn by audition. I refer to these small soundbites, because there is evidence 
that phonological variables contribute to, among others, the farther development of the 
approximate number system (Dehaene 2011; Spelke 2000) with which humans are 
innately endowed.  There is thus, already at birth, the probability that language as a 
sound system is a building block for language as a meaning system.  
Gopnik and Metlzoff (1997) and Gopnik (2003) propose that during the 
interaction between young children and their social environment, children not only hear 
the individual sounds of their first language, but also learn words and parts of words 
and how these connect in phrases and sentences. They thus also learn, through 
interaction, how syntax and word order operate to make meaning beyond single 
words. Dowker and Nuerk (2016) go as far as saying that between the semantics of 
words and sentences, there is a linguistic concept that forms a pathway to different 
parts of a brain and so form concepts, such as ‘water’, ‘mother’, food’ ‘walk’ or ‘eat’. 
My argument is that this is almost exactly how children develop concepts from their 
natural environment. They encounter phenomena, events and ideas, they hear spoken 
language that refer to these and they begin to connect words with concepts. Vygotsky 
(1986; Ragpot 2013) referred to this phenomenon as the ‘place’ where ‘scientific 
concepts’ and ‘spontaneous concepts’ meet. Henning (2012) has argued that the 
learning of what appears to be ‘senseless’ words and sentences, may ultimately 
coalesce into understanding and the ‘autonomy’ of the words as authentic symbolic 
representations of their meaning (in the scientific sense). Her study of adolescents’ 
use of terminology to express their conceptions of ‘light’ as a physical phenomenon 
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showed how the words and sentences came to meet after five years of high school 
science education.  
Words act as ‘placeholder’ structures in conceptual development (see Section 
2.3.2) and provide a substrate for the semantics of the concept in which to grow. Xu 
(2016) reviews three types of mechanisms of learning and developmental change and 
discusses language learning as a vehicle for conceptual change. These learning 
mechanisms have been discussed in Section 2.3.3. She argues that infants’ initial 
knowledge needs to be in the correct format for language learning, otherwise some 
developmental changes have to occur. She states that infants begin acquiring the 
semantics of language toward the end of their first year and that the various parts of 
language provide these ‘placeholder structures’ that enable conceptual development. 
Xu (2016) proposes that the core knowledge systems rely on language to become 
discrete, but cannot achieve this unless deep conceptual change occurs. This requires 
children to construct new resources to represent concepts and eventually emerge as 
a fluent speaker of the language with vocabulary and structures in concert with, for 
instance, the discourse of science (in the home). Katz and Fodor (1963:171) describe 
a fluent speaker’s mastery of his language as an individual who “can produce and 
understand the sentences of his language, including indefinitely many that are wholly 
novel to him.” The individual becomes a producer as well as a consumer of language 
that expresses their conceptual understanding in novel ways.  
The role of language in conceptual change has been debated in the fields of 
linguistics, philosophy, and psychology (Boroditsky 2011; Carey 2009; Fodor 1983; 
Whorf 1956). Carey (2009) distinguishes between two broad positions on the influence 
that language learning has on concepts. She first describes language learning that 
allows children to represent concepts that they previously could not represent. This 
she terms Quinian (or strong) linguistic determinism. The second, she describes as 
language learning that clarifies the concepts that children already hold and terms this 
as weak linguistic influence. Gentner and Goldin-Meadow (2003) refer to this as 
“language as a lens” and as “language as a tool” respectively. Language that provides 
novel ways to represent the world and by implication, enables learning mechanisms 
such as ‘bootstrapping’, is seen as a new lens through which to make sense of the 
world; or language has the ability to slightly alter representations that already exist.  
Levine and Baillargeon (2016) adds a third position to the debate and argues 
that regardless of the influence that language has on concepts, whether it is weak or 
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strong, is influenced by the amount and quality of language input that the child is 
exposed to. They posit that this could affect the timing and nature of the influence that 
language learning has on the relevant concept. They term this “language as data”. 
These three positions present a generic approach to the question of how language 
influences concepts, but Carey (2009) argues that no one answer would be sufficient 
to explain the totality of language’s influence on thought as language seems to play 
multiple roles in learning. She proposes that each case of conceptual development be 
studied separately to establish how language influences each specific domain. 
In their review of Carey’s work on numerical development Levine and 
Baillargeon (2016) found strong empirical support for Carey’s claim that language 
serves as a lens that makes possible new representations that children could not 
previously represent due to the incommensurability of the language associated with 
conceptual system 1 (see Section 2.3.2). They also found evidence that language 
sometimes serves as a tool that enhances existing representations. They furthermore 
emphasise that access to relevant language input – language as data – can influence 
the course of children’s conceptual development. These authors are in agreement with 
Carey, that research into the contribution of language on the conceptual development 
should focus on specific cases as to advance our understanding of conceptual 
development in general. I support this view and recommend that the same be done 
for specific cases in science education in South Africa. 
A challenge in South Africa, as with many developing countries, is the great 
diversity of languages spoken by its citizens. South Africa has eleven official 
languages, but the language of teaching is mostly English and Afrikaans from Grade 
4 onwards. Some of the African languages like isiZulu, Sesotho, and isiXhosa are 
chosen as the medium of instruction for the foundation phase only. Xu (2016) explains 
that even though the syntax of various languages may differ, the semantics associated 
with the words and phrases should align to represent the same concept. The concept 
of photosynthesis should be the same regardless whether it is expressed in Mandarin, 
English, or isiZulu. The challenge for science education lies in underdeveloped 
scientific terminology in the African languages. This results in children learning 
scientific vocabulary only in English but the rest of the conceptual construction occurs 
in their home language. This ‘code switching’ (or ‘interlanguaging’) requires the use of 
added cognitive resources, both general and specific, which creates a disparity 
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between home language English speakers and children who use English as an 
additional language. 
 I argue that if we are to investigate the role that language plays in conceptual 
development for science education in South Africa, we need to study the individual 
cases with regard to 1) each content domain of science and 2) in every language that 
these content domains are taught. The scale of such an investigation would be 
enormous, but still wouldn’t address how teachers would be able to use the knowledge 
generated from such studies. Given that each context is unique, teachers would need 
to be trained to determine the role that language plays in the conceptual development 
involved with each of their science lessons, and design appropriate learning 
opportunities using the identified language elements to improve the probability that 
conceptual change would occur. 
Thus far, this chapter included discussions of various aspects that enable 
conceptual development, but does so largely in a universal sense. Sections 2.7 and 
2.8 are dedicated to ‘geosocial’ context-specific matters that informed not only my 
thinking, but also the design of the study. When studying science education in a 
primary school in Soweto, Johannesburg it is important to sketch the background and 
current state of the science education landscape, in particular that of science 
education in the foundation phase.         
 
2.7 THE STATE OF SCIENCE IN THE FOUNDATION PHASE 
When studying the South African foundation phase curriculum it is evident that the 
science content is to an extent ‘hidden’ and not made explicit as is the case for the 
literacy and mathematics content (South Africa. Department of Basic Education, 
2011). The topics that can be categorised as science concepts or science knowledge 
can be found spread thinly within the ‘beginning knowledge’ strand of the life skills 
subject. The curriculum that preceded the current policy gave foundation phase 
teachers much more guidance in teaching science as this curriculum had a separate 
policy on science education which had a strong focus on learning through science 
process skills and allowed teachers greater autonomy in developing lesson topics by 
using the curriculum documents in tandem as tools to design lessons (Ross & Cartier 
2015). The current curriculum provides very little guidance on how to teach the 
prescribed topics and skills.  
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The life skills subject is viewed by many teachers as less important when 
compared to the mathematics and literacy subjects (du Preez 2016) and several 
authors (Krogh & Morehouse 2014; Patrick & Mantzicopoulus 2015; Slavin et al. 2014; 
Smolleck & Nordgren 2014) suggest that the low priority given to science within the 
life skills curriculum may lead to science as a subject being marginalised even further. 
This matter is not unique to South Africa but is witnessed in many countries which do 
not give much precedence to science in their curricula for the early grades (Albion & 
Spence 2013; Campbell & Chittleborough 2014). Complicating the matter of teaching 
science in the foundation phase is the fact that the life skills curriculum is not available 
in many of the African languages including isiZulu which, apart from English, is, 
colloquially, the most widely spoken language in the country. This presents a 
challenge for teachers who are required to teach using these African languages as the 
formalised language of instruction. The current curriculum does not offer much 
guidance on how to teach the ‘beginning knowledge’ part of the life skills curriculum 
and expects very little autonomy from the teacher.  
The curriculum does expect that the teacher teaches the life skills component 
in an integrated fashion that focuses on making learning reflect life so that the learners 
can see the value of why it is taught. It requires that content and skills be presented in 
such a way that learning is relevant and meaningful. Unfortunately, the curriculum 
does not provide sufficient guidance on the types of activities, nor does it provide 
guidance on how science should be integrated with the rest of the curriculum (Beni, 
Stears & James 2017). I argue that if the curriculum expects of teachers to integrate 
science in this fashion it should also be written in such a way as to give clearer 
guidance on how to achieve these objectives. The current Grade R curriculum does 
not even represent any science concepts in ways that conform to the criteria of 
scientific concepts which includes simple scientific concepts.  
Compounding the challenges presented by the current curriculum structure, 
foundation phase teachers are reluctant to teach science (Abell & Roth 1991; Appleton 
2003; Mellado, Blanco & Ruiz 1998; Smith & Neale 1989) and do not feel confident in 
teaching science and site their teacher training programmes as being inadequate in 
preparing them as teachers (Sibaya & Sibaya 2008). Southerland, Sowell and Enderle 
(2011) states that when teachers do not feel confident it often leads to avoidance 
behaviour and Appleton (2008) posits that this lack in confidence causes teachers to 
teach science in the same manner that they would teach other subjects. Science 
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learning is complex because naïve concepts about the natural world are not easily 
changed to scientific accurate concepts (Smith 2007; Vosniadou 2007; Carey 2000; 
Chi, Slotta & de Leew 1994; diSessa 1993). Therefore, science teaching requires a 
robust PCK of its own. What is typically observed in foundation phase science lessons 
is a teacher centred approach and in some cases include hands-on activities but these 
activities seldom build connections to science ideas or practice (Roth 2014). 
The lack of confidence of the teacher can be attributed to their lack of science 
content knowledge (Akerson & Flanigan 2000; Appleton 2008; Borko 1993; Smith & 
Neale 1989; Waters-Adams 2006) and their limited background in science often leads 
to a negative attitude towards teaching science (Riegle-Crumb et al. 2015; Smolleck 
& Nordgren 2014; Tenaw 2014). To remedy this Smolleck and Nordgren (2014) as 
well as Kazempour and Amirshokoohi (2013) suggest that teachers should first 
experience positive science learning themselves if they are to improve their confidence 
in teaching science. It therefore, places the onus on teacher training institutions to 
ensure that pre-service foundation phase teachers experience positive science 
learning opportunities during their training. 
Most South African foundation phase teacher training programmes include very 
little science in their curriculum. Most programmes only teach science content for one 
semester and mostly entail the learning of science content. In order for teachers to 
teach science adequately they not only require science knowledge across all content 
areas but also need a good understanding of the nature of science as well as PCK 
grounded in methodology unique to the teaching of science (Nowicki, Sullivan-Watts, 
Shim, Young & Pockalny 2013; Shulman 1987; Schneider & Stern 2010; Qablan & 
DeBaz 2015). 
The policy that informs the training of teachers, the minimum requirements for 
teacher education (MRTEQ), states the types of learning needed for teachers are 
“associated with the acquisition, integration and application of knowledge for teaching 
purposes” and requires of teachers to obtain “specialised PCK, which includes 
knowing how to present concepts, methods and rules of a specific discipline in order 
to create appropriate learning opportunities for diverse learners, as well as how to 
evaluate progress.” (South Africa. Department of Higher Education and Training, 
2015). I argue that many foundation phase teacher training programmes fall well short 
of these requirements when training teachers in science education. If we are to train 
teachers who can sufficiently teach science we need to ensure that the teacher training 
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curricula make connections between the theoretical components of teacher education 
and the practical realities of the classroom whilst encouraging critically reflective 
practices. This could enhance the student teachers’ professional practice as well as 
their self-efficacy, values and views as transformational science teachers (Lewis, 
Dema & Harshbarger 2014). 
South Africa is experiencing a shortage of professionals with mathematics and 
science skills to meet the workforce requirement of industry, commerce, health and 
education (Evans 2013; Hwenha 2013; Spaull 2013). If we wish to stimulate interest 
in science as a possible career choice for learners and cultivate scientifically literate 
citizens, we need to first introduce science earlier in the curriculum in a more robust 
manner and secondly equip the foundation phase teachers to teach science in such a 
manner that will ensure that children have science knowledge, science process skills, 
values and attitudes that will enable them to manage in a scientific and technological 
world. 
If we are to improve the state of foundation phase science education it would 
serve a pragmatic purpose to study cases from other countries whit a proven track 
record of excellence in science education. For the following section I discuss the 
success of Finnish science education.            
 
2.8 EXCELLENCE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION: FINLAND AS ROLE MODEL 
To discuss examples of exemplary science education, one also has to discuss it in 
tandem with the education system in which it is lodged. Education systems embody 
core values and aspire to specific educational ideals. In a comparison of the science 
curriculum in China and in Finland, Wang et al. (2018) explain that the Chinese 
curriculum resembles that of the Anglo-American curriculum tradition and Finland’s 
curriculum resembles that of the European-Scandinavian Bildung-Didaktik tradition. 
Both these traditions offer theories and practices that are prevalent in western 
countries, but differ in their philosophical goals. Nevertheless, although these 
traditions share learning and teaching goals, they differ in their aims for teaching and 
learning, the roles of teachers, and the function of the national curriculum (Wang et al. 
2018).  
I agree with Wang et al. (2018) when they argue that the Chinese curriculum 
has much in common with the Anglo-American tradition, which has a strong focus on 
standardisation and accountability in the education system and includes some 
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practices that continue to appear as  ‘transmission of knowledge’, the learning of skills 
and methods, problem-solving, inquiry and so forth.  This is in some contrast to the 
aim of the Bildung-Didaktik tradition of holistic education of the individual. The 
curriculum and teaching plans of the Anglo-American tradition are detailed and well-
articulated and expects of schools to achieve the stated objectives of the ‘common 
core’ and ensure that all the content included in the curriculum is covered. Teachers’ 
performance is measured by assessing the learners’ learning outcomes and could 
result in teachers becoming passive agents of the education system who are expected 
to follow the curriculum and implement its requirements rigidly.  
By contrast, the Bildung-Didaktik tradition aims at empowering citizens to be 
capable of participating in society whilst reconstructing society and living successfully 
(Autio 2013). This tradition values the teachers’ academic freedom and respects their 
autonomy, while emphasising the need to converse with learners about the subject 
matter in every lesson. These teachers are considered to be professional experts and 
entrusted with complete freedom to implement the curriculum and their performance 
is not only measured based on the learning outcomes of the learners. This is possibly 
a leading factor in the Finnish success evident in international benchmarking 
assessments such as PISA 2015 (OECD 2018). 
It could be argued that most countries’ school curricula lean closer to one of 
these traditions than the other and the question arises which one of these traditions 
would serve its citizens best in the 21st century. I argue that the aim of education should 
be to prepare people to be self-sufficient, participatory citizens of an ever changing 
global community. This view aligns closer to that of the Bildung-Didaktik tradition which 
I believe to be the most appropriate philosophy to adopt if we are to adequately 
prepare learners for life in the 21st century. Globally this topic has become an important 
subject of discussion when considering educational reform and international 
organisations such as the European Union value education as the means by which 
citizens would acquire the key competencies to live in a rapidly changing world (Voogt 
& Roblin 2012). These competencies do not only require the enrichment of the 
cognitive domain, but also promotes the acquisition of skills, values as well as 
knowledge. Incorporating these competencies in existing curricula presents many 
challenges which several countries have attempted to address by constructing 
frameworks for the teaching of these competencies.  
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Finland and China have both recently introduced their frameworks and I briefly 
summarise the aims of both these frameworks. The reform of the Chinese curriculum 
aims to cultivate the individual as a whole by emphasising core competencies in the 
areas of learning to learn; healthy living; citizenship; practice, creativity and innovation; 
cultural heritage; and scientific literacy. Finland has framed their core competencies 
as thinking and learning to learn; cultural competence, interaction, and self-
expression; managing daily life and taking care of yourself; multi-literacy; competence 
in information and communication technology; working-life competency and 
entrepreneurship; participation, involvement and building a sustainable future (Finnish 
National Board of Education 2016). These focus areas are applicable in all subject 
areas and aligns greatly with the aim of developing Bildung (German for the whole 
person). This then begs the question of what the role of science education is in 
supporting learners in acquiring these 21st century competencies.  
Science provides intersects for the acquisition of core competencies as the 
nature of science as well as scientific literacy addresses many of the focus areas as 
described by the Chinese as well as the Finnish frameworks. In both these countries 
science is taught as an integrated subject in the foundation phase and includes subject 
domains such as physics, chemistry, biology, geography, technology and engineering. 
This is in stark contrast with the South African curriculum (see Section 2.7) that does 
not include science to such a degree.   
The Finnish approach to education has proven worthy as example of 
excellence, given that their reform of education policy as the key to social and 
economic development has led to them being regarded as one of the most developed 
countries. Sahlberg (2007) attributes the success of the Finnish education system to 
an accumulation of various education policy reforms that did not follow global trends 
such as standardisation and centralisation of education; greater focus on numeracy 
and literacy; and consequential accountability. Instead Finland opted for flexibility and 
loose standards facilitated by a decentralised education system; broad learning 
combined with creativity; and intelligent accountability with trust based 
professionalism. Schleicher (2006:9) suggests that the success of the Finnish 
education system can be attributed to, among other factors, “the capacity of policy 
makers to pursue reform in ways that went beyond optimizing existing structures, 
policies and practices, and moved towards fundamentally transforming the paradigms 
and beliefs that underlay educational policy and practice until 1960’s.” Sahlberg (2007) 
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argues that several factors of the Finnish education system contributed to the good 
performance of its schools and learners. These factors include 1) the same basic 
school education for all children; 2) well trained teachers; 3) intelligent accountability; 
4) a culture of trust; and 5) sustainable leadership.  
The Finnish science curriculum supports the greater education policies of the 
country by aligning closely with the Bildung-Didaktik tradition by including more than 
just science knowledge and science skills commonly referred to as ‘scientific literacy’ 
and ‘scientific inquiry’. Key words such as ‘well-being’; ‘community’; and ‘sustainable 
development’ are prevalent in Finland’s science curriculum reflecting the broader aims 
and values of this knowledge society. Throughout the Finnish science curriculum 
emphasis is placed on adding an affective layer to that of knowledge and skills. Wang 
et al. (2018) show two examples of the additional focus on values and morals by 
comparing the Finnish science curriculum to that of the Chinese science curriculum 
and show that ICT is described as a tool for learner presentation in the Chinese 
curriculum, while the Finnish science curriculum mentions the ethical use of ICT. 
Secondly, they describe the category of communication, for the Chinese, has a greater 
emphasis on the knowledge and skills to communicate information while, for the 
Finnish, the communication of emotion is of import. For the Finnish, the science 
curriculum forms part of the greater educational whole and strives to aid in the 
development of citizens who can independently and voluntarily participate in their 
society while the science curriculum in China is for the benefit of the individual who 
becomes a tool in building the society. Modern science education should not only 
strive to cultivate the mere increase of science knowledge but should also cultivate 
reflective citizens who grasp the nature of science and who are intrigued by the ideas 
of science which in turn enables these citizens to engage with science related 
challenges at both the personal and greater community level (Ferreira & Morais 2013).                               
The inclusion of a more robust science teacher education curriculum in 
foundation phase teacher education programmes that focus on not only the learning 
of science content and associated pedagogies, but also on the importance of 
developing scientific literacy that can be applied to solving personal challenges as well 
as the challenges of the community, holds the potential to bolster the aim of preparing 
children for life in the 21st century. The South African foundation phase teacher is 
considered a generalist teacher and is required to teach content from a wide range of 
disciplines and subjects. I argue that these teachers are positioned optimally within 
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the education system as to introduce and establish scientific reasoning and problem 
solving. Frost (2010) identified types of knowledge that science teachers need to 
possess in order to adequately teach science. These include content knowledge, 
epistemological knowledge, knowledge of teaching and assessment strategies, 
curriculum knowledge, knowledge about student learning in science, attitudes toward 
science as well as attitudes toward their own professional development. These types 
of knowledge align with the knowledge types for teachers as stated by Shulman (1986) 
and presents a unique opportunity to integrate these knowledge types in foundation 
phase education programmes given the need for a more general PCK of foundation 
phase teachers. I argue that this integration of science as well as the inclusion of 
cognitive development and conceptual change in foundation phase teacher education 
programmes could assist greatly in training teachers competent in fostering the 
Bildung-Didaktik traditions.      
 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
From the discussion of conceptual change and conceptual development it is evident 
that change within conceptual networks are complex and require of teachers to nit only 
know science content and associated pedagogies but also a nuanced understanding 
of the mechanisms involved in establishing conceptual change. For foundation phase 
teachers this holds many challenges and would require intensive intervention, in policy 
as well as in practice, to empower them with the needed skills to design and execute 
lessons that would be of value to the development of science concepts of their 
learners. Before these interventions can be undertaken we first need evidence that 
foundation phase learners’ conceptual development aligns with those of children as 
presented in international literature. The remainder of this report describes my attempt 
at designing and executing a study that would confirm whether the conceptual 
development of children in the foundation phase, of one particular South African 
school, indeed align with what is known from international studies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
3.1 A CASE OF EARLY GRADE LEARNERS’ THEORIES 
I conducted this study as a practitioner researcher (Petker 2018; Colwell & Richardson 
2002) who wished to investigate, a part of my practice as a teacher educator, the 
theories that young children hold. Because I train teachers for the early grades, I 
advise them to read up on what leading science education researchers write about 
young children’s learning. However, I realised that we train future teachers without 
knowing much about the children who are in the primary school which serves as their 
‘pedagogical laboratory’ (Henning et al. 2015; Gravett & Ramsaroop 2017) on the 
university campus. Thus, to ensure that they “know the learner” as part of their 
foundation for pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) as described by Shulman (1986, 
1987), I embarked on a study that could yield some empirical knowledge of what the 
foundation phase children typically know.  
I designed the case as a “bounded system” (Stake 2008, 2013; Yin 2013), 
consisting of the young learners in their school context, specifically their expressions 
of understanding about observational astronomy and vitalist biology. The unit of 
analysis defined the boundedness of the system, in which I wanted to recognise that 
the children’s (individual) understanding is also nested within a sociocultural and 
educational reality that refracts their conceptual development in specific ways (Figure 
3.1). This is the reason for utilising activity system analysis (ASA) as an analytical and 
interpretive device. This tool is discussed in Section 3.10.  
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Figure 3.1 A child’s learning in a specific sociocultural- and linguistic reality 
 
In planning the study I contemplated whether I should assess the children’s knowledge 
in conventional classroom assessment mode, but realised that the modality would 
have to include some experiential investigation and also some elements of Homo faber 
– the children would have to not only talk about the topic, but should also see some 
demonstration that could grip their attention while, additionally, also make an artefact 
to explain their conceptions and their theories. I then opted to include science events 
and clinical task interviews as modality for data collection. I had by then defined the 
boundaries of the case; it would be about the unit of analysis (the children’s 
conceptions) and related data that would reflect their current knowledge, focusing on 
the research question from different angles.  
The research question that was posed at the outset of the study was about 
early grade children’s conceptions (thus also their theories) of observable astronomy 
and vitalist biology. To address the research question and the problem as described 
in Section 1.2, I needed to develop a means to gather and interpret data that would 
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provide insights into what Carey (2009) refers to as ‘conceptual systems’ of the 
foundation phase learners – in this instance, the systems that children had constructed 
about astronomy and living organisms. I also wanted to find out if there had been any 
progress in the forming of these science concepts during three years of learning and 
development in the foundation phase from Grade R to Grade 3. The research question 
firstly asked what learners in the foundation phase know about these two topics and, 
secondly, if there are any differences or similarities in this knowledge throughout  the 
grades of the foundation phase. To this end I designed a study in which I could 
investigate the topic by way of qualitative methods to obtain rich, descriptive data. 
Specific benefits of qualitative data are summarised by Miles and Huberman (1994): 
 
Qualitative data … are a source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and 
explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts…. Then too, good 
qualitative data are more likely to lead to serendipitous findings and to new 
integrations; they help researchers to get beyond initial conceptions and to 
generate or revise conceptual frameworks. Finally, the findings from qualitative 
studies have a quality of “undeniability”. Words, especially organized into 
incidents or stories, have a concrete, vivid, meaningful flavour that often proves 
far more convincing to a reader – another researcher, a policy maker, a 
practitioner – than pages of summarized numbers (Miles & Huberman 1994:1). 
 
For this study it was important to obtain data that could generate insight into the 
participants’ evolving conceptions and get beyond initial ones - my own as well as 
those of the children. To explore their understanding, and to ultimately interpret it, I 
needed to describe the conceptual framework within which I was lodging the study. I 
was hoping to find some ‘undeniable’ evidence of what the children’s theories of two 
parts of their natural environment are. The reasoning for the design of the study, 
specifically the approach to data analysis, was guided by an overview of the qualitative 
data analysis process as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994, 2013). I was 
attracted to their systematic rendering of how to plan this type of study, also as the 
original edition’s revised version in 2013 sets it out. In Figure 3.2 I show an adapted 
and simplified version of their qualitative data analysis process.  
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Figure 3.2: The flow of the research (adapted from Miles and Huberman 1994:308) 
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The figure illustrates a sequence of, as well as the relationship between the various 
aspects of a research study. The unit of analysis (Trochim 2006) of the study, namely 
foundation phase children’s notions of observational astronomy and vitalist biology, 
provided a platform for the combination of data. The conceptual framework for this 
focus has been discussed in Section 2.3 and describes how conceptual development 
and conceptual change theory have guided my thinking about how children 
formulate/express science concepts.  
What needs further discussion, however, is the choice of analytical framework 
for the study. I discuss cultural, historical, and activity theory (CHAT) as the ‘gaze’ 
(Wardekker 2008) on the sociocultural system in which the child participants live and 
learn (see Section 3.10). First I argue that a sample of specific children, who speak 
isiZulu, were selected for the second phase of the study, while the first phase included 
entire cohorts in the school, where Sesotho is also a medium of instruction and where 
linguistic ‘code-switching’ is a regular phenomenon. 
 
3.2 SAMPLING 
One of the challenges of designing qualitative research is that the researcher could 
find himself attempting to describe a phenomenon so comprehensively that no 
significance can be found in the description of the phenomenon (Merriam 2016). It is 
necessary to set clear boundaries when conducting a qualitative case study, to set a 
particular focus, and to reduce the grain size of a study to fit the required scope. Miles 
and Huberman (1994) regard decisions about design as a form of ‘anticipatory data 
reduction’, as these decisions constrain later analysis by excluding certain 
relationships and variables and including only the variables and relationships that are 
of significance to responding to the research question. In this view, qualitative study 
designs are seldom copyable, as every qualitative study should be uniquely designed 
to answer the research questions of the particular study in a very particular way, 
especially if the ‘grain size’ is small. For replicability purposes the ‘chain of evidence’ 
of research is recorded and the reliability is strengthened, though.  Decisions 
concerning the sample of an inquiry is one aspect of a study that assists in binding 
and focussing the research. Miles and Huberman (1994:27) say qualitative 
researchers “usually work with small samples of people, nested in their context and 
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studied in depth…” In this section I describe the people who participated in the study, 
as well as their context. 
A township school in the South West of Johannesburg was purposefully 
selected as research site, given the close relationship between the management of 
the school and the university research centre where this study is nested. The school 
is situated on the university premises with the aim of monitoring the integration of 
teaching theory and practice as well as researching all aspects pertaining to schooling, 
i.e. the learner’s academic development, teacher mentoring and the development of 
student teachers’ PCK (Loukomies et al. 2018). The school is a research-based 
teacher education site as well as a fully-fledged public primary school. Classroom 
populations comprise learners, student teachers, as well as teachers from the local 
community. The primary languages spoken in the community is IsiZulu and Sesotho, 
-  hence, the creation of two classes per grade in the foundation phase, each divided 
based on the language of teaching being either isiZulu or Sesotho. English is the 
language of teaching as from Grade 4; however, certain subjects, like mathematics 
are taught in English (with translations and code-switching) from Grade 1. Learners in 
this school come from a modest, relatively poor socio-economic background with 
many parents being informally employed or holding working class jobs. The school 
model is based on the Finnish practice school idea, where student teachers obtain 
practical knowledge in authentic classrooms under the supervision and mentoring of 
an experienced mentor teacher (Gravett & Ramsaroop 2015). Permission was granted 
to conduct interviews with the foundation phase learners of the school and do perform 
the science demonstrations.  
Qualitative sampling is often theory driven (Miles & Huberman 1994; Henning, 
Van Rensburg & Smit 2004) and should be informed by the conceptual framework of 
the study. To select ‘desirable participants’ I considered both the conceptual 
framework of the study and also considerations of convenience in sample selection 
(Henning, van Rensburg & Smit 2004).  Given that conceptual change is described as 
being resistant to change and often requires time (Ozdemir & Clark 2007), the decision 
was taken to sample children who have not been exposed to formal schooling in the 
foundation phase, as well as children who have had three years’ experience in the 
foundation phase and would soon be progressing to the intermediate phase of 
schooling.  My reasoning was that three years of schooling may show conceptual 
change. Hence, the Grade R and the Grade 3 cohorts were selected to participate in 
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this study, which can be regarded as a cross-sectional design. Data were collected at 
two separate time points. The first collection was during classroom interviews 
presented as a series of science demonstrations and the other was individual task 
based interviews, conducted in the school’s experimental classroom. The initial 
classroom interviews were conducted in one Grade R classroom (n=24) and one 
Grade 3 classroom (n=29). A total of 20 children (Grade R n=10; Grade 3 n=10) were 
randomly selected to participate in the individual task-based interviews (see Appendix 
C). All participants were enrolled in the isiZulu classes, necessitating the use of 
translators to assist with conducting the interviews. Most participants, especially, from 
the Grade 3 sample, were able to express themselves in English but did have the 
option to communicate in isiZulu if they so wished.        
 
3.3 INSTRUMENTS FOR DATA COLLECTION. 
In order to collect data one needs appropriate instruments that would capture data 
optimally. In a study such as this thesis, the tools for data collection were custom-
designed. The interviews, following on the science demonstrations, were a hybrid of 
the stimulated recall method, in that children were asked about the event in which they 
had participated immediately before the interview (Moustakas 1994). I decided on this 
type of interview to gain a deeper understanding of the participants’ experience of the 
science demonstrations and thereby capturing aspects of their ‘theories’ and their 
conceptual structures. In these interviews the children, as participants, could ‘speak 
for themselves’ (Babbie & Mouton 2010). For the design of the interview protocols for 
both phases of the fieldwork, I drew on the work of Carey (2009) and Vosniadou (1994) 
to inform the protocols.  My reasoning was that the questions in the protocol could help 
the children to focus on the topic. Carey (2015) and others (Zaitchik et al. 2016) used 
a battery of tests to elicit the ‘state’ of children’s theories of vitialist biology from the 
participants. As explained in Section 2.4 this battery of three tests aims to describe the 
theory of vitalist biology that an individual holds. First, these authors use the ‘animism 
interview’ (Carey 1985b; Larendeau & Pinard 1962; Piaget 1929) to probe the meaning 
of ‘alive’ and to establish what the individual categorises as a ‘living thing’. Following 
these open-ended questions participants are asked to judge a series of named entities 
- whether these are alive or not. The second test is a ‘death interview’ (Carey 1985b; 
Slaughter 2005; Slaughter & Lyons 2003; Zaitchik et al. 2013) that probes the 
difference between entities that are alive and entities that are considered dead. The 
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third task, the body parts interview (Carey 1985b; Slaughter 2005; Slaughter & Lyons 
2003), asks the participants to name the position and function of a series of organs 
and other body parts. The participants are also asked to predict what would happen if 
a person did not have a certain organ or body part. For both interview protocols, I 
decided against using the exact same battery of tests but rather decided to design a 
series of questions similar to those of the biology battery that could yield similar 
responses. Merriam (1998), cautions researchers that rigid adherence to 
predetermined questions may restrict researchers from gaining deeper insights into 
the perspective of participants. However, the interview protocols in the study remained 
constant across the various participants for reasons of reliability. 
 For the purposes of this study I aimed for more spontaneity and openness and 
decided to let the children elaborate on their answers as freely as possible. For the 
first phase of the fieldwork, children were presented with familiar objects, similar to 
those of the first task in the biology battery, and asked whether the object is alive or 
not. The children were then asked to explain their answers. In the second phase of 
fieldwork, a set of task-based interviews were designed in the same vein as Piaget 
(1929) did with his early research, using clinical interviews. In these task-based 
interviews, the young learners were asked to group a set of 20 pictures, each 
representing either an animal, plant or abiotic factor such as soil, air or water, into two 
groups. The rationale was that children who held a normative theory of vitalist biology 
would recognise the differences between biotic and abiotic factors and subsequently 
group the pictures from the same categories together. 
A similar approach was followed in the design of the interview protocols for the 
observational astronomy tasks. Vosniadou and colleagues (Vosniadou & Brewer 
1992; Vosniadou 1994; Diakidoy, Vosniadou & Hawks 1997) studied children’s naïve 
frameworks of observational astronomy by asking a series of factual and generative 
questions. The factual questions included questions that required of participants to 
provide information that would inform the researchers of their exposure to theoretically 
important facts, but did not require the participants to apply these facts in a specific 
context. Examples of such questions would include “what shape is the earth?” and 
“what colour is the earth” etc. The generative questions expected the participants to 
apply their knowledge to a specific context and provided the researchers with 
opportunities to gather information about the participants’ underlying conceptual 
structures. Examples of these questions are, “if you were to walk for many days in a 
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straight line, where would you end up?” and, “Would you ever reach the end of the 
earth?” These questions required the participants to generate a mental representation 
of the earth which would inherently contain information about its shape and 
relationship with other celestial objects. In this study I also used a combination of 
factual and generative questions to elicit the underlying conceptual structures of the 
participants.  
For the first phase of the observational astronomy interviews, children were 
asked a series of questions relating to the shape of the earth and the interaction of the 
sun and the moon with the earth. The children were then asked to elaborate on and 
explain their answers. For the second phase of fieldwork for observational astronomy 
the children were asked to create models of the earth, the sun and the moon, using 
clay. The participants were then asked a series of questions attempting to find out 
what their reasoning was. The participants were then asked to demonstrate the 
relationships between the earth, the sun and the moon. 
 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING 
For both instances of fieldwork, data were recorded on video. These recordings were 
translated, where necessary, and then transcribed. The researchers who assisted in 
conducting, recording, transcribing and translating the interviews all had what Miles 
and Huberman (1994) refer to as ‘markers’ of good qualitative researchers-as-
instrument which are 1) familiarity with the phenomenon being studied, 2) strong 
conceptual interest, 3) a multidisciplinary approach, as opposed to a narrow grounding 
or focus in a single discipline, and 4) good ‘investigative’ skills, including doggedness, 
the ability to “raw people out”, and the ability to ward off premature closure. The 
fieldworkers who assisted with the first phase of interviews were senior students in the 
faculty of education and who were fluent in isiZulu and together agreed on a final 
consensual, version of the text. The fieldworker who conducted the second phase of 
interviews was a B.Ed. Honours student in the faculty of education and conducted 
research in the South Africa Research Chair (SARChI) in the Centre for Education 
Practice Research on the Soweto campus. He is fluent in isiZulu and familiar with the 
phenomenon being studied. His translations were back-translated to firm up the 
reliability of the process of data collection (Henning et al. 2018). 
The involvement of translators in qualitative research presents unique 
challenges for ensuring the trustworthiness of the generated data. Temple and Young 
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(2004) ask three pertinent questions about translation in qualitative research: 1) Does 
it matter whether the act of translation is identified? 2) Does it matter whether the 
identity of the translator and the researcher are the same? 3) How far into the analysis 
of the data should a researcher involve a translator? All three these questions are 
important issues to consider during the design of the study; to ensure that accurate 
data can be generated, attention to translation issues is crucial (Van de Vijver & 
Poortinga 2004; Henning et al. 2018). Not being a speaker of isiZulu myself, inhibited 
my interaction with the participants of the study. I decided that for the reliability (and 
the trustworthiness of the results) of the inquiry, the children would be best 
accommodated in their primary language, with ample opportunity to code-switch to 
English.  To compensate for that I selected reliable and competent fieldworkers who 
are known for their research assistantships in the research centre. Ketso3, who was 
the main fieldworker and who also assisted with translation, is currently a lecturer in 
education at the university and has had ample experience as a fieldworker in various 
studies at the university and at the Department of Basic Education (Kotze, Fleisch & 
Taylor 2018).  
Temple and Young (2004) and Henning, Van Rensburg and Smit (2004) argue 
that one also has to consider the epistemological position of the researcher: On a 
spectrum, varying from researchers being seen as ‘objective’ instruments of research 
who want to reduce bias as much as possible, on the one end, and viewing 
researchers as interpretive and constructionist on the other, has implications for 
translation of data (Van der Vijver & Poortinga 2004; Herholdt 2017; Henning et al. 
2018). The production of knowledge is, according to these and other social science 
scholars (Henning et al. 2004), influenced by the researcher’s position within the social 
reality of the inquiry. This ‘social reality’ view acknowledges that the translator 
becomes part of the knowledge production activity. This has been evident in the study 
and was taken into account in the planning. Ketso would thus, ultimately, be more than 
a technical translator – he would be an instrument of linguistic representation and thus 
contribute to meaning in a pragmatical linguistic manner (Halliday 2004; Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2013). The knowledge that the translator contributed to the generation of 
data would not have been possible if he had been excluded from the study itself. An 
external translator, who did not have the social experience of being present in the data 
                                               
3 Pseudonym 
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collection could have distorted the data by a decontextualised translator. The 
importance and role of the translator in social science research is adequately 
summarised by Simon (1997:137) as follows: 
 
The solutions to many of the translator’s dilemmas are not to be found in 
dictionaries, but rather in an understanding of the way language is tied to local 
realities, to literary forms and to changing identities. Translators must constantly 
make decisions about the cultural meanings which language carries, and 
evaluate the degree to which the two different worlds they inhibit are ‘the same’. 
These are not technical difficulties, they are not the domain of specialists in 
obscure or quaint vocabularies…. In fact the process of meaning transfer has 
less to do with finding the cultural inscription of a term than in reconstructing its 
value. 
 
This view provided a guideline in selecting a suitable translator for my study; I needed 
an individual translator that would be able to represent the meaning expressed by the 
participants of the study in such a way that it could be back-translated and verified by 
the teachers of the children. The challenge of the view of the researcher being an 
‘objective’ instrument of research is that, in an attempt to reduce bias, utterances are 
translated and transcribed literally, risking the loss of the value of the utterances. In 
reading such transcripts, readers produce their own understanding of the text, based 
on their own assumptions, feelings and values that inherently increase the bias, due 
to the absence of contextual validity of the translation. I argue that, utilising the 
services of a translator within the knowledge production process has been beneficial 
to this study, because he has knowledge of the content and the context of the study. 
His description of the participants’ utterances can, arguably, be more usable than the 
‘accuracy’ of the translation of the participants’ utterances by an outsider who may not 
note the underlying cues.     
 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
During the process of analysing the data, I first read through the (translated) 
transcriptions, while viewing the video at the same time. Each response of the 
participants was marked as an entity or a ‘unit of meaning’ for analysis purposes. Much 
of the initial coding was inductive (Strauss 1987; Strauss & Corbin 1990) and 
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reduced/compressed the data into coherent and manageable entities that could be 
further utilised. Codes were assigned to each utterance/response in this way. These 
codes served as labels or tags that assigned meaning to descriptive and inferential 
information (Miles & Huberman 1994; Henning et al. 2004; Merriam 2013). The codes 
referred to sections of data and were assigned to single words, phrases, sentences or 
whole paragraphs, depending on the unitary meaning. Each code was reviewed and 
then grouped with other codes that were conceptually close and so categories of 
meaning were created. This is typical grounded theory analysis as presented by 
Strauss and Corbin (1994). Coding, in this sense, allows for information to be 
categorised and differentiated while giving an indication of the frequency of each 
category. Keeping in mind that this work is interpretive, and that the systematic manner 
in which I tried to do it was not just classifying meaning, but also ‘giving’ meaning. 
Such qualitative data analysis, although systematic, remains interpretive. ‘Empiricistic’ 
qualitative data analysis is merely a process of classifying and ordering. I did not wish 
to do that. Henning (1995) views this type of ‘easy coding’ as naïve ‘empiricistic 
qualitative research’.  
The process of coding and categorising developed along the lines of the 
Henning et al. (2004:104 - 105) model of qualitative data content analysis. This model 
suggests that, in the open coding phase, “codes are literally made up as the researcher 
works though the data…. The process of making inductive meaning, which is highly 
interpretive, is then preceded by a more technical process” which is transcribing the 
data verbatim. In this study I missed this specific process and relied on the English 
version that was written by Ketso, with whom I discussed the process of coding as it 
progressed, checking what the original isiZulu version was where needed to reach 
consensus.. Nevertheless, I argue that it was the optimal option – especially since 
there were such rich isiZulu expressions, which, Ketso translated very adequately, 
according to the teachers in the foundation phase at the school, who ‘audited’ his 
translations. They attested to the ‘member checking’ as a reliability mechanism on 
behalf of the children, whom they know well (Birt et al. 2016). 
 
3.6 RELIABILITY OF THE PROCESSES AND VALIDITY OF THE FINDINGS 
One of the cardinal aims of this type of qualitative case study is to reflect reality as 
accurately as possible (Merriam 1998), even while inevitably interpreting it. To ensure 
that the research account does accurately reflect the reality of the investigated case 
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is not a simple endeavour and Borsboom et al. (2004) advises that the researcher 
should attempt to account for all processes, findings and conclusions as precisely as 
possible, in order to instil trust in the findings of the research. Qualitative research is 
deemed ‘good’ or ‘trusted’ when the findings and conclusions are reliable, valid, 
dependable, reasonable, confirmable, credible, useful, compelling, significant, 
empowering, and legitimate (Merriam & Tisdell 2016; Guba & Lincoln 1985) and when 
the processes to arrive at findings are stipulated precisely. The challenge for 
qualitative researchers, who do not have the epistemological partner of statistics, is to 
find appropriate ‘measurements’ of these elements. The validity of a study is not an 
absolute state that cannot be improved on, once certain criteria are met, but rather, 
validity is a matter of degree that can be improved through the addition of multiple 
criteria of the previously mentioned elements (Cohen et al. 2002). Borsboom et al. 
(2004) argues that the validity that is most pertinent for research is the validity of the 
findings in relation to the construct it reports on.  The question is, how can one trust 
the findings and conclusions of a study if it is not possible to trace the steps in a type 
of ‘audit trail’? The validity of the study relies (thus requiring reliability), firstly, on its 
replicability and its evidential trail. Would another researcher, who follows the same 
design, who uses the same data collection protocols, and who studies similar 
participants, be able to draw similar conclusions from the findings of such a study 
(Merriam & Tisdell 2016)? Replicating qualitative studies is difficult, given the diverse 
perspectives of different researchers and their interpretations of the data. Merriam and 
Tisdell (2016) argue that it would be more beneficial to determine whether the results 
of the study are consistent with the data collected. The greater the consistency and 
coherence of the results with the collected and presented data, the greater the 
dependability of the findings. Eisenhart and Howe (1992) and Merriam (1995) agree 
that the coherence of argumentation as put forward in the study encourages debate 
and interrogation of research processes and results and, therefore, increases the 
trustworthiness of inferences, interpretations and conclusions drawn from the data.   
Howe and Eisenhart (1990) propose five shared standards in qualitative 
research that would improve its overall validity/trustworthiness. These standards prove 
useful in the construction of firm arguments in educational research and present 
opportunities within each standard to choose design specific standards that would 
support the arguments made in the study: 1) The first standard proposes a fit between 
research questions, data collection procedures and analysis of the data in so far as 
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the data collection and analysis is driven by the research question. 2) The second 
standard examines the credible application of data collection and analysis techniques. 
3) The third standard raises questions about the researcher’s alertness to his 
assumptions about existing knowledge and his awareness that his own subjectivity 
should be made explicit. 4) Standard four relates to the application of general 
principles to judge the arguments made in the study. 5) The fifth standard pertains to 
the comprehensive worth of the findings and conclusions of the study in informing and 
improving education. The last standard is pragmatic in the sense that different contexts 
require different senses of worthiness. 
The overall validity of a study will ultimately be judged by its evidence about the 
object of the study as proposed and set out by the research question, the aims and 
the objectives of the study. There would need to be alignment between the inferences 
drawn from the findings, the empirical data and how these two elements intersect with 
the theoretical framework of the study. For this study I was guided by Miles and 
Huberman (1994), Henning et al. (2004), Saldana (2015), and Silverman (2013) in the 
various steps of research and analysis of data in qualitative research and I argue for 
both construct and contextual validity of the study. The construct of this study is 
children’s conceptual development and conceptual change (theories and theory 
change), pertaining to their theorising of observable astronomy and vitalist biology. 
The reliability of the study would become evident when studying the audit trail as 
presented throughout this document. Ultimately, I would argue, that if the study can 
be regarded as reliable in its methods, and the construct and context is valid, that the 
findings of the study can be regarded as valid.  
 
3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that to approach qualitative research with the aim 
of ‘uncovering’ truth at all costs is not practical because considerations about the moral 
and ethical treatment of research participants, peers and funders of the research 
should be on the foreground of the design of a study as to avoid the exploitation of the 
people whose lives are being studied. Determining whether a study is ethical remains 
a challenge to qualitative researchers, given the myriad epistemologies of ethics. For 
this study, I was guided by a set of principles as explained by Sieber (1992) and 
Marshall and Rossmann (2014) to ensure that ethics underpinned the design and 
execution of the study. The principles of beneficence, mutual respect, justice, non-
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coercion, and support for democratic values and institutions were incorporated 
throughout the design of the study and the execution of the research in the following 
ways.   
This research was conducted in accordance with the education faculty’s ethical 
standards and has been approved by the same faculty’s ethics committee (See 
Appendix A) with clearance certificate number 2016-009. Approval was granted to 
conduct research in the school due to the agreement set out between both institutions 
that locates the school as research site for the department of childhood education. A 
formal letter was sent to the parents of the selected participants to explain the research 
and to obtain informed consent of participation. Participation in this study was 
voluntary and participants could withdraw from the study at any time. Anonymity, 
confidentiality, and privacy was maintained by not mentioning any names or specific 
identifying markers during the transcription and translation of the interview recordings. 
In respect of video recordings I have elected to only share these recordings with the 
translator, supervisors and assessors of this study to limit the exposure of the 
participants. The video recordings are stored on a mobile hard drive that is kept in safe 
keeping with only myself having access to the drive. Some videos were uploaded to a 
cloud based server, in this case, Google drive (see Appendix D) that ensures that only 
people who have been sent the link to these videos would be able to view the videos. 
This was done to ensure that assessors and supervisors could securely access the 
large files with ease instead of sending hardware that contained files that could 
compromise the identity of the participants if accessed by non-intended recipients. The 
risk to participants in this research were minimal, however, all participants were 
informed of the possible risks and ensured that all reasonable measures to mitigate 
these risks were undertaken by the researcher.   
  
3.8 ACTIVITY SYSTEM ANALYSIS (ASA)  
For this study I used an epistemological ‘grand theory’ (Le Compte & Preissle 1993). 
According to these authors such a theory ‘governs. The positioning of the researcher.  
In this study I deliberately positioned my thinking in what the philosopher Denis Phillips 
(Phillips 2000) and others refer to as a ‘social constructivist’ position. A social 
constructivist epistemology (Phillips 2000) regards individuals as being interconnected 
with society and with each other and is mediated through the semiotics via tools and 
via signs, such as language (Vygotsky 1978). In a study such as this thesis, the 
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interactions and relationships between the child, the teacher and the environment 
wherein these interactions occur are be studied in order to identify the tensions that 
inhibit the proper development of the child’s early theories. I have chosen to use third 
generation cultural-, historical-, and activity theory (CHAT) as systemic lens through 
which I gaze (Wardekker 2008) onto the data as knowledge. In doing this I see ‘data 
interactions’ and thus employ activity system analysis (ASA) as a heuristic, which 
Engeström (1987, 1991, 2001, 2015) introduced in the third iteration of the original 
activity theory of Vygotsky (1934/1978) and Leontiev (1979). Vygotsky (1978) 
proposed the term ‘activity’ to describe the intricacies of human interaction, both 
interpersonal interactions as well as the interactions with the sociocultural 
environment. The well-known metaphorical activity of the ‘primeval hunt’ has often 
been referred to in the early theorising of human activity in Soviet psychology of the 
first quarter of the 20th century (Leontiev 1979). In this metaphor there are several sets 
of integrated actions and tool-use performed by the members participating in the hunt. 
These actions include the stalking of the target animal as well as operations with a 
shared motive and objective. The hunt is motivated both naturally, driven by the need 
to obtain food, and culturally, mediated through the systematic use of tools and signs. 
This view of activity is known as first generation activity theory.     
Cultural-historical theory was initially devised by Vygotsky and subsequently 
modified by two generations of Soviet and Scandinavian scholars, (www.iscar.org) 
after which it became applied widely in the social sciences. This lens is used to identify 
the ‘tensions’ within an activity system. Vygotsky (1978) was a proponent of what later 
became known as ‘social constructivism’ and posited that children ‘make use’ of 
society to assist them in communicating and to make meaning of their reality. He 
proposed that learning occurs on two levels: the first on a social level by interacting 
with others; and the second on a personal level where the socially constructed 
knowledge is internalised. This would allow them to develop individual cognition 
(Rogoff 1990). Language serves as a semiotic device that mediates the meaning 
making process and is seen as “perhaps the most formal of human meaning systems” 
that a society can share (Odora-Hoppers 2005:1). The young child entering formal 
schooling therefore has five years of language and conceptual developmental history. 
CHAT is used in this study as a lens to peer through the window of concepts and 
theories of children who have grown up in Soweto and have entered the school where 
the research was conducted.  
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Engeström’s (2001) third generation activity theory comprises six factors which 
should be considered within each ‘activity system’ such as a classroom or the learning 
activity of an individual child. All these factors are dynamically interconnected either 
directly or indirectly, which results in an outcome (Hardman 2008). The dynamic nature 
of the interactions between these factors will inevitably have an impact on the other 
factors and on the envisaged outcome. This constitutes an activity system which can 
be illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 3.3: The bounded activity system of the case study 
 
Engeström (1987) developed the third generation activity theory by elaborating on the 
models proposed by Vygotsky and Leontiev in the first two ‘generations’ of this theory.  
An activity system is useful in the study of human interaction and behaviour as 
it becomes the basic unit for research of these interactions. Roth and Lee (2007) posit 
that the people within an activity system constantly and dynamically shape each other, 
hence the two-way arrows in the diagram, during their interactions. The top tier of the 
triangle still resembles that of first generation activity theory with the tools that mediate 
the activity placed at the apex. The base of the triangle now includes the individual 
action that occur not only towards the object, but which includes the social realm. 
Third generation CHAT was used as analytical framework for this study in which 
the development of science concepts of foundation phase learners was analysed. 
CHAT is appropriate for this study as it allows one to view the child within a whole 
context taking his historical and cultural background into consideration. 
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For the purposes of this study the different factors as depicted in Figure 3.3 will 
be interpreted as having the following meaning: 
The envisaged outcome is that the foundation phase learners adequately 
develop normative science concepts that would form the foundation for future science 
learning. Given that social constructivism suggests that learning of these concepts 
occur in a social setting but depends on the personal internalising of the concepts, the 
subject of this activity system is the foundation phase learner who uses tools such as 
language, to communicate within the social setting of the activity system. These tools 
influence the object which is the development of the science concepts. This is 
achieved within the rules of the activity system which in this case is bounded by the 
rules of the foundation phase curriculum as well as those of the community wherein 
the child grew up. The community in this case consists of the parents, teachers and 
other significant individuals that could influence the development of the child’s 
concepts of the natural world throughout the development of the child. The division of 
labour within this activity system contributes to the achievement of the outcome seeing 
that the role of the teacher and parents are to present the learner with experiences 
that would allow the child to form and develop concepts. The role of the child is to 
actively participate in the meaning making whether it is explanatory or exploratory in 
nature. 
The argumentative base for the design of this study, namely that for the optimal 
development of science concepts, children have to be exposed to learning 
opportunities that allows them to restructure their conceptual networks. I argue that 
this could be achieved within an activity system that values and comprehends the 
nuances of conceptual development.   
 
3.9 CONCLUSION  
The design of this study has certain strengths: it can claim contextual validity 
(Golafshani 2003, Borsboom & Mellenbergh 2004), because the young learners were 
investigated in their everyday environment, with the aim of creating specific knowledge 
for the teacher education programme. For the learners, the sharing of their everyday 
school life was not an invasion of their privacy in any way. The Achilles Heel of the 
study was the process of translation and the extra measures that had to be taken to 
verify the translation. 
89 
As a case study, the inquiry has had a strong bounded system to investigate 
and the unit of analysis has remained at the core of the inquiry. In the data analysis 
chapter, which follows, this statement is put to the test. The strong reliance on the 
framework of conceptual change has served the design well, while the ASA served to 
examine the phenomenon in the real world of the system in which the child participants 
live and learn. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DATA OF THE STUDY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the process of collection and analysis of the data – culminating 
in the main themes. In the case study of a group of young learners these themes were 
constructed from the analysis in two phases of inductive coding and then collapsing 
the codes to form categories (Henning et al. 2004; Merriam 2016; Strauss & Corbin 
1990). The data were generated on two separate iterations, in classroom group 
interviews during a ‘science demonstration’, and in task-based (clinical) interviews, the 
aim of which was to capture the learners’ expression of their conceptions of two topics 
in the curriculum, namely observational astronomy and vitalist biology. The results 
from the data analysis is presented as four different data sets. In Chapter 5 I will show 
the coherence between these themes and how they together constitute the main 
finding of this study. Section 3.5 explains the design reasoning of the interview 
protocols used during the different iterations of the fieldwork.  
This chapter comprises the representation of the data as codes and categories 
for the classroom group interviews (see 4.2) and then a separate section for the codes 
and categories for the task-based interviews (see 4.3). The chapter concludes with the 
listing of the final themes and patterns that are evident from the analysis of the data.  
        
4.2 SCIENCE DEMONSTRATION CLASSROOM INTERVIEW DATA 
In the following section I show the codes and categories as generated from the science 
demonstration classroom interviews.  For the purposes of this section I will show the 
conceptual collapsing of codes into categories and discuss the reasoning (by way of 
examples) for the creation of these categories. The categories are labelled with a 
distinct code, showing the data set whence these categories come.   
These demonstrations took place during classroom demonstration in one 
Grade R and one Grade 3 classroom. I illustrate the coding process by using an 
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example of how a category, in this case Category SSR24, was generated from the raw 
data as can be seen in the transcription of the Grade R classroom interview (Appendix 
B). 
 Interviewer:  Can you tell me what the sun does? 
 Participant 1:  It is hot. 
 Participant 2:  When our clothes are wet it makes them dry. 
 Participant 3:  And shoes. 
Participant 4: When you have a sack and it is wet the sun comes and 
makes it dry. 
 Participant 5:  When our clothes are dry we put them in the wardrobe. 
 
The first step was to codify such utterances, resulting in the following primary code 
(raw code) ‘the sun dries wet clothes’. This code, along with two others, as generated 
from other utterances, ‘the sun gives light to see’ and ‘the sun gives heat so we can 
play’, were collapsed into a secondary code named ‘the sun is a functional agent that 
facilitates human activity’. This secondary code was grouped with two other codes, 
‘the moon is a functional agent that facilitates human activity’ and ‘shadows are given 
human only traits’ to generate Category SSR2 ‘Celestial bodies are personified’. In 
Section 4.4 I collapse all similar categories into the themes that were abstracted during 
analysis. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 The category acronyms were chosen to maintain an audit trail of the data sets in order to avoid 
confusion due to the multiple data sets. As an example, Category SSR2 refers to the Science Show 
that was conducted in the Grade R classroom. The number ‘2’ refers to the second category in the 
series. 
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4.2.1 Grade R 
Primary- and secondary codes, and categories, as generated from the translations of 
the Grade R science demonstration classroom interviews on observational astronomy 
were captured from transcriptions. 
 
Table 4.1: Results of data analysis of Grade R classroom interviews on observational 
astronomy 
Primary Code Secondary Code Category 
Expressive language is a  
limitation 
Influence of Language on 
Learning in Science 
SSR1. Limited expressive 
vocabulary inhibits 
explanations 
Sun gives Light to See 
Sun gives heat so we can 
play 
Sun dries wet clothes 
Sun is a functional agent that 
facilitates human activity 
 
SSR2. Celestial bodies are 
personified 
Moon shows you it is time to 
sleep 
 
Moon is a functional agent 
that facilitates human activity 
 
Shadow is a human 
No shadow at night because 
of cold 
 
Shadow is given human only 
traits 
 
Sun position is up 
Moon position is up 
Stars’ position is up 
 
‘Up’ is the position of 
celestial bodies 
 
SSR3. Description and 
explanation of phenomena 
is naïve 
 
The sun goes home at night 
Stars go to the sky during the 
day 
 
Celestial bodies don’t move 
in an orbit 
 
Children relate phenomena 
to their personal experience 
Night time is when the 
thieves come 
 
Children relate natural 
phenomena to their own 
experience 
 
SSR4. Children relate 
phenomena to social reality 
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The moon is a banana 
 
Shape of celestial bodies are 
described as fruit shapes 
 
SSR5. Objects are classified 
and described as 
geometrical shapes 
 
 
Category SSR1. Limited expressive vocabulary inhibits explanations 
During the science demonstrations it became evident that learners struggled with 
expression (through the medium of) the vocabulary of science. The initial question of 
the interview asked the class to describe what science is. Some participants, after 
giving a pause, answered by giving similar sounding words such as “sun” and “stop 
sign”. It became evident that expressive language is a limitation and may even have 
caused much confusion. However, the participants started to comprehend what was 
asked of them only after the translation of the question into isiZulu, with some 
explanation in isiZulu.   
 
Category SSR2. Celestial bodies are personified 
Throughout the series of questions on observational astronomy learners often 
assigned human characteristics to various celestial bodies such as the sun and the 
moon. Three secondary codes make up this category. Each one will be discussed 
separately. 
 
 The sun is a functional agent that facilitates human activity 
For some of the participants the sun acted as an agent that provides opportunity for 
them to perform activities. Participants would answer the question on the function of 
the sun as “the thing that lights for us to see”; “the sun makes it to be warm when it is 
cold so that we can go to the street and play while it is hot”; and “when our clothes are 
wet it makes them dry”. These answers showed that the participants had good 
understanding of the characteristics of the sun in that it provides light and heat. What 
is particularly interesting is the addition of a qualifying effect of the characteristics in 
that it facilitates human activity and that the understanding is personalised and 
‘egocentric.’ Overall I had the sense that it is almost as if the sun becomes the 
facilitator (or even catalyst) of human activity and that we would not be able to conduct 
these activities if the sun didn’t ‘decide’ to provide us with light or heat. The sun was 
also featured as a ‘decision-maker’. 
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 The moon is a functional agent that facilitates human activity 
The function of the moon was stated as “it shows you it is night” and “it shows you that 
it is time to sleep”. In much the same way as with the questions about the sun, the 
participants represented the moon as an agent that allows humans to do certain 
activities by ‘showing’ us the time. The personification is not entirely evident within the 
transcribed text of the interviews but lies within the tone of voice of the participants. 
 
 Shadows are given human traits 
When asked to describe what a shadow is the participants initially used the term 
“shade” to describe what a shadow is, once again showing the facilitation of human 
action in the way that shade gives relief from the sun. The participants then described 
the shadow by answering that it was “a human” that does not appear “…at night 
because of the cold” and because “the thieves come” at night, thus personifying the 
notion of shade to only being the shadow of a human. They attributed human 
characteristics to a lifeless figure that resembled the familiar shape of a human. The 
causal reasoning that underlies these answers is logical, but the normative science 
concepts remain elusive. 
  
These responses show that the participants assigned human-like characteristics or 
relationships to various phenomena. 
 
Category SSR3. Description and explanation of phenomena is naïve 
Throughout the interview there were clear indications of naïve conceptual expressions. 
In this instance I identified two categories of naïve concepts relating to observational 
astronomy.  
‘Up’ is the position of celestial bodies 
When asked to indicate where the sun or the moon is situated, most participants raised 
their hands pointing upwards and said that these celestial bodies were “up”. Most of 
these interviews were conducted during the morning yet the moon was still indicated 
as being in the apex of the sky. None of the participants gave an alternative response 
to having the sun and the moon in the same position in the sky. For the participants, 
the moon is the guide at night and the sun gives heat and light in the day. That is how 
far their reasoning extends.  When asked if the moon was visible during the day the 
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participants unanimously said “no” even when at the time of the interview the moon 
was indeed visible in the morning sky through the classroom window. 
 
Celestial bodies don’t move in an orbit 
The participants were asked what happens to the moon during the day and what 
happens to the sun at night. The majority of responses did not indicate any 
understanding of the orbital movements of these celestial bodies. Instead, the 
participants had either a linear view of the movement of the sun and the moon in that 
it moves away from the earth, or an abstract concept of where these celestial bodies 
go. One participant mentioned that the sun goes “home” at night. When asked where 
‘home’ is, the participant could not answer the question. Another participant indicated 
that the sun “goes to the sky” during the day, showing her understanding of linear 
movement of the sun away from the earth instead of orbiting around it. 
 
Category SSR4. Children relate phenomena to social reality 
The most evident example of this category relates back to the answer of one of the 
participants on the question about shadows. The dangers that these children 
experience on a daily basis is part of the explanation of why the shadow is not visible 
at night. It isn’t visible because “the thieves come.” Furthermore, when explaining the 
function of the sun and that of the moon the participants answered from their unique 
perspective i.e. the sun provides heat in order for them to play and light so that they 
can see. The explanations are not separated from their own experiences.   
  
Category SSR5. Objects are classified and described as geometrical shapes 
There was a high prevalence of instances where participants used geometrical 
terminology to describe the celestial bodies throughout all of the data sets. In this 
particular interview the participants described the shape of the moon as shaped like a 
banana. In fact, the moon was described as actually being “a banana”. This also 
showed the use of a metaphor of a known object because the specific concept or 
terminology of the shape ‘crescent’ is not known to the participants. 
  
The following section shows the codes and categories as generated from the Grade 
R science demonstration classroom interviews on ‘vitalist biology’. 
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Table 4.2: Results of data analysis of Grade R classroom interviews on vitalist biology 
Primary Code Secondary Code Category 
Breathing as vitalist 
discourse 
 
Respiration as vitalist 
discourse 
 
SSR6. Vitalist discourse 
relates to obvious 
observable characteristics 
and is naïve and ‘egocentric’ 
(or anthropomorphic) 
 
Walking as vitalist discourse 
Water is alive because it 
shakes 
Not walking discourse of not 
alive 
Walking as vitalist discourse 
Flying as vitalist discourse 
Standing as vitalist 
discourse 
‘Go' as vitalist discourse 
 
Movement as vitalist 
discourse 
 
Drinking water as vitalist 
discourse 
Flowers are alive because it 
needs water 
 
Ingestion as vitalist 
discourse 
 
Seeds come from fruit 
 
 
Growth as vitalist discourse 
 
Trees don't talk = not alive 
Talking as vitalist discourse 
 
Communication as vitalist 
discourse 
 
‘Go' as vitalist discourse 
 
Excretion as vitalist 
discourse 
 
Rock is different from dog 
because dog has teeth. 
 
Presence of teeth is 
important for vitalist 
categorisation 
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Use colours to categorise 
birds 
 
Categorisation: Based on 
colour 
 
SSR7. Classification / 
categorise according to 
colour 
 
Trees are for hiding 
 
Children relate phenomena 
to their personal experience 
only 
 
SSR8. Children relate 
phenomena to their own 
experience 
 
 
Category SSR6. Vitalist discourse relates to obvious observable characteristics and is naïve 
and ‘egocentric’ (or anthropomorphic) 
During this interview it was possible to identify which characteristics of an object these 
participants deemed important to classify the object as living or non-living. Seven 
categories arose that displayed the views of the participants. 
 
Respiration as vitalist discourse 
Throughout this interview participants were asked whether the different objects were 
alive or not and only in one instance did a participant consider breathing as a reason 
for the object, in this case a human, to be alive. Breathing falls in a subcategory of 
vitalist categorisation as respiration would have been a more accurate characteristic 
of living organisms.  
 
Movement as vitalist discourse 
The responses during this interview favoured movement as a characteristic of living 
organisms. Being able to walk, shake or fly was pertinent considerations for the 
participants. For some of the participants water was classified as living on the basis 
that it moves. Certain participants asked as a rebuttal to the claim that water was not 
alive that “why does it shake then?” In another instance a seed was seen as non-living 
because “it does not walk.” 
 
  Ingestion as vitalist discourse 
Being able to drink or eat was also a consideration for the characteristics of living 
organisms. One participant mentioned that humans were alive because “you drink 
water.” However this was the only reference to ingestion in the entire interview. 
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Growth as vitalist discourse 
In this interview there was one instance where growth was related to the 
characteristics of living organisms. When asked whether a flower is alive the majority 
of the class agreed that it was alive. Their explanation was “because it needs water.” 
After further probing, the participant mentioned that the water is needed for the flower 
“to grow” and an object that grows is alive. This could also be connected to ingestion 
as vitalist discourse but I do not believe that this was the direct intension of the 
participant. 
 
Communication as vitalist discourse 
Trees were considered to be non-living “because it is not talking” whereas the dog is 
alive “because it’s talking.” One of the participants imitated the sound of a dog “whoof-
whoof!” 
 
Excretion as vitalist discourse 
Throughout all data sets there was only this one possible conspicuous mention 
connected to excretion as consideration for the characteristics of living organisms. 
When asked whether the dog was alive, one participant said that the dog was alive 
“because it go.” The language here is problematic as it is unclear whether the 
participant intended that ‘go’ referred to the action of ‘go’ing to the toilet or whether it 
referred to ‘go’ as in ‘move’. From the recording I lean more toward the notion that the 
participant intended excretion rather than movement. 
 
Presence of teeth is important for vitalist categorisation 
When asked what the difference was between the dog and the rock, one of the 
participants mentioned “because the rock doesn’t have teeth” and showed that an 
object needed to have similar features or organs as humans to be considered to be 
alive.  
 
Category SSR7. Classification / categorise according to colour 
During the section of the interview where a real bird was presented to the class I asked 
the participants what other birds they know of. Instead of providing names of different 
breeds or species the participants mentioned an array of different colours. 
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Category SSR8. Children relate phenomena to their personal experience only 
The example for this category comes from the answer of a participant on the question 
asking “what other trees do you know of?” In this case the participants did not list trees 
by colour but it was clear that they answered in relation to their experience and 
interaction with trees. The most pertinent example of this comes from the answer “the 
ones for hiding.” This answer could stem from the participant using a tree to hide away 
when playing games. 
 
4.2.2 Grade 3 
The Grade 3 science demonstration classroom interviews yielded an array of codes 
and categories on observational astronomy. These categories are discussed in this 
section. 
 
Table 4.3: Results of data analysis of Grade 3 classroom interviews on observational 
astronomy 
Primary Code Secondary Code Category 
Science is magic 
 
It is difficult to explain what 
science is 
 
SS31. Limited vocabulary 
inhibits explanations 
Language limitations 
(‘planets’ vs ‘plants’) 
 
Evidence of vocabulary 
confusion 
 
Moon is sometimes whole 
 
Evidence of suitable 
vocabulary and some 
conceptualisation 
 
Light tells you it is morning 
 
Sun is an agent that 
facilitates human activity 
 SS32. Description and 
explanation of phenomena 
is naïve 
 
Sun is fire 
Sun is bright like a star 
 
Analogies used to describe 
the sun 
 
  
Sun's position is up 
Description of the position of 
the sun is naïve 
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Sun is in the sky 
 
 
Sun is in Space 
Planets are in Space 
 
Description of the position of 
the sun is celestial 
 
Moon is a planet 
 
Moon is a planet 
 
Sun goes up to the sky at 
night 
Sun goes under the moon at 
night 
Clouds close the sun at night 
 
Description of the sun at 
night is naïve 
 
The sun hides at night 
 
Sun is personified 
 
SS33. Celestial bodies are 
personified 
 
Moon comes out at night 
 
Moon is personified 
 
Moon is banana shaped 
 
Moon is described using 
shapes of everyday objects. 
 
SS34. Objects are classified 
and described using 
geometrical shapes 
 
Moon is a circle 
 
Moon is described using 
geometrical shapes 
 
Classify sun and star on 
shape 
 
Classification based on 
shape 
 
Stars are rectangles 
 
Stars are described using 
geometrical shapes 
 
Moon becomes half during 
the day 
 
Changing nature of the moon 
is noted 
 
SS35. Changes in 
phenomena are observed 
and noted 
 
Classify sun and stars on 
colour 
 
Classification based on 
colour 
 
SS36. Objects are classified 
and described using size 
and colour 
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Classify sun and star on size 
 
Classification based on size 
 
 
 
Category SS31. Limited vocabulary inhibits explanations 
This category surfaces in each one of the data sets and I will provide the evidence for 
each data set separately. In this case the data were organised in three categories. 
 
It is difficult to explain what science is. 
At the start of the interview the participants were asked to explain what science is. In 
this Grade 3 classroom none of the participants could give any definition or 
explanation. Only after being prompted did one girl answer that science was magic. 
 
Evidence of vocabulary confusion. 
During one segment of the interview the participants were asked to show where the 
sun was. One response was that the sun was “in out of space” which is a misnomer 
for ‘outer space’ but when asked what ‘space’ was the participant answered that it was 
“a planet”. The follow up question asked the participants to describe where planets 
were and he answered that the planets are in the garden, referring to plants instead 
of planets. This shows some confusion between terminologies that sound similar. 
 
  Evidence of suitable vocabulary and more normative conceptualisation 
As opposed to the Grade R interview, here we saw some evidence of discourse that 
is less naïve and closer to an accurate description of phenomena. During the Grade 
R interview the participants referred to the shape of the moon as a banana indicating 
the crescent shape of the moon. During the Grade 3 interview the participants referred 
to the “half-moon” as well as that the moon “sometimes it’s whole.” However, there 
were still responses from some of the Grade 3 participants that the shape of the moon 
“is like a banana”. 
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Category SS32. Description and explanation of phenomena is naïve 
There were multiple instances during this interview where the participants exhibited 
their naïve expressions of phenomena. These have been categorised in 6 categories.  
 
The sun is a functional agent that facilitates human activity 
As with the Grade R interview, we still saw this category repeated with the Grade 3 
participants. In their explanation there was a perceived agency from the sun in that it 
facilitates human action. In asking how they knew that it was morning one participant 
responded that “you see with light” and another answering that “I see outside, when it 
is white outside” followed by another participant adding “and the sun.” Collectively the 
responses show that they think the sun provides the light that allows them to see when 
the environment is lit. 
 
Analogies used to describe the sun 
Throughout the interview some of the participants used analogies when trying to 
describe and explain phenomena. The sun in particular was described as being “fire” 
and when asked to describe what fire is, another participant responded by saying fire 
is “light”. Even though these analogies aren’t incorrect it was clear that the participants 
did not have a nuanced understanding of the difference between the heat and light 
energy provided by the sun. This however, shows greater conceptual understanding 
of the function of the sun as compared to that of the Grade R class. 
Another analogy that was used was uttered during an exchange between the 
participants when asked whether the sun was a star. In this instance one participant 
agreed that the sun is a star “because it is bright like a star.” The remainder of the 
class did not believe that the sun was a star and described differences in colour, size 
and shape of the two seemingly different concepts.  
 
Description of the position of the sun is naïve 
As with the Grade R class the position of the sun was “up” and “in the sky.” When 
asked to explain what happens to the sun during night time the participants responded 
by saying that the sun “goes up in the sky” in much the same linear movement as 
described by the Grade R participants. Others explained that “it go under the moon” 
while others explained that “the clouds close the sun.” One participant said that “the 
103 
sun hides and it becomes dark.” During this exchange we saw greater diversity in 
explanations as compared to that of the Grade R class. 
 
Description of the position of the sun is celestial 
The mention of ‘outer space’ during this interview is an addition that was not seen 
during the Grade R interview. Some of the participants had a more normative concept 
of the sun as a celestial body situated in space. There were also spontaneous mention 
of planets that are in space. However their understanding of the interaction between 
the earth, the sun and the moon was still naïve. 
 
Moon is a planet 
The interviewer asked the participants where planets are, during the exchange where 
a participant confused the terminology of ‘planets’ and ‘plants’. One of the responses 
from a participant showed a common inaccuracy that the moon is a planet. 
 
Category SS33. Celestial bodies are personified 
Both the sun and the moon were given human-like characteristics by some of the 
participants. In response to the question on what happens to the sun at night, one 
participant explained that “the sun hides and it becomes dark”. The act of hiding here 
being the personified characteristic. The moon was given human-like characteristics 
like “it comes out” at night also implying that it was hiding. 
 
Category SS34. Objects are classified and described using geometrical shapes. 
There was a high prevalence of descriptions where shapes related to geometry was 
used to describe and classify objects. Four examples of this was evident in this 
interview. As explained earlier the moon is described as being banana-shaped 
referring to the crescent shape of the moon. The moon was also described as being 
“a circle” or a “half-moon.” When describing the differences between the sun and stars 
some participants mentioned a difference in shape where “the sun is a circle” and “the 
star is a rectangle.”  
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Category SS35. Changes in phenomena are observed and noted. 
The participants in this interview showed that they noticed and observed changes in 
phenomena. Even though these relationships were explained using naïve concepts it 
was evident that they realised the relationship between various phenomena. The 
example from this data set relates to the phases of the moon. These participants were 
aware that the moon’s shape changed as opposed to the Grade R interview where all 
participants noted the crescent shape of the moon. There was mention made that the 
moon “gets circle when it is morning” indicating the awareness of a change in shape 
by using the word “gets”. Another participant said “sometimes it [the moon] is whole” 
implying that they are aware that at other times the moon is not whole. When asked 
what happens to the moon during the day one participant responded that “it becomes 
half.” 
 
Category SS36. Objects are classified and described using size and colour as criteria. 
Several instances where objects were classified based on their size or their colour 
were captured during this interview. The moon was described as being white and the 
sky as being blue. When comparing the sun and stars a distinction was made based 
on colour as a “star is white and sun is yellow.” The difference between these two 
objects were explained using size as characteristic. One participant stated that “the 
sun is big and the star is small”.  
        
Codes and categories as generated from the Grade 3 science demonstration 
classroom interviews on ‘vitalist biology’. 
 
Table 4.4: Results of data analysis of Grade 3 classroom interviews on vitalist biology 
Primary Code Secondary Code Category 
Speaking as vitalist 
discourse 
Can't speak with water 
Can't speak to water 
 
Communication as vitalist 
discourse 
 
SS37. Vitalist discourse 
relates to obvious 
observable characteristics 
and has progressed but is 
still not normative and 
closely related to human life 
 
Walking as vitalist discourse 
Running as vitalist discourse 
Movement as vitalist 
discourse 
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Trees move because of wind 
(Tree is alive) 
 
Breathing as vitalist 
discourse 
Water can breathe 
 
Respiration as vitalist 
discourse 
 
Eating as vitalist discourse 
Drinking as vitalist discourse 
 
Ingestion as vitalist 
discourse 
 
Touching as vitalist 
discourse 
Can't touch air 
 
Touch as vitalist discourse 
 
Washing as vitalist discourse 
 
Cleansing as vitalist 
discourse 
 
Sitting as vitalist discourse 
Driving as vitalist discourse 
Exercise as vitalist discourse 
Kicking as vitalist discourse 
Stretching as vitalist 
discourse 
Water does not have hands 
Water does not have mouth 
Water does not have a face 
Water does not have legs 
 
Relationship to human 
activities and human 
features relate to vitalist 
characteristics 
 
Growth is not a characteristic 
of life 
 
Growth is not a characteristic 
of life 
 
Flowers can't listen 
 
Hearing as vitalist biology 
 
Reproduction as vitalist 
discourse 
 
Reproduction as vitalist 
discourse 
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Flowers are not alive 
Trees are not alive 
 
Plants are non-living 
 
SS38. Plants are generally 
considered as non-living 
 
Nothing in balloon when 
inflated. 
 
Air is not seen as matter 
 
SS39. Theory of matter is 
naïve 
 
Seeds are beads of flowers 
 
Relation to cultural artefacts 
 
SS310. Sociocultural 
component of  natural 
objects 
 
Give flowers to friends for 
birthday 
Flowers to decorate your 
house 
 
Flowers have a social 
interpersonal role 
 
Flowers make fruit when 
given water 
 
Relationship between 
flowers and fruit are evident 
 
SS311. Learners note 
relationships between 
natural phenomena 
 
Trees move because of wind 
(Tree is alive) 
 
Influence of wind on 
movement is evident 
 
Dogs categorised according 
to names 
 
Categorisation based on 
names 
 
SS312. Objects that are 
familiar are classified and 
described using terminology 
 
 
Category SS37. Vitalist discourse relates to obvious observable characteristics and 
has progressed but is still not normative and closely related to human life 
After analysing the responses of the participants for this section of the interview I have 
seen evidence of vitalist discourse that is similar to that found in the Grade R interview. 
It is clear that the expression of concepts had progressed but was still not normative. 
I have collapsed the codes into ten categories which will now be discussed separately. 
 
Communication as vitalist discourse 
Being able to talk was a pertinent consideration for some of the participants to classify 
an object as being alive. When asked whether they were alive and to provide reasons 
for their answer one girl explained that she was alive because “we can speak” with 
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another girl adding that “we can speak a lot.” Rocks, seeds and flowers were deemed 
to be non-living because “it can’t talk” and birds were alive because “it can sing.”  
 
Movement as vitalist discourse 
Movement was considered as a characteristic of living organisms. Humans were alive 
because “we can walk” and “we can run.” Water however was deemed not to be alive 
because “the water can’t walk.” Not being able to walk ensured that some participants 
classified flowers as non-living. One girl responded contrary to the rest of the 
participants when asked whether a tree were alive. She said that a tree was alive 
“because the tree can move” and explained that the tree moves “when there is windy”. 
Another boy added that trees move “when the air is more.” The bird was deemed alive 
because “it can fly” and the dog was alive because “it can run.” 
 
Breathing as vitalist discourse 
In this interview the participants considered breathing as an important factor in 
classifying objects as living or non-living entities. Humans, birds, dogs and even water 
was considered being alive because they breathe. Seeds and flowers are considered 
non-living because they do not breathe.  
 
Ingestion as vitalist discourse 
Ingestion of food was a consideration for the participants, in this interview, to classify 
objects as being alive. Humans, birds and dogs were considered alive because “it can 
eat” and “it can drink” whereas seeds and flowers were deemed non-living because “it 
can’t eat” and “it can’t drink water.”  
 
Touch as vitalist discourse 
The participants classified, on a few occasions, objects as living based on the fact that 
the object was able to touch another object. Humans were alive because “we can 
touch.” Air was interestingly classified as non-living because “you can’t touch it” and 
“you can’t hold it” or even “you can’t hug it.” 
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Cleansing as vitalist discourse 
On a few instances the participants referred to the ability of an object to clean itself as 
a characteristic of a living organism. When asked whether a rock was alive or not one 
girl responded by saying that the rock was non-living because “it can’t bath.”  
 
Relationship to human activities and human features relate to vitalist 
characteristics. 
In many cases the consideration of the participants were related to actions that they 
commonly associate with the actions of humans. Some of these instances have 
already been used as example in the previous categories. Here I will show the 
instances that were not included in the other secondary codes of this category. 
Humans were classified as living because “we can drive” a car, “exercise”, “kick”, 
“stretch”, “smile”, “sleep” and “tie your shoe.” Air was deemed non-living because “you 
can’t hug it.” The activity of building was mentioned on two occasions. The rock was 
considered to be non-living because “you can’t build with it” whereas the bird was 
considered living because “he can make his own house.”  
Interestingly, not only human activities but also bodily features, especially anatomy, 
also were a consideration in classifying an object as living or non-living. Water was 
non-living because it “don’t have bones”, “doesn’t have legs”, “no hands”, “doesn’t 
have a face” and “don’t have a mouth.” A tree was deemed non-living “because it don’t 
have feet”. The bird was considered alive because “it has a heart” and “it has eyes”. 
The dog is alive because “it has bones”, and “it has teeth and [a] mouth.”       
 
Growth is not a characteristic of life 
The participants referred to growth on multiple occasions during the interview but did 
not consider it as a characteristic of living organisms. A series of questions asked the 
participants whether a seed was alive. The general response was that it was non-living 
even though it grows. When asked whether humans grow and if they are alive the 
participants affirmed that humans do indeed grow and is living. The causal link 
between growth and being alive was not made. This happened on two occasions. 
During the series of questions pertaining on the seed as well as the series of questions 
on the pot plant. 
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Hearing as vitalist biology 
Being spoken to and being able to hear were considered to be characteristics of living 
organisms by some participants. For instance, water, air, and the rock were deemed 
non-living because “you can’t speak with it.” The tree was considered non-living 
because “… the tree can’t listen.” 
 
Reproduction as vitalist discourse 
On only one occasion during the interview did a participant refer to the ability to 
reproduce as a characteristic of living organisms. When asked whether a dog was 
alive, one participant agreed that the dog is living because “it can make babies.” 
Category SS38. Plants are generally considered as non-living 
On most occasions all plant matter were considered as non-living. This was evident 
from the responses of the participants who cited lack of movement, not breathing, does 
not exhibit human-like traits, and not eating or drinking, as reasons why plant matter 
is deemed non-living. 
The only two instances where participants deemed plant matter as living was from the 
responses of one boy and one girl, respectively, who were asked whether the tree was 
alive. The boy responded that the tree was indeed alive “because it grows apples” and 
the girl responded: “I say yes because the tree can move.” The girl was referring to 
the motion of the leaves in the wind. 
 
Category SS39. Theory of matter is naïve 
It was evident from many of the examples mentioned thus far that the conceptual 
understanding of many of the concepts were naïve or very poorly developed. One 
instance made this clear. When the participants were shown a deflated balloon and 
asked to describe what was in the balloon they answered that it contained “nothing.” 
No one stated that the balloon contained some air. After inflating the balloon the 
question was repeated and all participants mentioned that the balloon now contains 
air. There was therefore no discrimination between the amounts of air in both these 
scenarios.  
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Category SS310. Sociocultural component of natural objects 
From some of the responses I could gather that the participants’ answers were 
influenced by instances from their cultural background. When asked what one can do 
with flowers the participants mentioned that “you can take them and then you give your 
friend” showing the cultural practice of gifting flowers for occasions like another’s 
birthday or “because you love” your friend. Another participant referred to the aesthetic 
value of flowers by stating that “you can plant your flowers in your house” and “you 
can decorate inside your house.”  
The other example refers to the confusion between terminologies. When presented 
with sunflower seeds and asked to describe what it is, one participant said that it is 
“the beads of a flower.” In this community the practice of beading to create traditional 
clothing is common place and probably influenced the confusion in terminology given 
that the sunflower seed could resemble one of the beads used in this practice. 
 
Category SS311. Learners note some relationships between natural phenomena 
Many participants spontaneously mentioned relationships between different objects or 
phenomena during their responses. It was evident that they knew the causal 
relationship between water, sunlight and plant growth. The explanation of their 
reasoning was, however, superficial in that they only know that water and sunlight is 
needed for growth but couldn’t explain any form of mechanism that could cause the 
growth. When asked why flowers needed water, one participant answered that it was 
done “to make fruits.” The participants were at no stage presented with a fruit during 
the interview and this participant used knowledge from her own experience to answer 
the question. Another example of the participants’ knowledge of causal relationships 
was the exchange on why trees move mentioned earlier in this section. 
 
Category SS312. Objects that are familiar are classified and described using 
terminology 
When asked what type of dogs they had at home, the categorisation of these dogs 
where based on an attempt to remember the breed e.g. “Rodviders”, “Pitbulls” and 
“China dog” or it was based on the pet names of the animals eg. “Snoopy”, “Scratch” 
and “Smokey.”  
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4.3 CLINICAL INTERVIEW DATA 
In the following section I show the codes and categories as generated from the 
individual task-based clinical interviews that were conducted with a 2017 cohort of 
Grade R learners as well as the Grade 3 cohort (who were in the Grade R 2014 cohort 
and took part in the science demonstrations and the interviews). The coding process 
employed to generate the categories for these data sets were done similarly to the 
process followed for the science demonstration classroom interviews. The only 
deviation is that the raw data were not transcribed verbatim, given the complexities of 
the interview protocol in that utterances coincided with visual data.  I reasoned that it 
would be prudent to analyse the data and generate codes from viewing the interviews 
(Appendix E) and translated versions of the recordings (Appendix D) simultaneously. 
    
4.3.1 Grade R 
Codes and categories as generated from the Grade R individual clinical interviews on 
observational astronomy. 
 
Table 4.5: Results of data analysis of Grade R individual interviews on observational 
astronomy 
Primary Code  
(n = frequency) 
Secondary Code Category 
It is like that / That is how it is 
(15) 
 
Difficulty explaining 
reasoning (15) 
 
CIR1. Limited vocabulary 
inhibits explanations (15) 
Earth Shape is 2D (9) 
Earth is flat (6) 
Sun is 2D (5) 
Moon is 2D (4) 
 
2 Dimensional view of 
celestial bodies (24) 
 
CIR2. Conceptual 
expression is naïve (41) 
 
Sun has rays (7) 
 
Solar rays are made visible 
(7) 
 
Sun position is on top of / 
touching the earth (4) 
 
Rectangular or disc earth 
synthetic model (4) 
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Moon opposite side of sun 
(6) 
 
Sun and Moon are 
antithetical (6) 
 
Earth is 3D (1) 
Sun is 3D (3) 
Moon is 3D (4) 
 
3 Dimensional view of 
celestial bodies (8) 
 
CIR3. Conceptual 
expression is somewhat 
normative (11) 
 
Yellow shows temperature is 
hot (3) 
 
Relationship between colour 
and characteristic (3) 
 
Earth is a circle (4) 
Earth is round (1) 
Sun is a circle (7) 
Rays are sticks / lines / 
Triangles (4) 
 
Geometric description of the 
earth and Sun (16) 
 
CIR4. Connections to other 
subjects, specifically 
geometry (35) 
 
Moon is crescent (7) 
 
Moon is crescent shaped (7) 
 
The sun is yellow (6) 
Moon is white (6) 
 
Description of phenomenon 
is based on observable 
characteristics (12) 
 
I like to make it in this shape 
/ colour (11) 
 
Individuality as consideration 
for shape and colour (11) 
 
CIR5. Strong sense of self 
(egocentric expression)  
(11) 
 
 
Category CIR1. Limited vocabulary inhibits explanations. 
Throughout the interviews with the Grade R learners there were 15 instances where 
the learners could not explain their choices and decided to answer with “because that 
is how it is.” The participants could not find the explanatory fodder in their vocabulary 
to express the reasoning behind their choices. An example of such an instance comes 
from participant FFR1 where she chose to depict the earth as a flat rectangle. When 
asked why she chose to use that shape she responded: “It is like that.” Another 
instance is observed when participant FFR5 uses white clay as the colour of the earth. 
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When asked to explain her choice she said: “The earth is like this.” No further 
explanation was attempted. 
 
Category CIR2. Conceptual expression is naïve. 
There were 41 instances where the participants expressed their concept of a 
phenomenon in a naïve manner. This category was collapsed from the following four 
secondary codes. 
 
Two-dimensional view of celestial bodies 
More often than not the participants in these interviews depicted celestial bodies as 
two-dimensional structures. On 24 occasions they either depicted the earth, or the 
sun, or the moon as two-dimensional objects. The following figure shows some of 
these clay models: 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Participant FFR1’s model of the earth. 
 
Figure 4.2: Participant FFR2’s model of the earth and sun 
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Figure 4.3: Participant FMR3’s models of the earth, the sun, and the moon 
 
Solar rays are made visible 
There were seven instances where the participants made the solar rays visible. 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show examples of the clay models that the participants made. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Participant FFR3’s model of the sun including the visualisation of the sun 
rays 
 
Rectangular or disc earth synthetic model 
For four of the participants the relationship between the three celestial bodies were 
depicted in a similar manner as that of the rectangular or disc earth synthetic model 
(see Section 2.4.2). In this case the sun and the moon is encapsulated within the 
earth’s dome. When asked to show where the sun or the moon was in relation to the 
earth, participants FFR5 and FMR6 placed the sun and the moon directly on top of the 
clay model of the earth with no distance between the earth and the sun or the moon. 
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When they explained their reasoning it was clear that they formulated a disc earth 
synthetic model of the interaction between the earth, the sun and the moon. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Participant FFR5’s depiction of the relationship between the earth, the sun, 
and the moon 
 
Sun and moon are antithetical 
For 6 of the participants the sun and the moon where always placed on opposing sides 
of their clay model of the earth. It was seldom seen that the sun and the moon would 
appear on the same side of the earth.  Figure 4.5 is also showcases this response. 
 
Category CIR3. Conceptual expression is somewhat normative. 
There were 11 cases where the participants showed a more normative understanding 
of certain concepts. These were grouped in two categories. 
 
Three-dimensional view of celestial bodies 
In eight instances the participants showed a three-dimensional understanding of 
celestial bodies. Participant FFR5 depicted the earth as a white ball. Even though the 
colour chosen to represent the earth was naïve the three-dimensional shape of the 
clay was more normative. This same participant depicted the sun as a three-
dimensional figure but made a two-dimensional crescent shaped model of the moon. 
Participant FFR2 chose to make a sphere shaped sun but made a flat model of the 
earth. Participant FMR3 made his model of the sun a three-dimensional sphere but 
also chose to make his model of the earth flat and square. 
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Relationship between colour and characteristic 
During the interview with the Grade R participants there were three instances where 
the participants realised a connection between the colour of an object and the 
characteristic of that object. Participant FFR3 showcased this in her answer to the 
question on why she chose yellow as the colour of the sun. She responded: “The sun 
is yellow and is so bright that it blinds your eyes. Yellow is brighter than all the other 
colours.” This shows that the participant made a connection between the colour yellow 
and the characteristic of brightness. Participant FMR6 explained that “It [the colour 
yellow] makes the earth get hot.” This shows that the participant made the connection 
between the colour and the characteristic of temperature. 
 
Category CIR4. Connections to other subjects, specifically geometry. 
During these interviews there were 35 instances where the participants used 
vocabulary that showed a pertinent connection to other school subjects. A connection 
to geometry was the most frequent connection observed. This category is broken 
down into three categories. 
 
 Geometric description of the earth and sun 
When asked to explain what shape they chose to depict the earth or the sun the 
participants used vocabulary associated with geometry. Examples of these responses 
include “It [the earth] is a rectangle.” (FFR1); “It [the earth] is a circle.” (FFR2); “The 
earth is big and round.” (FFR3); and “The shape [of the earth] is square.” (FMR3). On 
four occasions the participants added rays to their models of the sun. When asked to 
explain what these rays were they responded: “When you draw the sun you make a 
circle and triangles or sticks or lines.” (FFR1); “The sun is round and on the sides there 
are shapes, triangles.” (FFR3); the sun is a “circle and there are sticks.” (FFR5); and 
“The sun has got triangles.” (FMR5). 
 
 The moon is crescent shaped 
All participants except one chose to depict the moon as a crescent. It was only 
participant FMR2 who chose to depict the moon as a flat circle. None of these 
participants could use suitable vocabulary to explain their reasoning for choosing this 
shape. The responses varied from “This is how the moon is.” (FFR1); “I like to make it 
like this.” (FFR2); and “I like it. The moon is a triangle.” (FFR4); to “That is the shape 
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of the moon. It is oval.” (FFR3); “That is the shape of the moon. It is something that is 
crooked.” (FFR5); and “The moon is like this. It is white. It is the moon shape. Shoes 
have a shape like this.” 
 
 Description of the phenomenon is based on observable characteristics  
There were 12 instances where the participants merely described the observable 
characteristics of a phenomenon when asked to explain their reasoning. When asked 
to explain their choice of colour when depicting the sun they merely stated that “the 
sun is yellow” (FFR1, FFR2, FFR4, FMR3) without elaborating. A similar response 
was given when asked to explain their choice of colour when depicting the moon. 
Participants FFR2, FFR3, FFR5, FMR2 and FMR5 responded by saying that the moon 
is the colour they chose. 
 
 
Category CIR5. Strong sense of self (egocentric expression). 
Many of the participants exhibited a strong sense of self when answering the 
questions. I could identify 11 instances where egocentric considerations and the 
participants’ individuality was the major consideration behind their actions and 
explanations. Participant FMR2 chose the blue clay to make his model of the earth. 
When asked to explain his choice he simply answered “I like the colour blue.” 
Participant FMR5 chose the brown clay to make his model of the earth and expressed 
that “I see that colour. I took this colour.” When choosing the shape of the sun 
participant FFR2 said “The sun is a circle. I like it this way.” Similarly participant FFR4 
answered that “I like it. The moon is a triangle” when asked to explain why she chose 
to depict the moon with blue clay and shaping it as a crescent.  
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Codes and categories as generated from the Grade R individual clinical interviews on 
vitalist biology. 
 
Table 4.6: Results of data analysis of Grade R individual interviews on vitalist biology 
Primary Code  
(n = frequency) 
Secondary Code Category 
Groups are unequal (5) 
 
No clear distinction between 
the 2 groups (5) 
 
CIR6. Vitalist biology is not 
a consideration in 
classification (5) 
 
Picture stays here (3) 
 
Habitat as consideration for 
classification (3) 
 
CIR7. Ecological factors are 
considered in classification 
(6) 
 
The sun changes position 
during the day (3) 
 
Relationship between 
elements used for 
classification (3) 
 
Groupings according to 
colour (4) 
 
Colour as consideration for 
classification (4) 
 
CIR8. Superficial 
considerations for 
classification (4) 
 
Explains by describing the 
pictures (5) 
 
Difficulty explaining 
reasoning (5) 
 
CIR9. Limited vocabulary 
inhibits explanations (5) 
2nd attempt group numbers 
is same as interviewer (6) 
 
Learners attempt to mimic 
the interviewer (6) 
 
CIR10. Learners attempt to 
mimic the interviewer (6) 
 
 
Category CIR6. Vitalist biology is not a consideration in classification. 
During this activity it was clear that the participants did not consider any of the vitalist 
considerations when grouping the images. Five of the participants had no clear 
distinction between their own groupings. It was as if they formed their own smaller 
groups within the two larger groups. The expectation was that the participants would 
form two groups of images separated on the grounds of their vitalist characteristics. 
Participant FFR5 came close to making a distinction based on movement in that she 
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referred to her grouping as “These are all things that walk.” However, her second group 
included plants which she grouped together with rocks and explained her reasoning 
as “Everything [in this group], they all start from the bottom.” Here she referred to 
growth of fruit on trees. Except for these few vitalist characteristics none of the other 
participants made mention of any characteristics that could be associated with the 
characteristic of living organisms.   
 
Category CIR7. Ecological factors are considered in classification. 
It was interesting to note that the major considerations for the grouping of the pictures 
were based on ecological factors such as habitat and interaction between the various 
ecological entities, both biotic and abiotic. Participant FFR4 made an ecological 
connection between the image of the insect and the soil as well as a connection 
between the fish and the water. She said: “The insect goes with the ground because 
it lives on the sand.” She also referred to the fish and the water by saying: “Fish, the 
small fish live inside the water.” Participant FFR5 made a connection between the 
image of the tree and that of the soil by noting that the tree grows in the soil. She said: 
“Tree, it is the one that start. It starts properly. The one that grows from small to big. It 
grows and then we can have apples or peaches or bananas.” She also grouped the 
rocks with the soil and the tree and explained that “Rocks, they are always on the 
ground. Everything, they all start from the bottom.” Another connection between the 
soil and, this time, the chameleon was made by participant FMR6 in that he said: “It 
[the chameleon] is at the bottom. It stays, sits at the bottom on the ground.” The same 
participant grouped the image of the whale and the image of the water together saying 
that: “It [the whale] stays in the water.” Similarly participant FFR3 grouped the image 
of the water with that of the fish and said: “The water goes with the fish.” Implying that 
the two should be grouped together as the fish lives in water. 
During the second episode of this part of the interview, where the interviewer grouped 
the images ‘correctly’, we heard more responses that emphasised the ecological 
considerations of the participants. Participant FFR1 saw that the images of the cow 
and the grass were placed in separate groups but saw that the image of the cow 
included the grass that it stood on and subsequently responded: “The cow eats the 
grass.” This showed the participants understanding of feeding as a consideration for 
their groupings. Another example of feeding as consideration for their groupings was 
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seen when participant FFR1 grouped the image of the insect with that of the 
chameleon and explained that: “It [the insect] eats the [pointing to the chameleon].”  
    
Category CIR8. Superficial considerations for classification. 
During these interviews there were four instances where the participants’ groupings 
were based on superficial considerations such as the images having similar colours or 
that the participant merely liked grouping the images together. Participant FMR2 
grouped the image of water and that of the bird together and explained: “Because I 
like to put it here.” Similarly he placed the image of the tree and that of the sun in the 
same group and said: “I like to put it here. The sun is about to set.” This same 
participant also based some of his groupings on common colours. For instance, he 
grouped the image of the water and that of the cow together and explained that “It is 
connected because of colour” and later added “The water has white elements and the 
cow gives us milk.” Participant FMR5 explained his groupings in that it had “three blue 
in each group.” Showing that the colour of the images were a consideration for his 
groupings. Participant FFR2 mentioned in her explanation that “The colours make 
them the same.” Participant FMR6 explained that grouping the images of clouds and 
that of water together was because “At the top there are white and blue things.” 
 
Category CIR9. Limited vocabulary inhibits explanations. 
Throughout these interviews it was apparent that some of the participants had limited 
vocabulary to explain their reasoning behind certain decisions. This often manifested 
as the participant resorting to descriptions of the images instead of explaining their 
decisions. This occurred on five occasions. In attempting to explain why the 
interviewer grouped the images as he did, participant FFR4 could only describe the 
groups as “Here there are clouds. This side there are animals.” The same participant 
continued explaining her own groupings by merely describing the images by pointing 
to the images and saying: “Sand and sun. Here the sun is setting and here it is rising. 
In the other group there is a bird. It is in the flowers.”  
 
Category CIR10. Learners attempt to mimic the interviewer. 
As describe in Section 3.5 the interviewer shuffled all images following the participants’ 
initial attempt at grouping the images and proceeded to ‘correctly’ group the images 
based on vitalist characteristics thus splitting the living from the non-living objects. But 
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in each separate interview, only the arrangement of the cards were done differently to 
ascertain whether the participants tried to mimic the arrangement of the interviewer or 
if the participant memorised the placement made by the interviewer. There were five 
instances where the participants’ initial groupings were uneven in number that 
changed to an even numbered split during their second attempt following the ‘correct’ 
arrangement of the interviewer. In most cases, especially that of participant FFR5, the 
arrangement of the images mimicked that of the interviewer. The actual images 
however, differed from that of the interviewer in all cases except that of participant 
FMR6. The explanation however of this participant did not indicate that he 
comprehended the reason for the two different groups of images.  
 
4.3.2 Grade 3 
Codes and categories as generated from the Grade 3 individual clinical interviews on 
observational astronomy. 
 
Table 4.7: Results of data analysis of Grade 3 individual interviews on observational 
astronomy 
Primary Code  
(n = frequency) 
Secondary Code Category 
It is like that / That is how it is 
(5) 
 
Difficulty explaining 
reasoning (5) 
 
CI31. Limited vocabulary 
inhibits explanations (5) 
Earth Shape is 2D (4) 
Earth is flat (2) 
Sun is 2D (5) 
Moon is 2D (3) 
 
2 Dimensional view of 
celestial bodies (14) 
 
CI32. Conceptual 
expression is naïve (24) 
 
Sun has rays (4) 
 
Solar rays are made visible 
(4) 
 
Sun position is on top of / 
touching the earth (1) 
 
Rectangular or disc synthetic 
model of the earth (1) 
 
Moon opposite side of sun 
(5) 
Sun and Moon are 
antithetical (5) 
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Earth is 3D (5) 
Sun is 3D (4) 
Moon is 3D (3) 
 
3 Dimensional view of 
celestial bodies (12) 
 
CI33. Conceptual 
expression is somewhat 
normative (14) 
 
Yellow shows temperature is 
hot (2) 
 
Relationship between colour 
and characteristic (2) 
 
Earth is a circle (4) 
Earth is round (4) 
Sun is a circle (3) 
Rays are sticks / lines / 
Triangles (1) 
 
Geometric description of the 
Earth and Sun (12) 
 
CI34. Connections to other 
subjects, specifically 
geometry (29) 
 
Moon is crescent (6) 
 
Moon is crescent shaped (6) 
 
The sun is yellow (6) 
Moon is white (5) 
 
Description of phenomenon 
is based on observable 
characteristics (11) 
 
I like to make it in this shape 
/ colour (10) 
 
Individuality as consideration 
for shape and colour (10) 
 
CI35. Strong sense of  self 
(egocentric expression) (10) 
 
 
Category CI31. Limited vocabulary inhibits explanations. 
As was the case with the Grade R participants, the Grade 3 participants also exhibited 
instances where their limited vocabulary inhibited their explanations. What is 
noteworthy however, is that the frequency of these responses where much lower in 
the Grade 3 sample. Where the Grade R participants had 15 instances, the Grade 3 
participants only had five. When asked to explain his choice of colour when making 
the model of the sun participant FM37 responded: “The sun is like this.” When 
participant FM33 was asked to explain why he placed his pin in the centre of the ball 
of clay he responded: “I don’t know.” 
 
Category CI32. Conceptual expression is naïve. 
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There were 41 instances where the Grade R participants expressed their concept of 
a phenomenon in a naïve manner. With the Grade 3 participants the frequency 
reduced to 24 instances of naïve expressions. The same four categories that were 
generated during analysis of the Grade R data are also prevalent in the responses of 
the Grade 3 participants. 
 
Two-dimensional view of celestial bodies 
There were 14 instances where participants still depicted celestial bodies as two-
dimensional figures. This is a reduced number in comparison with the 24 instances 
found in the Grade R sample. These participants still either depicted the earth, or the 
sun, or the moon as two-dimensional objects.  
 
Solar rays are made visible 
There were four instances where the participants made the solar rays visible. This is 
also reduced from the seven instances found in the Grade R sample. 
 
Rectangular or disc earth synthetic model of the earth 
In the Grade 3 sample there were only one participant who held the view that the 
relationship between the three celestial bodies were similar to that of the rectangular 
or disc synthetic model of the earth (see Section 2.4.2). In this case the sun and the 
moon is encapsulated within the earth’s dome. When asked to show where the sun or 
the moon was in relation to the earth, participant FM36 placed the sun directly on top 
of the clay model of the earth with no distance between the earth and the sun and 
explained that the sun is “inside the sky of the earth.”  
 
  Sun and moon are antithetical 
For six of the Grade R participants the sun and the moon where always placed on 
opposing sides of their clay model of the earth. I saw in the Grade 3 sample that this 
occurred on five occasions. Within this sample the sun and the moon would not appear 
on the same side of the earth but poised antithetically. 
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Category CI33. Conceptual expression is somewhat normative. 
In the Grade R sample there were 11 cases where the participants showed a more 
normative understanding of certain concepts. Yet in the Grade 3 sample there were 
14 instances where the understanding of the concepts were more normative but also 
qualitatively the vocabulary showed improvement. These instances were again 
grouped in two categories. 
 
Three-dimensional view of celestial bodies 
In 12 instances the Grade 3 participants showed a three-dimensional understanding 
of celestial bodies as opposed to the eight instances seen in the Grade R sample. 
Participant FF33 depicted the earth as a red ball. Even though the colour chosen to 
represent the earth was naïve the three-dimensional shape of the clay was more 
normative. However, this same participant depicted the sun as a flat disk with 
protruding rays and also chose a crescent shape for the model of the moon. In the 
case of participant FM32 he chose to make a sphere shaped blue earth but made flat 
disk models of both the sun and the moon.  
 
Relationship between colour and characteristic 
During the interview with the Grade R participants there were three instances where 
the participants realised a connection between the colour of an object and the 
characteristic of that object. In the Grade 3 sample there were only two instances. 
Participant FF34 showcases this in her answer to the question on why she chose blue 
as the colour for her model of the earth. She responded: “The world is blue and green 
in other places. The blue is water” This shows that the participant made a connection 
between the colour blue and the phenomenon that the planet appears blue due to the 
large oceans which contain water. A similar response was given by participant FM32. 
When asked to explain why she chose the colour yellow for her model of the sun 
participant FF34 explained that “The sun is yellow and when it is yellow it shows that 
it is in the morning and that it is hot.” This shows that the participant made the 
connection between the colour and the characteristic of temperature. 
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Category CI34. Connections to other subjects, specifically geometry. 
During the interviews with the Grade 3 sample there were 29 instances where the 
participants used vocabulary that showed a pertinent connection to other school 
subjects. Similarly the Grade R sample showed 35 instances of the same. During the 
interviews with the Grade 3 sample the connection to geometry was also the most 
frequent connection observed. This category is broken down into the same three 
categories as with the Grade R sample. 
 
 Geometric description of the earth and sun 
When asked to explain what shape they chose to depict the earth or the sun these 
participants, as with the Grade R participants, still used vocabulary associated with 
geometry. Examples of these responses include “The world has a roundish shape.” 
(FF34); “Everything is square everywhere.” (FF35); “It [the earth] is round.” (FM31); 
and “The earth is a circle.” (FM33). It occurred on five occasions that the participants 
added rays to their models of the sun. When asked to explain what these rays were 
they responded: “I think the sun is yellow and has lines around.” (FF31). The other 
four participants could not explain what these rays represented. When describing the 
shape of the sun the participants responded by saying: “The sun is also round.” 
(FM31); “The sun is a circle when you look at it.” (FM32); and “The sun is a circle.” 
(FM37). 
 
 Moon is crescent shaped 
As opposed to the Grade R sample we see more of the Grade 3 participants choosing 
to not shape their model of the moon as a crescent. But the majority of the Grade 3 
participants still shaped their model of the moon as a crescent. Participants FF32, 
FM31 and FM 32 chose a flat round disk shape as the shape of their model of the 
moon. It was only participant FF35 who made a three-dimensional, spherical model of 
the moon. Interestingly she chose to make her model blue, stating that “The moon is 
blue.” The chosen vocabulary of the explanations of the participants were an 
improvement on what was seen during the same explanations in the Grade R sample. 
The responses were varied but still showed greater reasoning: “I’ve done this in Grade 
R and Grade 1.” (FF33); “The moon at night we see at top and it looks like a banana.” 
(FF34); and “At night it appears this shape.” (FM36). The responses from the 
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participants who did not choose a crescent shape also showed greater use of 
vocabulary i.e. “When you look at the sky, at the top, the moon is round.” (FF35). 
  
 Description of the phenomenon was based on observable characteristics  
There were 11 instances where the participants merely described the observable 
characteristics of a phenomenon when asked to explain their reasoning as opposed 
to that of the 12 instances observed during the Grade R interviews. When asked to 
explain their choice of colour when depicting the sun the participants still only stated 
that “the sun is yellow” (FF33, FM31, FM32, FM36) without elaborating. A similar 
response was given when asked to explain their choice of colour when depicting the 
moon. Participants FF34, FF35, FM32, FM36 and FM37 responded by saying that the 
moon is the colour they chose. 
 
Category CI35. Strong sense of self (egocentric expression). 
As with the Grade R sample we still see many of the participants exhibiting a strong 
sense of self when answering the questions. With the Grade 3 sample I could identify 
10 instances where egocentric considerations as well as the participants’ individuality 
were the major consideration of their actions and explanations. Participant FF33 chose 
the red clay to make her model of the earth and when asked to explain her choice she 
responded “I like to mark with this colour in class” and in her explanation of choosing 
blue for her model of the moon she responded: “I like to wear the colour blue and a 
blue cap. I’ve never seen a blue moon.”  Similarly participant FM33 chose the green 
clay to make his model of the earth and expressed that “I wanted the earth to be green. 
The earth is blue but I wanted to make it green.” And when he was asked to explain 
his choice of white for the colour of his model of the sun he added “I like this colour 
too. The sun is yellow.” This same individual chose to make his model of the moon red 
and explained that “I wanted it [the moon] to be like this. I like the colour red. The real 
colour of the moon is blue.” When choosing the shape of the earth participant FF33 
and FM37 said “I like this shape.” In her explanation of her choice of shape for the 
model of the sun participant FF35 answered that “I just like this shape.”  
 
 
 
 
127 
Codes and categories as generated from the Grade 3 individual task-based clinical 
interviews on vitalist biology. 
 
Table 4.8: Results of data analysis of Grade 3 individual interviews on vitalist biology 
Primary Code  
(n = frequency) 
Secondary Code Category 
Groups are unequal (5) 
 
No clear distinction between 
the 2 groups (5) 
 
CI36. Vitalist biology is not a 
consideration in 
classification (5) 
 
Picture stays here (3) 
 
Habitat as consideration for 
classification (3) 
 
CI37. Ecological factors are 
considered in classification 
(6) 
 
The sun changes position 
during the day (3) 
 
Relationship between 
elements used for 
classification (3) 
 
Groupings according to 
colour (4) 
 
Colour as consideration for 
classification (4) 
 
CI38. Superficial 
considerations for 
classification (4) 
 
Explains by describing the 
pictures (5) 
 
Difficulty explaining 
reasoning (5) 
 
CI39. Limited vocabulary 
inhibits explanations (5) 
2nd attempt group numbers 
is same as interviewer (6) 
 
Learners attempt to mimic 
the interviewer (6) 
 
CI310. Learners attempt to 
mimic the interviewer (6) 
 
 
Category CI36. Vitalist biology was not a consideration in classification. 
As with the Grade R sample it was again clear that the participants did not consider 
any of the vitalist considerations when grouping the images. Five of the participants 
had no clear distinction between their own groupings. Participant FM31 was the only 
participant to notice that the intended distinguishing factor between the images was 
based on the fact that some images were of living organisms and other images were 
of non-living objects. After the interviewer arranged the images as was intended, 
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participant FM31 explained that “all these [pointing to one of the groups] things are 
alive. All of these [pointing to the other group] are not alive.” Participant FM31 was 
also the only one in the entire sample to correctly rearrange the images during his 
second attempt in the intended groups. When asked to explain his reasoning he 
responded “You [the interviewer] showed me that these are alive and these are not 
alive.”  The only other instance of a participant noticing a vitalist characteristic came 
from participant FF33 who made mention of cows eating grass but did so in an attempt 
to describe what she saw in the image instead of using feeding as vitalist characteristic 
to distinguish it from other images.  
 
Category CI37. Ecological factors are considered in classification. 
In the sample of Grade 3 participants we, once again, see that ecological factors, such 
as habitat and interaction between various ecological entities, both biotic and abiotic, 
are a greater consideration as distinguishing factor between the images than vitalist 
characteristics were. Participant FF31 mentioned that her groups were based on 
cohabitation and stated that it “looks like they [the images in one of her groups] belong 
here and they live in one place.” Participant FF33 showed a connection between the 
image of soil and that of water and concluded that these go together because “the 
water is connected with the sand and they create mud.” The consideration of habitat 
was again mentioned by participant FF34 when she explained that “sometimes these 
[insects] live [pointing to the images of the sand, soil and trees].” And also saying that 
“other animals, you can find them living outside of water. This was further supported 
by participant FM32 when he pointed to the image of the fish and that of water 
explaining “it [the fish] stays in the water.”  
During the second episode of this part of the interview, where the interviewer grouped 
the images as intended, we again heard more responses that emphasised the 
ecological considerations of the participants. Participant FF34 tried to explain the 
groupings of the interviewer by saying: “I think that you put these because it stays 
here. This one [pointing to the cow] likes to sleep here on the grass.” Participant FM32 
made a distinction between the two groups based on the first being possible habitats 
for animals and the other as a grouping of all the animals. He said: “This side, animals 
stay on earth and in the water. Other group is animals. It is grass and trees.” Participant 
FM33 seemed confused by the interviewers groups as he tried to explain the 
interviewers reasoning: “I don’t know. This one [group] is not the same [pointing to the 
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other group]. This is water and here, there is grass inside. But this one [whale] stays 
in water and they [fish] also live in water.” This showed that he wanted the image of 
the water and that of the fish and the whale to be grouped together.  
After rearranging the images into two groups during their second attempt, some of the 
participants made further mention of the habitats of the animals by still grouping some 
animals with the non-living objects or environments where they believed these animals 
should live. Participant FF34 still grouped the image of water and that of the whale 
together saying “This one [whale] is always in the water.” Participant FM32 solely used 
habitat as distinguishing factor as explanation of his groupings during his second 
attempt. He said: “These [pointing to the image of the whale and that of the fish] stay 
in the water. This [pointing to the image of the cat] stays in the house and other places. 
This [pointing to the image of the insect] stays in the sand.” 
 
Category CI38. Superficial considerations for classification. 
As with the Grade R interviews we see similar superficial considerations for some of 
the groupings made by the Grade 3 participants. These considerations include the 
images having similar colours or that the participant liked grouping the images 
together. Participant FF35 matched the colours in the images and said: “This one 
[pointing to the image of the plume of white smoke] is white and the clouds are also 
white. This one [pointing to the image of the chameleon] is green and the grass is also 
green. The colours are similar.” The same participant explained that the interviewers 
choice of groups were also based on colour by saying that “these ones [pointing to the 
group on her left] match. This one [pointing to the grass] has green. These [not clear 
to which individual image she is pointing] are similar. These ones [pointing to the sand 
and the soil] have the same colours.” During his second attempt at arranging the 
images in two groups, participant FM33 explained the distinction he made between 
the two groups as “these [pointing to the group on his left] are soft when you touch 
them. These [pointing to the other group] are hard when you touch them”. After his 
second attempt participant FM37 explained that he chose to group the images the way 
he did by saying “I like it this way.” 
 
 
 
 
130 
Category CI39. Limited vocabulary inhibits explanations. 
In much the same way as the Grade R sample there were five instances during these 
interviews that showed how some of these participants could not manage to explain 
their reasoning. This, again, manifested as the participant resorting to merely 
describing the images instead of explaining their decisions. It is however, noteworthy 
to observe the improvement in vocabulary, as can be expected, in the Grade 3 sample 
as opposed to the vocabulary of the Grade R sample. Participant FF33 could not 
explain her reasoning behind her decisions and resorted to describe the images. She 
answered in such a way that showed a stream of consciousness as if to attempt to 
satisfy the interviewer by talking ‘enough’. She answered “There are trees that are 
green. The chameleon will change colour. Animals are always digging and coming 
outside. Cows like to eat grass. At the bottom there is sand and people put stones on 
top of the sand.” In much the same way participant FM36 responded “This is where 
the sun is. It [pointing to the image of the cow] is an animal.” When he was explaining 
the interviewer’s groups he continued describing the images, saying “These is animals 
here [pointing to the group to his left] and flowers and trees.” He described the other 
group by saying “There are clouds and the sun. Here is late afternoon. Rocks, water 
and the sun.”  
 
Category CI310. Learners attempt to mimic the interviewer. 
In exactly the same way that some of the Grade R participants attempted to mimic the 
interviewer’s groups, we see more instances of the Grade 3 sample attempting to do 
the same. There were, again, five instances where the participants’ initial groupings 
were uneven in number that changed to an even numbered split during their second 
attempt following the ‘correct’ arrangement of the interviewer. In most cases the 
arrangement of the images mimicked that of the interviewer to such an extent that 
even the tenth card was placed in the same position as the interviewer had placed his.  
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Figure 4.6: Example of interviewer’s groupings showing the placement of the tenth card 
in the centre row 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Example of the interviewer’s groupings showing the placement of the tenth 
card in different positions 
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The actual images, as was the case with the Grade R interviews, differed from that of 
the interviewer in two instances, with three participants being able to group the images 
correctly as the interviewer did.  
 
4.4 THEMES IDENTIFIED FROM THE DATA ANALYSIS 
In this section I summarise the various themes generated from the data categories, 
mindful of the requirements for trustworthiness, of which coherence of findings are 
crucial. (Le Compte & Preissle 1993; Miles & Huberman 1994, 2013). In total 40 
categories were created and in order to connect these conceptually, I have decided to 
further collapse the categories into themes according to the commonalities of their 
origin. I end this section by drawing the major themes of this study which will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4.1 Children hold naïve theories 
 SSR2. Celestial bodies are personified 
 SSR3. Description and explanation of phenomena is naïve 
 SSR5. Objects are classified and described using geometrical shapes 
 SSR6. Vitalist discourse relates to obvious observable characteristics and is naïve 
and ‘egocentric’ (or anthropomorphic) 
 SSR7. Classification / categorise according to colour 
 SS32. Description and explanation of phenomena is naïve 
 SS33. Celestial bodies are personified 
 SS34. Objects are classified and described using geometrical shapes 
 SS36. Objects are classified and described using size and colour 
 SS37. Vitalist discourse relates to obvious observable characteristics and has 
progressed but is still not normative and closely related to human life. 
 SS38. Plants are generally considered as non-living 
 SS39. Theory of matter is naïve 
 CIR2. Conceptual expression is naïve 
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 CIR6. Vitalist biology is not a consideration in classification 
 CIR8. Superficial considerations for classification 
 CI32. Conceptual expression is naïve 
 CI36. Vitalist biology is not a consideration in classification 
 CI38. Superficial considerations for classification 
 
4.4.2 Personal experience of natural and sociocultural phenomena hold sway in 
their theories 
 SSR4. Children relate phenomena to social reality 
 SSR8. Children relate phenomena to their own experience 
 SS310. Sociocultural component of natural objects 
 SS312. Objects that are familiar are classified and described using terminology 
 CIR4. Connections to other subjects, specifically geometry 
 CI34. Connections to other subjects, specifically geometry 
 CIR5. Strong sense of self (egocentric expression) 
 CIR10. Learners attempt to mimic the interviewer 
 CI35. Strong sense of self (egocentric expression) 
 CI310. Learners attempt to mimic the interviewer 
 
4.4.3 Limited vocabulary inhibits expression of concepts 
 SSR1. Limited expressive vocabulary inhibits explanations 
 SS31. Limited vocabulary inhibits explanations 
 CIR1. Limited vocabulary inhibits explanations 
 CIR9. Limited vocabulary inhibits explanations  
 CI31. Limited vocabulary inhibits explanations  
 CI39. Limited vocabulary inhibits explanations  
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4.4.4 Conceptual expression was somewhat normative in older children 
 SS35. Changes in phenomena are observed and noted 
 SS311. Learners note relationships between natural phenomena 
 CIR3. Conceptual expression is somewhat normative  
 CIR7. Ecological factors are considered in classification 
 CI33. Conceptual expression is somewhat normative 
 CI37. Ecological factors are considered in classification 
 
In Figure 4.8 I draw the relationship between the themes from the data with the most 
expressed finding, that children hold naïve concepts, in the centre of the diagram with 
the other prominent themes in proximity to the central theme. In Chapter 5 I will discuss 
the connection of these themes and how these themes relate to the conceptual 
framework of the study. 
 
Figure 4.8: The connection of sociocultural experience, language and the expression 
of naïve concepts 
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4.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
The development of normative science concepts, particularly a normative theory of vitalist 
biology and observation astronomy, requires of the individual to dedicate domain general as 
well as domain specific resources to learning about these concepts. The results as described 
in this chapter have given a snapshot of the state of the participants’ conceptual networks. It 
was found that the children mostly hold naïve concepts of vitalist biology and of observational 
astronomy and that their experiences, or lack thereof, of these natural phenomena, play a role 
in the development of these concepts. Despite their naïve concepts some individuals made 
some progression toward a normative understanding of some of the concepts, but this was 
only evident in a minority of children. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study began with a reference to diSessa’s proposal for granular investigations of 
conceptual change (diSessa 2002). Thus, when I asked the research question, ‘what 
concepts do Grade R and Grade 3 learners hold when they explain scientific 
phenomena?’ -  I responded with the plan of a qualitative case study, the design of 
which is described in Chapter 3. The analysis of data would thus conform to what 
diSessa (2002) argued for, because I would strive to search for minutiae in the 
children’s expression.  I found specific granular aspects of the conceptual 
development of the young people in this study. They expressed the type of naïve 
concepts and intuitive theories that authors such as Carey (2009), Gopnik (2011), and 
Vosniadou (2007) have investigated. Added to that, it is evident that their everyday 
experience and their social context featured in their expressions. 
The main finding of the study is, for teacher educators, somewhat disconcerting 
– namely that young children in a well-functioning public school, with ample material 
and human resources, do not learn much about the topics of the science curriculum 
over a period of three years. They are unlikely to be able to engage with the Grade 4 
curriculum, in which they will encounter natural sciences and technology as a subject. 
The findings of this study suggest that these young children simply do not yet have a 
firm grasp of the basic concepts that were investigated in the study and that there was 
not a noteworthy difference between the younger and the older children, when judged 
by the task-based interviews that were conducted in the second phase of the study.  
For the remainder of this chapter I will discuss the significance of the themes, 
as derived from the data analysis in Chapter 4, within the framework of the hierarchy 
of mental entities, as described in Chapter 2, and of activity systems analysis (ASA), 
described in Chapter 3.  These were the dual analytical frameworks which I now invoke 
in the interpretation of the findings.  
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5.2 THE THEMES  
In Chapter 4 I described the data analysis process. I showed how the ‘raw’ data in 
each data set across the two phases of inquiry were awarded primary codes, and how 
these were then clustered into secondary codes. These codes were amalgamated 
according to their conceptual connectedness and from each of these groupings I 
abstracted 40 categories in total. These categories were then further grouped (Section 
4.4) to formulate four overarching themes, which constitute the findings of the study. 
The main finding is that there is limited progression over the three-year period (from 
Grade R to Grade 3) of children’s conceptual development of observational astronomy 
and vitalist biology. The study was not intended to be longitudinal, but in the cross-
sectional data there is evidence to claim that the Grade R children and the Grade 3 
children do not differ much in their expression about the two topics of the inquiry. Also, 
the interviews of the first phase of the study, captured the Grade R cohort of 2014, 
from which a sample was randomly assigned for the second phase in 2017, when the 
participants in the sample were in Grade 3. There are, thus, elements of a longitudinal 
view, which I did not interrogate, due to the fact that the sample of 2017 was not the 
exact sample of 2014. This was because in 2014 the utterances were from individuals 
who did not necessarily form part of the random sample in 2017. In hindsight, this was 
a design flaw.  
In addition, of course, this was not a study with the use of a fixed, validated 
instrument that showed progression in any standardised way, and the data that 
captured the children’s concept formation are at best descriptive. Nevertheless, there 
is sufficient warrant to argue that the Grade R children’s concepts and theories did not 
differ much from those of the Grade 3 children in the same school, with similar home 
backgrounds.  
 
5.2.1 Situating the themes within the hierarchy of mental entities 
The work of various researchers of children’s theory formation was utilised to design 
an analytical tool for the study (Carey 2009; diSessa 2002; Barner & Baron 2016), 
which I refer to as a ‘hierarchy of mental entities’ (Fig.2.3). In this diagram I propose 
the relationship between the various levels in the ‘hierarchy’, with ‘mega’ conceptual 
structures as the ‘top’ structure. I compare this with what Carey (2009) would refer to 
as a ‘conceptual system’. In the rest of this section I view each finding through the lens 
of this heuristic and describe the themes as I located them on each one of the levels 
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of the hierarchy. Figure 5.1 shows an overview of the interpretation of the findings 
according to this heuristic. I mark the locations of each theme on one or more of the 
‘levels.’ 
 
Figure 5.1: Situating the themes within the hierarchy of mental entities 
 
This figure represents the most pertinent locus of each main theme in the hierarchy. 
The number of ‘Xs’ indicate the relative magnitude of the manifestation of the themes.  
 
Theme 1: Children hold naïve concepts 
This theme was derived from 18 categories, referred to in Section 4.4.1 and shows the 
instances in all four data sets where the participants demonstrated a naïve 
understanding of natural phenomena. In most cases the explanations which the 
participants gave did not resemble the normative or scientifically accurate 
explanations at all, but exhibited a myriad of naïve and intuitive ‘misunderstandings’ 
and ‘misconceptions’, or, as some theorists would argue, ‘concepts in formation’ 
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(Vosniadou 1994; Carey 1985). Many of these explanations were similar to the 
synthetic models5 as described in Section 2.4.2.  
Before embarking on this study, I hypothesised that the Grade R learners would 
hold naïve concepts, but I expected the Grade 3 sample to demonstrate fewer such 
naïve conceptions and show some cognitive move or progression towards normative 
concepts. By comparing the Grade R samples to the Grade 3 samples, it is evident 
that some individual children have progressed in terms of conceptual understanding 
by the time they reached Grade 3, but that the explanations given by them still do not 
resemble the normative concept in any way. These individuals were also in the 
minority as most of the participants in the Grade 3 samples still demonstrated their 
naïve concepts in much the same way as the Grade R participants, using similar 
linguistic expressions. 
When interpreting this theme, and using the analytical tool I have devised, I 
argue that the expression of mega-conceptual structures, such as theories, cannot be 
expected to be normative when knowledge, situated on the underlying levels within 
the hierarchy, are underdeveloped. This means that children learn, based on what 
they know. The notion of the ‘learning paradox’ comes to mind (Bereiter 1985; Prawat 
1999). “Efforts to explain learning as a constructive process run into the paradox of 
having to attribute to the learner prior knowledge that is at least as complex as the 
new learning to be explained” (Bereiter 1985:201). 
Bereiter (1985) argues that knowledge ‘under construction’ is as multi-layered 
as previously constructed (prior) knowledge. Also, a constructivist epistemology 
assumes that prior knowledge ‘connects’ with new knowledge (Von Glasersfeld 1995; 
Piaget et al. 1978; Phillips 2000). I would argue that the ‘connection’ is a missing link 
in trying to get a clear picture of how early grades children learn about the natural 
world. The data of this study show, quite pertinently, that, although the Grade 3  
children had been exposed to some new knowledge in school, it was not connecting 
with what they knew and believed – in fact, it would seem that their naïve ideas had 
been firmed up by what they had encountered at school (and elsewhere).6 The children 
were holding on to their naïve concepts of life and what they ‘observed’ of the earth 
                                               
5 Interestingly, in impromptu testing of undergraduate students and Honours students in the teacher 
education programmes, similar naïve/intuitive theories were held. Education at school did not change 
their conceptual systems 
6 It could well be that the teachers had not developed normative theories, much like the students I 
referred to in a previous footnote. 
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and the solar system. In studies by Carey et al. (2015), Zaitchik et al. (2016), and 
Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) the findings were similar. It could be that this is a 
‘developmental stage’ for humans to move through to understand their natural 
environment. There is some universal applicability to the current view of conceptual 
development, regardless of context, but that the nuances of the differences between 
the various studies might depend on the exposure that the children have had to 
specific natural phenomena and to instruction (Ozdemir & Clark 2007). My sense is 
that in the case of this thesis study, the teaching was not addressing the naïve 
concepts, possibly because the teachers did not inquire into children’s existing 
knowledge or held a view of child learning that does not allow for this type of 
exploration. The position of the study is that if teachers   knew more about children’s 
‘theories-under-construction’, they would adapt their teaching to form the constructivist 
bridge for children’s journey to normative concepts and theories.     
Several authors (Legare & Clegg 2015; Gopnik 2011; Naude 2015) agree that 
children between the age of six and nine years have the causal reasoning skills to 
interpret novel experiences in a way that can adapt their initial conceptual system 
through cognitive processes such as bootstrapping (Carey 2009, 2016; Barner & 
Baron 2016)  and other learning mechanisms (Section 2.3.3). All the participants of 
this study showed their ability to reason causally and they interacted with the 
interviewers comfortably. They appeared ‘open’ to learn and to adopt new terminology 
and should, ultimately, be able to change their knowledge and thus their 
concepts/theories, if given suitable scaffolds to build new knowledge. And that, in my 
view, would depend on teachers who know not only how to teach and what to teach, 
but who also know how children learn.  
The children in this study may not have received worthwhile instruction, or may 
not have had informal discussions on the topics in everyday encounters. One would 
expect this type of informal exposure in a social context where the solar system and 
biology are mentioned and taught and where children learn in a sociocultural set-up 
that somehow makes them aware as informal apprentices, such as Rogoff (1990), 
Lave (1988), Roth (2014), and others have argued. When learners are not exposed to 
some such learning opportunities, whether they be formal or informal, they are less 
likely to ‘transform’ their conceptual systems towards a near-normative understanding 
of natural phenomena. The prevalence of teacher- centred science teaching methods 
in the foundation phase is possibly to blame, as is the largely facts-based science 
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teaching, which does not contribute to theory formation or conceptual change. For 
instance, they learn an aide de memoire to remember the order of the planets in 
distances form the sun, but do not learn the concept of the solar system itself. 
The children in this study are in a public school, where teachers have a very 
strictly ‘controlled’ curriculum, with only a few science concepts listed in the content. 
The allocation of teaching time of these concepts is overshadowed by the 
requirements to teach mathematics and language (Mostert 2018). The teaching 
‘duties’, and in particular the  pressure to continually assess and record performance, 
along with a range of other non-teaching related responsibilities of the teacher, does 
not allow the teacher the freedom and time to invest in every lesson (Radebe 2018; 
Ntsoane 2018). In my observation at the school, the children mostly complete 
worksheets in workbooks to serve as proof that the teacher has ‘covered’ the content. 
This does not encourage deep learning and learners are left with their naïve 
understanding of science concepts, with which they then enter Grade 4. In this grade 
they are expected to know much more to begin with.  
In this ‘reduced curriculum’ of the foundation phase, they simply cannot learn 
science, because science learning already requires major re-organising of the 
learners’ knowledge base (Vosniadou 1996:99; Carey 2009). The current way of 
introducing science to young learners just does not make sense. In my view, the 
schools should have time for science demonstrations, makerspace activities, as well 
as brief excursions to the natural world outside the classroom, such as reported in the 
work of Roth (2014). If learners do not encounter learning experiences whereby their 
own beliefs (Level 2 in the hierarchy of mental entities) are challenged, they are 
unlikely to re-organise these beliefs.  
This theme is most evident within Level 4 of the hierarchy of mental entities, but 
is most likely caused by underdevelopment of the lower levels. In my own theorising 
on this theme I would argue that science that is taught by factual knowledge will not 
overrule beliefs and ontologies that the children hold, but are likely to reinforce these. 
The ‘crescent’ moon (or the ‘banana; moon) representation of children in this study is 
an example.               
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Theme 2: Personal experience hold sway in their theories 
This theme was constructed by connecting 10 categories that had captured 
participants’ explanations and tasks, reflecting their personal experience of natural- 
(and interlinked) sociocultural phenomena. I have placed the greatest weighting of this 
finding on Level 2 of the hierarchy of mental entities, followed by Level 1. The influence 
of experience and interaction with the sociocultural- as well as the natural environment 
feature strongly in their conceptions and in the revision of their ontological beliefs (see 
Section 2.3.2). Chi (2009) argues that there is constant flux in children’s ‘favourite’ 
beliefs. This flux is initiated when children experience a novel phenomenon that 
requires them to make sense of it and when the ‘stability’ of the held conceptual 
network is threatened, because the novel experience cannot be assimilated and then 
also not accommodated. The explanations and considerations of the participants 
showed that they valued knowledge from spheres of life other than that of science. I 
would argue that for many of the participants their considerations were mostly not due 
to a formalised view of science, but rather due to their own intuitive understanding of 
an interrelated whole with themselves as the axis. Most of the demonstrations and 
explanations of the participants were egocentric. It was also evident that the 
participants made knowledge connections with other subject areas, such as 
mathematics and art, which may have influenced their responses and interactions 
during the interview discussions and tasks. There were also instances where elements 
of the participants’ symbols of everyday culture influenced their explanations, for 
example, the child who referred to the sunflower seeds as beads – an object closer to 
her world than the notion of seeds of a flower, which she has probably never seen. 
These experiential factors were evident in the explanations of the participants, which 
is not unusual for learners of any age-group, but which were particularly prominent in 
the data. 
This finding required an additional analysis of the sociocultural environment in 
which the children grow up; in another part of this chapter (Section 5.2.3) I include an 
activity system analysis of the learning of science in the early grades in a school such 
as the one where this study was conducted, to invoke the societal, communal factors 
that are inserted into young children’s learning (of science). This type of analysis is not 
unusual in studying organisations such as schools and is typically used in educational 
psychology, utilising the theory of Bronfenbrenner (1979) or the modality suggested 
by Vygotsky (1933, 1978, 1986) and elaborated by Engeström (1987). 
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 The environmental factors, specifically the status quo of the foundation phase 
curriculum, is not conducive to optimal conceptual development. The architecture of 
the curriculum indicates an isolated, disconnected approach to teaching science 
content when, by contrast, it is the nature of the individuals to find connectedness. 
This connectedness between the various learning areas found in the curriculum is 
seldom made explicit by the policy or by teachers, and flies in the face of what is 
required for conceptual change to occur optimally. Also, a fundamental tenet of ‘social 
constructivism’ (Phillips 2000) is the interrelatedness of the individual and the cultural 
milieu (Vygotsky 1978, 1987; Kozulin 1986; Rogoff & Lave 1984; Rogoff 1990). This 
has important implications for science education in the foundation phase and supports 
the argument for a more integrated approach to teaching science in the early grades.  
Once teachers have identified what children already know - and what they 
believe - they could improve lesson design by utilising cross-cutting concepts between 
multiple disciplines or learning areas and incorporate these in lessons that aim to 
develop skills as well as address ‘big ideas’, a methodology known as three 
dimensional teaching (Erickson & Lanning 2014). If science is to have a greater focus 
in the foundation phase, it would need to fit within the greater constraints of the current 
curriculum without the need to revise the curriculum, as this would be too disruptive in 
a school system where change has become the curricular norm. Thus, by identifying 
the topics from science that connect with topics of language and mathematics, 
teachers would be able to integrate the teaching of these topics. This may address the 
issue of children’s ‘egocentric’ nature and allow for learners to place themselves as 
the axis of the learning experience, while still being immersed in their cultural 
environment. This, then, could more closely mimic the life that they live outside of the 
classroom, ensuring that the transition from being outside the classroom to inside the 
classroom is as seamless as can be.  The current trend of ‘phenomenon-based’ 
learning in Finland and Norway (Francis et al. 2013) is an example of a curriculum and 
pedagogy that puts experience and a specific phenomenon at the centre and truly 
exemplify teaching (and learning) ‘across the curriculum.  Silander (2015:1) writes: 
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The phenomenon-based approach is anchored learning, where the 
questions asked and issues to be learned are naturally anchored in real-world 
phenomena, and the information and skills to be learned can be directly applied 
across borders between subjects and outside the classroom in situations where 
the information and skills are used (natural transfer).       
 
Theme 3:  Limited vocabulary inhibits expression of concepts 
The categories mentioned in Section 4.4.3, where there were examples of participants 
not being able to express their reasoning sufficiently, showed up in this theme strongly. 
This was evident in both the Grade R and Grade 3 samples, regardless whether the 
participant chose to respond in isiZulu or English or in a code-switched rendering. In 
the Grade R sample there was a greater prevalence of this, which is to be expected, 
given that the Grade 3 children had longer to develop their vocabulary than the 
participants in the Grade R sample. This is further complicated by the arrangement 
that the language of tuition for the Grade R learners was exclusively isiZulu and that 
the language of tuition for Grades 1 to 3 includes English for some subjects such as 
mathematics, but, generally in the school, there is much code-switching and 
translanguaging. But, even so, children expressed themselves in non-fluent discourse. 
They often halted and could not find words to express themselves and struggled with 
verbs, specifically.  
When children do not have the much needed vocabulary that could serve as 
‘placeholders’ (Carey 2009) for their evolving understanding, it does not inherently 
imply that the child holds a naïve concept, but without sufficient expressive language 
competence, conceptual development can be compromised. Gopnik and Meltzoff 
(1997) argue strongly for a view of child development that relies on and expands 
linguistic competence. In Section 2.6 I discussed how language serves as a semiotic 
device that mediates the meaning making process and is a fundamental system of 
meaning making (Henning 2012; Henning & Dampier 2012; Odora-Hoppers 2005). 
Furthermore, if teachers are not adequately trained in the content and skills of science 
as well as the ‘language of science,’ it will not be possible for them to teach science 
for conceptual development. 
The dominant locality of this theme within the hierarchy of mental entities is on 
Level 1. One of the proto-conceptual primitives is that of concepts as a single lexical 
entity that forms the placeholder structure (see Section 2.3). Words ‘hold a place’. 
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Vygotsky (1986) describes this by referring to ‘pre-linguistic concepts’ and ‘pre-
conceptual language’ – arguing that if the two ‘meet’ concepts get firmed up. Dowker 
and Nuerk (2016) and Levine and Baillargeon (2016) have shown how this 
phenomenon plays out in mathematics learning.  If children aren’t exposed to 
terminology (as linguistic placeholders for developing concepts),   they will not create 
the placeholder structure that serves as the primer for conceptual development.  For 
example, if children learn the word ‘orbit’, they may not have any semantics for it (yet). 
But, when they ‘pretend’ play, to simulate the orbit of the moon around the earth in a 
playful way by, for instance, one child running around the whole class all bundled 
together as the plane earth in a tight circle, the placeholder word slowly acquires some 
semantics (Fig 5.2). Dowker and Nuerk (2015) refer to this as a ‘linguistic concept – 
the bridge from word to meaning. Carey would refer to this as conceptual development 
with a placeholder (which, according to her, can be a word, an image, a sound or any 
object). 
 
Figure 5.2: From placeholder to concept 
 
Further to that, concepts on Level 3 would be greatly underdeveloped when the 
semiotics, or the signs and the symbols representing the beliefs (Level 2) are not 
challenged by contradicting, or substantiating, competing beliefs – if these could not 
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adequately develop because of the lack of vocabulary and underdeveloped proto-
conceptual primitives. This naturally has a ‘knock-on effect’ for the development of 
mental entities on the other levels of the hierarchy.  If children did not have a meaning 
for ‘orbit’ as a verb representing a phenomenon and thus become a concept, they 
would be left in the dark and simply memorise a meaningless definition of ‘the moon 
orbits around the earth”. Of course, the meaning of earth would have to be clear, and 
in turn, the earth’s orbit around the sun as well. 
          
Theme 4: Emergent normative expression of concepts in older children  
Six categories coalesced to constitute this theme, in which signs of a ‘bud’ of a concept 
(Vygotsky 1978:74) are noticed. It shows that some children have   started to ‘move’ 
towards a normative understanding of the two natural phenomena. There was only 
one such instance in the Grade R sample, compared to five category instances in the 
Grade 3 sample. This is to be expected because, as time progresses, children are 
exposed to more instances that challenge their conceptual frameworks and they  
encounter more words as placeholders and also  develop more general cognitive 
skills. It is difficult to determine whether these instances of emergent normative 
expressions are due to the tuition at school or whether this is due to external factors 
such as their interest in the topic or more regular exposure to the concept due to family 
interactions and everyday life, including television and the internet. 
Tuition seems an unlikely source of the learning, as the majority of Grade 3 
participants still had not changed their expression and held naïve understandings. If 
their concepts had changed due to the tuition they had received, it would be 
reasonable to assume that most of the Grade 3 sample would express their 
understanding of the concepts in a similar manner – despite the small sample size, 
this is still a notable observation.  Added to that, the instances of these emergent 
normative concepts, do not show many similarities or correlation with each other  
When reading the foundation phase curriculum, it is notable that there are 
ample opportunities to incorporate the teaching of science concepts in lessons in other 
subjects, in other words, to utilise science phenomena as topic for integrated 
curriculum teaching. This would require all foundation phase teachers to have a 
holistic view of the progression of the entire foundation phase curriculum to identify 
these opportunities. Furthermore, teachers need to develop their PCK of science in 
order to adaptively connect science concepts to other topics in the curriculum. This, in 
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turn, places a responsibility on foundation phase teacher training institutions to 
redesign their foundation phase programmes to include a greater focus on the 
teaching of scientific literacy throughout their curricula.       
 
5.2.2 Dominant locus of impact 
The discussion of the themes gives an indication of the major challenges to children’s 
conceptual development of the two topics. I decided to conduct a secondary analysis 
of the data to triangulate within data analysis. I not only viewed these themes in 
isolation but also wished to find the average locality within the hierarchy of mental 
entities. Finding this locus of impact, I reasoned, would require a meta-interpretation 
of the findings and I used Figure 5.1 to serve as platform for a meta-interpretation. The 
highest concentration of X’s would show the locality within the hierarchy of mental 
entities where the findings of this study had the biggest ‘impact’, or featured most 
strongly in the analysis. On this view I conclude that the locality of impact is greatest 
in level two and level three. This is understandable, given the constraints of this study; 
by design, the mega-conceptual structures were not investigated explicitly. The 
interview protocols were designed to explore the expression of the concepts (on Level 
3) that the learners hold. It would therefore be ambitious to suggest that the findings 
of this study would show ‘impact’ on the mega-conceptual structures the most. 
However, all four themes featured on either the subnetwork on Level 2 or the network 
of concepts on Level 3. 
Theme 1 shows that the children hold naïve concepts and that these concepts 
are based on the interconnectedness of their conviction to the ontological and 
epistemological beliefs that have developed due to their interaction with the natural 
and sociocultural world. I would argue that these beliefs are deeply entrenched 
because of the children’s extended experiences within their unique sociocultural 
context. In this way Theme 3 and Theme 1 are interconnected and, even though the 
findings cannot confirm causality, it would stand to reason that a lack of exposure to 
science phenomena and scientific investigation, whether through play or discussion, 
would disadvantage the development of normative concepts.            
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5.2.3 Activity system analysis: learning as activity in a specific sociocultural 
system 
In addition to the interpretation of the findings thus far and to further the analytical 
veracity of the study, I also conducted an activity system analysis, because it was 
evident that the challenges that young learners in this urban ‘township’ school in 
Johannesburg face systemic challenges that go beyond their individual learning and 
development capabilities. Thus, instead of citing the vast literature on poverty as factor 
in learning, which would not yield much original thinking on my part, I opted to do a 
systematic analysis of the children’s learning activity system as per the tool that 
Engeström (1987, 2001) designed in ‘third generation activity theory’. I wanted to use 
this thinking tool to gauge what systemic influences are arguably present in the 
children’s learning.  With this, I wished to ‘tease out’ or ‘unpack’ some of the tensions 
in their ‘system’ that could possibly inhibit science conceptual development (see 
Section 3.10). TI described the components of the activity system according to the 
ASA tool: 
 
Figure 5.3: The activity system of learning science in the foundation phase 
 
Studying the current state of foundation phase science education, including current 
practice and policy (see Section 2.7), assisted me in identifying certain ‘tensions’ in 
the hypothetical ‘activity system’ of science learning in a ‘township’ school. In this 
section I briefly mention these tensions to highlight the systemic challenges. 
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The desired outcome of the activity in the system of learning science in schools 
such as the one where I conducted my study is adequate progression in science 
concept development Grade R to Grade 3. This outcome was not met. I identified the 
tensions within the system, with the aim to suggest a feasible intervention.  
The findings of this study show that there is tension between the subject of this 
study, the learner, and the object of this study, the learners’ conceptual development. 
This is, of course, not the only locus of tension in the system but is an important tension 
to interrogate to determine whether this tension can be attributed to the ability of the 
children to comprehend the normative concepts at their stage of development, or 
whether the tension is a result of factors external to them, such as a reduced 
curriculum, or inept teaching. The discussion of the findings led me to conclude that 
the inadequate development of normative concepts cannot be solely placed on the 
cognitive ability of the learners, but that the contribution of tensions that are present in 
various loci in the activity system should be investigated. I have argued in this thesis 
that if teachers knew more about children’s learning, they will be adaptive and adjust 
their teaching. 
The community component of the analytic device also gives a ‘gaze’ 
(Wardekker 2008) on the development of concepts. The community in this system can 
be defined as the classroom and the school, as well as home life.  Developing an 
interest in science as well as fostering values and attitudes toward science issues, as 
opposed to only learning factual knowledge, is not at the foreground of foundation 
phase teacher education programmes. I argue that by aligning foundation phase 
teacher education programmes with the Bildung-Didaktik traditions (Wang et al. 2018), 
as observed in Finland, foundation phase teachers would place greater value and 
importance on the learning of all facets of science. This could, in turn, create learning 
opportunities that would value not only factual science knowledge but also the skills, 
values and attitudes of science. Most foundation phase teachers have not received 
proper training on how to teach science and their lack of, or rudimentary PCK is a 
factor that adds to the tension between the division of labour and the subject in this 
activity system.  
The rules component of the activity system gives a ‘gaze’ that shows added 
tension on the subject (the learner) either directly or indirectly. Given that the policies 
such as the foundation phase curriculum and teacher training curricula do not value 
the teaching of science to such an extent as it values the teaching of subjects such as 
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math and language, this is not unexpected. These policies also do not make explicit 
the instances where content from different subjects can be taught in an integrated way. 
The language of instruction as well as the lack of existing science terminology 
for African languages can be viewed as ‘rules’ as well as the ‘tools’ in the activity 
system that also add tension. The curriculum places expectations on teachers to use 
science terminology with which they are not comfortable and which is foreign to many 
children, especially those in Grade R.  
 
5.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge about early grades education and in 
particular to PCK of early grades science teaching. The study has also provided and 
in-depth analysis of a sample of children’s learning and development, which would 
make useful reading for student teachers and for teachers who wish to expand their 
knowledge of child development and learning. 
 
5.3.1 Knowledge synthesised: Conceptual development and conceptual change 
Throughout this study, particularly in Chapter 2, I provide an account of literature about 
conceptual development and conceptual change, referring to several pertinent 
studies. I regard the heuristic that I designed as a useful tool with which to investigate 
concepts in science and in other domains and would hope to see it used in future 
studies (see Figure 2.3). This is a diagrammatic representation of how one can classify 
concept development. It is an amalgamation of the postulates of scholars who studied 
conceptual change theory and conceptual development. It illustrates the interactions 
and relationships between the various ‘mental entities’ and how these structures 
change during theory construction and revision. I discussed (Section 2.3.1) how the 
discourse and vocabulary around ‘concepts’ is used generally - given the colloquial 
use of the word and its often misuse. I have described the discourse and the 
associated semiotics of the various terminologies evident in the literature of conceptual 
development and have arranged these concepts within a novel framework which 
represents the hierarchy of ‘mental entities’. This is, thus, a knowledge contribution 
that emerged in the study of a selection of the literature. The contribution is to the 
knowledge domains of children’s theorising about science phenomena, the learning of 
science concepts in the foundation phase of the primary school, science talk for 
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children in the classroom, and knowledge about what adults should know to 
understand children’s thinking.   
   
5.3.2 Methodological contribution 
The methodological design of the study held many risks, given the likelihood that very 
little rich data could have been generated and could have provided little insight to the 
conceptual development of children in the foundation phase. Fortunately, the interview 
protocols provided ample opportunity for the participants to engage with science 
phenomena in a manner that is non-disruptive to the participants but importantly 
afforded them the opportunity to converse about science in their home language. 
These interview protocols contributed to a localised approach to knowledge 
generation. The design of the study further contributes to the methodology of 
translation in social science research by using a translator in a unique context. As 
discussed in Section 3.6 the translator’s role was more than just a fieldworker, but his 
role extended further to that of a data source in itself as he became a research partner 
in the study allowing me to peer through a window to study the conceptual frameworks 
of the participants.  
 
5.3.3 Contribution to primary school teacher education 
This study also contributes to the practice of teacher education and informs possible 
policy changes to both foundation phase teacher education curricula as well as 
changes to the foundation phase school curriculum. Throughout this study I have 
referred to the current state of science education and science teacher education for 
the early grades. I argue for an integrated teacher education curriculum that employs 
science literacy as vehicle to train pre-service foundation phase teachers. I further 
argue that the foundation phase curriculum could benefit from the inclusion of more 
formalised science learning progressions (Wiser & Smith 2016) informed by research 
on children’s theorising of the natural world.  
   
5.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Although I argue for the internal validity of the study, with its detailed audit trail and 
explication and that it remained true to the construct, there is no argument for external 
validity, except, in the words of Eisner (1991, 2017) who said that the generalisation 
is in ‘the eye of the beholder’ (Eisner 2017). Readers of this study can transfer the 
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findings to contexts that they know and for that the options remain open.  The findings 
and conclusions drawn from the data is ‘constrained’ by the design of the case study 
- the inferences drawn from the data are only applicable to the parameters of the 
bounded system of the case which I presented . In Section 3.8 I argued that, for this 
study, construct validity and contextual validity would be the focal points to determine 
the trustworthiness of the findings and conclusions. The population from which the 
sample was drawn (randomly) was too small to allow any extrapolation of findings and 
conclusions to other contexts. This was, however, never the intention of the study as 
the aim was to gather rich data from the purposefully selected site that would inform 
my own practice as science teacher educator. This does not preclude the applicability 
of the findings and conclusions on other similar contexts as this study could be 
replicated in schools with similar parameters as the one studied in this research and 
in so doing increases the reliability of this study.  
A further limitation of the collection and analysis of data lies in the disparity of 
language ability of the researcher. Not being fluent in isiZulu, limited my involvement 
during data collection and necessitated the use of translation to make the data 
accessible to myself. This could have caused the misinterpretation of data and skew 
the findings and inferences drawn from the findings.  I mitigated against bias by being 
present in all data collection sessions, though. In Section 3.8 I discuss how the design 
of the study further mitigated this risk and limited the skewing of the findings and 
conclusions.     
 
5.7 RECOMMENDATIONS 
I propose the following as potential outflows from this study: 
 
5.7.1 A longitudinal study of children’s science concept development 
A longitudinal study, to track individual children’s science concept development, 
should be undertaken to simply get to know what children in urban ‘township’ schools 
know and what the possible difference is for children growing up in rural villages or in 
middle class suburbia. I would recommend studies of other topics of early science 
learning. It would be valuable to know how such children’s performance is throughout 
the primary school – including how they learn through medium of English. Similar 
protocols could be used. 
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Results from such longitudinal studies would inform the possible integration of 
curriculum subjects in teaching in the foundation phase by identifying curriculum 
themes from mathematics, language and life skills that could serve as crosscutting 
concepts (Erickson & Lanning 2014). Such a unit could be nested within a larger entity 
such as the South African Research Chair Initiative (SARchi) for the Integrated Studies 
of Learning Language, Mathematics and Science in the Primary School. 
 
5.7.2 Development of science discourse for African languages 
In Chapter 2 I discussed the importance of linguistic code in the learning and 
expression of concepts. There is currently limited capacity of research resources to 
allow for studies such as this one to be conducted on a larger scale. I recommend that 
more opportunities be generated that would allow for post-graduate programmes that 
could enable students to build capacity as researchers of science education in African 
languages.  
 
5.7.3 Diagnostic investigation of children’s conceptual frameworks 
The methods used in the study could be used by teachers in their own assessment 
practices. I recommend that science teachers and researchers of science education 
use and develop similar methodologies or protocols to diagnose the conceptual 
structures of children.       
 
5.7.4 Policy of the foundation phase curriculum       
The composition of the foundation phase curriculum should be revised in order to 
incorporate the latest findings from international and national research on the learning 
of science concepts. These findings suggest domain specific learning trajectories and 
learning progressions that could scaffold the learning of science concepts. To achieve 
these policy changes would require greater collaboration between the department of 
higher education and training and the department of basic education to ensure 
alignment between the foundation phase teacher education curricula and the 
foundation phase curriculum. In-service teachers would also need to be trained given 
that most teachers did not receive adequate science training during their tertiary 
education.     
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5.8 CONCLUSION 
Despite the gaps that arose during the progress of a study, I round off the thesis by 
glancing back at how I set out and conclude that the research journey has had ample 
yields.  In Chapter 1 I argued that such a study is much needed, because teachers 
generally do not pay attention to the constructivist epistemologies that they purport to 
subscribe to. The South African school curriculum makes much of such an 
epistemology, yet, teachers do not, generally, live the tenets of constructivism. Finding 
out what children know, how they think, and how they model the natural world mentally, 
is crucial for teachers to teach with some fidelity. This study showed up some of 
children’s understanding and how powerful beliefs and intuitive theories are. I argue 
that teachers should know this before they venture to ‘add’ knowledge to an unknown 
conceptual space. 
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APPENDIX B: TRANSCRIPTS OF CLASSROOM 
SCIENCE DEMONSTRATIONS 
Science Concept Project Transcripts    
 Grade R 
00.01 Alright guys please tell me do you know what is science 
00.13[pause] it’s the sun 
00.27 [silence] stop sign 
00.28 discussion 
1.19 do know what is an experiment? 
1.21 Its spider man 
1.22 batman 
 
Astronomy 
1.31 How do you know its morning? 
1.32 good morning 
1.33 good morning 
Translation 
2.05 The sun 
2.08 What is the sun? 
2.09 The sun. 
2.31 It’s the thing that lights for us to see. 
2.40 The sun makes it to be warm when it is cold so that we 
can go to the street and play while it is hot. 
3.12 Where is the sun? 
3.17 Up 
3.32 can you tell me what does the sun do? 
3.40 It is hot 
4.14 When our clothes a wet it makes them dry. 
4.20 And shoes 
4.33 when you have a sack and it is wet the sun comes and 
makes it dry. 
4.45 When our clothes are dry we put them in the wardrobe. 
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5.09 how does the sun do it? 
5.19 Very well 
5.29 You have to wait for them to be dry. 
5.40 After the dry you send a child to put them on the bed and 
fold them and the put them in wardrobe. 
6.40 What happens to the sun at night? 
6.48 It is not there. 
6.56 Where does it go? 
7.01 Home 
7.02 goes to the sky. 
7.13 What do you see in the sky when it is dark? 
7.19 it’s dark. 
7.20 What is in the sky when it’s dark? 
7.32 there are stars. 
7.36 moon 
7.50 stars 
8.01 What is the moon? 
8.11 It’s a banana. 
8.28 Where is the moon? 
8.30 The moon up. 
8.48 What does the moon do? 
8.57 It shows you its night. 
9.11 How does the moon show you its nighttime? 
9.17 It shows you that it’s time to sleep. 
9.45 Because it’s dark. 
9.50 can you see the moon in the day? 
9.52 No teacher. 
10.03 What are stars? 
10.12 star. 
10.25 it’s human. 
10.37 Where are the stars? 
10.38 Up 
10.45 is it the same place where the moon is? 
10.54 No. 
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10.58 What do stars do? 
11.00 [trying to guess] 
11.20 They shine 
11.21 What happens to the stars in the day? 
11.31 They go to the sky. 
 
SHADOW experiment 
 
11.44 What is this? 
11.46 Light 
12.02 What do you see? 
12.05 hands 
12.20 hand and light. 
12.45 What do you see against the wall? 
12.50 butterfly. 
14.20 Do you know what is a shadow? 
14.21 No 
14.44 it a shade. 
15.09 What do you see on the floor? 
15.14 A human 
15.52 do you have a shadow at night? 
15.58 No 
15.59 yes 
16.00 yes 
16.04 Why don’t you have a shadow at night? 
16.10 Because it is cold. 
16.24 Because its night. 
16.28 The thieves come. 
16.38 Because it’s dark. 
 
LIVING AND NON-LIVING 
 
16.51 Are you alive? 
16.57 [pause] yes 
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17.00 [whole class] we are alive 
17.13 Why are you alive? 
17.23 Because you are a human 
17.30 What tells you that you are alive? 
17.45 It is breathing. 
18.03 breathing and walking. 
18.53 you drink water. 
18.59 is the water alive? 
19.04 water is not alive 
19.08 is alive we drink it. 
19.13 [learner] why does it shake then? 
19.30 Where can you find water? 
19.39 From the tap. 
19.49 From the mountain. 
20.00 From the jug when you drink tea. 
20.07 you collect water in the bucket. 
20.11 From the kettle. 
20.25 From the water car (truck) 
20.34 What is this? 
20.35 balloon. 
21.45 tell me what is inside the balloon? 
21.47 It is air. 
22.09 is the air alive? 
22.18 no/yes 
23.34 What do you see? 
23.38 A rock. 
23.44 is the rock alive? 
23.48 no/yes 
24.22 Where else can you find rocks? 
24.27 On the grass. 
24.40 From the soil 
24.46 From the mountains. 
24.51 From the ground. 
24.58 In the yard. 
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25.01 What do you see in here? 
27.16 It’s a seed 
27.25 Where does the seed come from? 
27.37 From the peach. 
27.47 From the apple. 
27.54 And down 
27.55 An orange. 
28.14 is the seed alive? 
28.18 No. 
28.25 Why do you say so? 
28. 34 it does not walk. 
28.51 What do you see? 
28.52 A flower. 
28.54 is the flower alive? 
28.58 yes/no 
29.00 yes 
29.10 why? 
29.22 Because it needs water. 
29.27 Why does it need water? 
29.28 To grow. 
29.34 So a thing that grows is it alive or not. 
29.35 It is alive 
30.08 What do you see now? 
30.11 A tree. 
30.27 Where do trees come from? 
30.33 From the soil. 
30.36 From the grass. 
30.43 is the tree alive? 
30.47 yes/no 
30.55 If you say no why do you say no? 
31.02 Because it’s not talking. 
31.09 Who says yes? 
31.11 Why is it alive? 
31.12 – 31.40 discussion 
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32.18 It is not alive. 
32.22 what other trees do you know of? 
32.33 The ones with the sticks. 
32.40 peach trees 
32.48 The ones for hiding. 
32.54 For bombing. 
33.15 What do you see? 
33.16 bird. 
33.20 Where does the bird come from? 
33.27 comes from the sky. 
33.34 is the bird alive. 
33.38 yes. 
33.39 Why do you say so? 
34.58 Because it walks. 
35.11 It flies 
35.21 It can stand. 
35.40 what other birds do you know of? 
36.09 A black one 
36.11 A brown one 
36.14 A yellow one 
36.15 An orange one 
36.20 A colored one. 
36.23 Where else can you find birds? 
36.38 On the ground. 
37.05 In town. 
37.23 Who of you has a bird at home? 
37.36 What birds do you have at home? 
37.44 A bird. 
37.56 dog 
38.03 Where does the dog come from? 
38.13 From the farm. 
38.16 From the shop 
38.20 Home. 
38.29 From the zoo. 
179 
38.38 From its cage. 
38.51 is the dog alive? 
38.57 yes 
39.00 why? 
39.07 Because its go. 
39.18 Because it’s talking. 
39.23 whoof-whoof! 
39.36 what other dogs do you know of? 
39.44 A puppy 
39.52 A pit bull 
39.57 bulldog. 
40.05 police dog. 
40.23 Where else can you find dogs? 
40.37 Nowhere else. 
40.52 From the shop 
41.24 What is the difference between this [dog] and this 
[rock]? 
42.22 Because the rock doesn't have teeth. 
 
Experiments. 
Balloon, baking powder and vinegar experiment. 
44.45 If I put vinegar inside the baking powder, what is going 
to happen? 
44.50 Its going to inflate. 
44.56 why do think it’s going to blow? 
44.59 [few learner] its air. 
Pours vinegar inside the balloon with baking powder. 
46.25 what did you see? 
46.26 ball. 
46.40 when you pour vinegar there is a white thing inside and 
it goes bhaaaa! 
46.50 how many teaspoons of baking powder did we put into the 
balloon? 
46.57 two 
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47.01 we going to put five now. 
47.53 what do you think is going to happen? 
47.54 it’s gonna blow. 
48.10 its going to inflate. 
48.12 do you think its going to be big or small? 
48.14 its going to be big. 
48.15 why? 
48.20 because he poured five things(spoons of baking powder) 
48.21 pours five spoons of baking powder and vinegar. 
49.49 which one is bigger 
49.51 this one [learners pointing to bigger balloon] 
49.53 why? 
50.05 because he poured five teaspoons. 
 
COMBUSTION 
50.56 Is the flame alive? 
51.05 yes. 
51.10 why? 
51.12 silence 
51.16 [mumblings] 
52.20 what is going to [to the flame] happen if I put vinegar 
in there? 
52.27 its gonna phh..! 
52.37 its going to be big. 
52.41 its going to be put out. 
52.47 why? 
52.52 because he poured water. 
52.55 I’m not going to pour the vinegar onto the flame, do you 
still it’s going to go off? 
53.08 [class] no! 
53.16 its going to be big[the flame]. 
54.28 what happened to the flame? 
54.29 Its gone. 
54.35 why is the flame gone? 
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54.37 [silence] 
54.48 because he poured baking powder and vinegar. 
 
ABSORPTION 
58.25 MARKS THE WATER LEVEL. 
58.38 What is going to happen if I put this [kitchen paper 
towel] in there? 
58.40 [silence] 
58.53 it’s going to be white. [Water] 
59.40 puts the paper towel inside the water. 
59.50 what happened? 
1.00.05 its pink. 
1.00.10 the tissue changed the colour to pink. 
1.00.18 what happened to the water? 
1.00.34 the water went down/reduced. 
1.00.46 what happened? 
1.00.47 [silence] 
 You put the tissue inside the water and it turned red 
1.02.21 we are using five tissue paper now. 
1.02.44 what is going to happen if I put all five in there? 
1.02.58 they are going to turn pink. 
1.03.13 the water is going to go down. 
1.03.28 dips the paper towel into the water. 
1.03.46 what did you see? 
1.04.03 they put the tissue inside the water and it turned 
pink. 
1.04.12 it reduced the water. 
1.04.26 which one took most of the water? 
1.04.50 the one with five pieces. 
1.04.52 why? 
1.05.05 because it had a lot of papers. 
 
PROPULSION 
1.08.35 What is going to happen if I leave the balloon? 
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1.08.42 it is going to go. 
1.08.45 why? 
1.08.46 its gonna go with the straw. 
1.08.52 if I leave the balloon which way is the air going to 
come out? 
1.09.20 that side [pointing on the side of the opening] 
1.11.30 what did you see? 
1.11.38 I saw the balloon moving. 
1.12.   Why did it move. 
1.12.21 because you inflated it and let it go. 
 
 
Grade 3: Transcription 
Introduction  
Question: (00:21)  Do you know what science is? 
Answer 1: (00:22)  No!!!!( Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (00: 25)  Don’t you?  
Answer: 1: (00:26)  Yes!! ( Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (00:28) So you don’t even have the slightest idea? Who wants to take a 
guess? 
Answer 1: (00: 36)  Magic (Girl) 
Question: (00:41)  Why do you say its magic? 
Question: (00:50)  What is magic? 
Question: (00:58)  Is it a difficult question to answer? 
Question: (01:03)  Do you know what an experiment is? 
Answer 1: (01:05)  No!!! ( majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (01:27)  How do you know it is morning? 
Answer1: (01:32)  You see with light (girl) 
Answer 2: (01: 36)  I see outside, when it is white outside.(boy) 
Answer 3: (01: 44)  and the sun (Girl) 
Question: (01:49)  Tell me, what is the sun? 
Answer 1: (02: 00)  Fire (Girl)  
Question: (02:04)  Is the sun fire? Who else wants to tell me what is fire?  
Answer 1: (02:06)  Light (Boy) 
Answer 2: (02:14)  It’s a good fire (Boy) 
Question: (02:18)  Where is the sun , tell me where is the sun? 
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Answer 1: (02: 24)  It’s up (Boy) 
Answer 2: (02: 27)  It’s in the sky (Boy) 
Answer 3: (02:29)  It’s in out of space (Boy) 
Answer 4: (02:33)  Up in the sky (Girl) 
Question: (02:36)  What is space if you say it’s in out of space? 
Answer 1: (02:39)             A planet (Boy) 
Questions: (02:43)   Where are planets? 
Answer 1: (02:50)  In the garden (Boy) 
Question: (02:53)      Not plants but planets? 
Answer 1: (02:57)  Is a moon (Girl) 
Question: (03:05)  What happens to the sun when it’s night? 
Answer 1: (03:08)   It goes up to the sky (Girl)  
Answer 2: (03:24)  It go under the moon (Boy) 
Answer 3: (03:31)  The clouds close the sun 
Answer 4: (03: 38)  The clouds close the sun and the moon (Boy) 
Answer 5: (03:42)   The planets rounds (Boy) 
Answer 6 (03:51)  The sun hides and it becomes dark(Girl) 
Question: (03:56)  And what do you see when it becomes dark? 
Answer 1: (04:00)  You see clouds (Boy) 
Answer 2: (04:04)  You see stars (Girl)  
Answer 3: (04:06)  Moons (Girl) 
Answer 4: (04: 12)  Clouds (Girl) 
Answer 5 (04:15)  I see lights (Boy) 
Question: (04: 17)  What lights do you see? 
Answer 1: (04: 22)  White lights (Boy) 
Answer 2; (04: 28)  I see blue sky (Boy) 
Answer 3: (04 :33)  White moon (Girl) 
Answer 4: (04:39)  Half-moon (Boy) 
Question: (04:42)  What is the moon? 
Answer 1 (04:47)  It’s a planet (Boy) 
Question: (04:50)  What shape is the moon? 
Answer1: (04:55)  Is like a banana (Girl) 
Answer 2: (05:04)  Is a circle (Boy) 
Answer 3: (05:07)  It gets circle when it is morning (Girl)   
Answer 4: (05:12)  Sometimes its whole (Girl) 
Question: (05:21)  And stars what are stars? 
Answer 1: (05:26)  White (Girl) 
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Question: (05:33)  Does anybody else want to tell me what are stars? 
There is a long silence in the classroom 
Question: (05:49)  Ok let me ask you this, Is the sun a star? 
Answer 1: (05:50)  Some learners shout out No!! and others Yes!! 
Question: (05:56)  Who says yes the sun is a star? Lift up your hand. 
Answer 1: (06:01)  One learner raises her hand. 
Question: (06:02)  Why do you say so? 
Answer 1: (06:03)  Because its bright like a star. 
Question: (06:06)  Who says no the sun is not a star? 
Answer 1: (06:12)  Because star is white and sun is yellow (Girl) 
Answer 2: (06: 18)  The sun is big and the star is small (Boy)  
Answer 3: (06:26)  The sun is circle and the stars are ……. (Girl) 
Question: (06:33)  What shapes are stars? 
Answer1: (06:40)  Star (Girl) 
Answer2: (06:44)  The sun is bright and the moon is not bright. (Boy) 
Answer 3: (06:53)  The star come at night and the sun don’t come at night (Girl) 
Answer 4: (07:01)  The star is a rectangle (Boy) 
Question: (07:07)  Do you agree?, What shape are stars? 
Answer1: (07:09)  Star (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (07:16)  What happens to the moon when it is day? 
Answer 1: (07:32)  It becomes half (Girl) 
Question: (07:33) Anybody else who wants to tell me what happens to the moon 
at night 
Answer 2: (07:44)  It comes out (Girl) 
Question: (07:46)  Can you see the moon when it is day? 
Answer1: (07:48)  No!! (Some learners shout out) 
Answer 2: (07:50)  The sun comes out (Boy) 
Shadow demonstration  
Question: (07:58) Do you know what is this? ( Mr Naude holding a Torch in his 
right hand) 
Answer 1: (08:00)  Yes (The majority of the class shouts out) 
Answer 2: (08:01)  Torch (Few learners shout out) 
Question: (08:02)  What’s the nice English word ? 
Answer 1: (08:04)  Flashlight (Few learners shout out) 
Question: (08:07)  What does the flashlight do ? 
Answer 1: (08:09)  You use it when its night (Boy) 
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Answer 2: (08:15) If you want to take something when its dark you take a flashlight 
(Girl) 
Answer 3: (08:21)  If you go to the camp and the dark (Boy) 
Answer 4: (08:33)  When outside it is dark you use a torch (Boy) 
Answer 5: (08:40)  When you want your phone you light a torch (Girl) 
Mr Naude reflects the flashlight on a piece of kitchen paper. 
Question: (09:07)  What do you see? 
Answer 1: (09:11)  A tissue and a flashlight (Boy) 
Answer 2: (09:26)  I see a light (Boy) 
Answer 3: (09:31)  I see a bright light (Boy) 
Question: (09:36) What is going to happen if a put my hand in the way of the light? 
Answer 1: (09:41)  The light will go….. (Boy) 
Answer 2: (09:50)  The light will be on your hand (Boy) 
Answer 3: (09:55)  It’s going to be dark (Girl) 
Question: (09:58)  What is going to be dark? 
Answer 1: (10:07)  It’s going to be dark when you put your hand (Girl) 
Answer 2: (10:13)  Your hand will be light (Girl) 
Answer 3: (10:17)  Your hand will be like a flashlight (Boy) 
Answer 4: (10: 24)  Your hand will be light (Girl) 
Mr Nauda puts his hand in front of the flashlight as it is reflected on the kitchen paper. 
Question:(10:27)  What do you see? 
Answer 1: (10:30)  We see your hand (Boy) 
Question: (10:31)  Where do you see my hand? 
Answer 1: (10:33)  On the toilet paper (Boy) 
Answer2: (10:37)  I see the shadow of your hand (Boy) 
Answer 3: (10:46)  I see a flashlight in your hand (Boy) 
Question: (10:47)  What colour is my hand ? 
Answer 1: (10:48)   White (Boy) 
Question: (10:51)  What colour is the hand on the tissue? 
Answer 1: (10:53)  Black!! ( Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (10:55)  Why is my hand white and the shadow is black?   
Answer 1: (11:01)  Because your hand is a ……. (Boy) 
Answer 2: (11:14)  Because your hand is a shade (Girl) 
Question :( 11:18)  What is a shadow? 
Answer1: (11:29) A shadow is a thing that is black when you move it follows you.     
(Boy) 
Question: (11:40)  Do all of you have shadows? 
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Answer1: (11:41)  Yes!!!! ( The majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (11:43)  When do you have a shadow? 
Answer 1: (11:47)  In the afternoon (Girl) 
Answer 2: (11:50)  When the sun is bright ( Boy) 
Question: (11:55)  Do you have a shadow at night? 
Answer 1: (11:56)  Nooo!! (The majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (12:00)  Why don’t you have a shadow at night? 
Answer 1: (12:03)  Because it is dark (Girl) 
Answer 2: (12:07)  Because when outside its dark you can’t see (Boy) 
Section 2: Living and Non-living 
Question: (12:25)  Are you alive? 
Answer 1: (12: 26)  Yes (The majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (12: 29)  How do you know you alive? 
Answer 1: (12: 33)  We can speak (Girl) 
Answer 2: (12: 34)  We can walk (Girl) 
Answer 3: (12: 37)  We can breath (Girl) 
Answer 4: (12: 43)  We can eat (Girl) 
Answer 5: (12:45)  We can speak a lot (Girl) 
Answer 6: (12: 49)  We can touch (Girl) 
Answer 7: (12: 54)  We can talk to a human (Boy) 
Answer 8: (13:00)  We can drink (Boy) 
Answer 9: (13:01)  We can wash (Girl) 
Answer 10: (13:03)  We can run (Boy) 
Answer 11: (13:05)  We can sit (Girl) 
Answer 12: (13:07)  We can drive (Boy) 
Answer 13: (13:10)  We can exercise (Girl) 
Answer 14: (13:14)  You can kick (Boy) 
Answer 15: (13:16)  You can stretch (Boy) 
Answer 16: (13:19)  You can tie your shoes (Girl) 
Answer 17: (13:22)  You can walk (Boy) 
Answer 18: (13:24)  You can gym (Boy) 
Answer 19: (13:27)  You can speak (Girl) 
Answer 20: (13:29)  You can sleep (Girl) 
Answer 21: (13:31)  You can smile (Girl) 
Mr Naude pours water into a small plastic cup 
Question: (13:47)  What do you see? 
Answer1: (13:50)  I see water (Girl) 
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Answer 2: (13:55)  I see water in a bottle (Boy) 
Answer 3: (14:03)  I see a plastic cup inside you put a water (Boy) 
Question: (14:18)  Is water alive? 
Answer 1: (14: 20)  No!!!/ Yes!! (Learners shout out)  
Question: (14:24)  Put up your hand if you say water is alive? 
Answer 1: (14:25)  One learner raises his hand  
Question: (14:36)  Why do you say water is not alive ? 
Answer 1: (14:39)  Because water is not alive like you (Boy) 
Answer 2: (14: 45)  Water is not like you the same(Boy) 
Answer 3: (14:50)  Water don’t have bones (Girl) 
Answer 4: (15:00)  The water can’t walk (Girl) 
Answer 5: (15:03)  You can’t speak with water (Boy 
Answer 6: (15:07)  The water doesn’t have legs (Girl) 
Answer 7: (15:14)  Water can breath (Girl) 
Answer 8: (15:17)  No hands (Girl) 
Answer 9: (15:19)  Water don’t have a mouth (Girl) 
Answer 10: (15:24)  Doesn’t have a face (Boy) 
Answer 11: (15:28)  Doesn’t have legs (Boy) 
Question: (15:30)  What can you do with water? 
Answer 1: (15:33)  Drink water (Girl) 
Answer 2: (15:36)  You can wash yourself (Boy) 
Answer 3: (15:39)  You can bath (Girl) 
Answer 4: (15: 41)  You can cook (Girl) 
Answer 5: (15: 44)  You can drink (Boy) 
Answer 6: (15:47)  You can make a plant (Girl)  
Answer 7: (15:50)  You can wash your car (Girl) 
Mr Naude shows the learners a balloon 
Question: (16:08)  What is this? 
Answer 1: (16:11)  A balloon (Majority of the class shouts out) 
Answer 2: (16: 20)  Blue (Boy) 
Question: (16:22)  What is inside the balloon? 
Answer 1: (16: 24)  Nothing (Boy) 
Answer 2: (16:26)  Water (Girl) 
Question: (16:30)  And if I do this what is inside the balloon? 
Answer 1: (16:33)  Nothing (Majority of the class shouts out) 
Mr Naude blows the balloon 
Question: (16:49)  And now what is in the balloon? 
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Answer 1: (16:51)  Air (Boy) 
Question: (16:55)  Are you sure? 
Answer 1: (16:56)  Yes ( Boy) 
Question: (16:57)  How do you know there is air inside? 
Answer1: (17:00)  Because you blow it (Boy) 
Question: (17:03)  What’s going to happen if I let go? Referring to the balloon 
Answer 1: (17:06)  There will be no air (Boy) 
Answer 2: (17:09)  It’s going to fly (Girl) 
Mr Naude lets go of the balloon 
Question: (17:28)  So you said inside the balloon there is air where else  
     can you get air? 
Answer1: (17:34)  You can find air outside (Boy) 
Answer 2: (17:40)  In the house when we open the windows (Girl) 
Answer 3: (17:43)  On the shop (Boy) 
Answer 4: (17:47)  In the world (Girl) 
Question: (17:51)  Is there air inside the class? 
Answer 1: (17:54)  No!!!/ Yes!!! (Learners shout out) 
Answer 2: (17:57)  When we open the windows (Boy) 
Question: (17:59)  When the door is open? 
Answer 1: (18:02)  Yes (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (18:04)  What can you do with air? 
Answer 1: (18:08)  You can’t do anything (Boy) 
Answer 2: (18:10)  You can breath (Girl) 
Question: (18:14)  Is air alive? 
Answer 1: (18: 16)  No (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (18:17)  Why do you say so? 
Answer 1: (18:19)  Because you don’t see air (Boy) 
Question: (18:25)  Why not?, why is air not alive? 
Answer 1: (18: 28)  Because you can’t touch it (Girl) 
Answer 2: (18:31)  Because you can’t hold it (Boy) 
Answer3: (18:34)  You can’t hug it (Girl) 
Answer4: (18:36)  Because you can’t speak to it (Boy)  
Mr Naude shows them a rock 
Question: (18:46)  What do you see? 
Answer 1: (18:56)  Stone (Boy) 
Answer 2: (19:00)  A rocks (Boy) 
Question: (19:09)  Is the rock alive? 
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Answer1: (19:11)  No!!! (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (19:12)  Why do you say so? 
Answer 1: (19:15)  You can’t speak to it (Boy) 
Answer 2: (19:17)  You can’t build with it (Boy) 
Question: (19:28)  Can you or can’t you build with it? 
Answer 1: (19:32)  Yes (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Answer 2: (19:35)  It can’t walk (Girl) 
Answer 3: (19:37)  It don’t have bones (Girl) 
Answer 4: (19:39)  It can’t see (Girl) 
Answer 5: (19:43)  It can’t bath (Girl) 
Answer 6: (19:49)  It can’t talk (Girl) 
Answer 7: (19:51)  It don’t have legs (Girl) 
Mr Naude shows them seeds 
Question: (20:02)  What do you see? 
Answer1: (20:06)  The beads of a flower (Boy) 
Question: (20:16) So you say they are beads of a flower what do you call that? 
Answer 1: (20:19)  Seeds (Boy)  
Question: (20:22)  What are seeds? 
Answer 1: (20: 28)  From the flower (Boy)   
Question: (20:31)  What do seeds do? 
Answer 1: (20:35)  Seeds plant things (Girl) 
Question: (20:42)  What happens to seeds when we plant them? 
Answer1: (20:44)  Seeds plant flowers (Boy) 
Answer 2: (20:51)  Seeds grow up flowers (Girl) 
Answer 3: (20:57)  It can grow (Boy) 
Answer4: (21:00)  You can plant it (Boy) 
Question: (21:03)  Are seeds alive? 
Answer 1: (21: 04)  No!!! (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (21:09)  You say no, why do say no the seeds are not alive? 
Answer 1: (21:14)  The seeds can’t walk (Boy) 
Answer 2: (21:18)  It can’t breathe (Girl)  
Answer 3: (21: 20)  It can’t see (Girl) 
Answer 4: (21: 24)  It can’t talk (Boy) 
Answer 5: (21:27)  It can’t eat (Girl) 
Answer 6: (21:29)  It can’t drink water (Girl) 
Question: (21:34)  Why do we give seeds water? 
Answer 1: (21: 37)  Because they need to grow (Girl) 
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Answer 2: (21:44)  To be bigger (Boy) 
Answer 3: (21:50)  Sunlight (Girl) 
Question: (21:53)  Why do they need sunlight? 
Answer1: (21:58)  They need sunlight to grow Girl)   
Answer2: (22:03)  And rain (Girl) 
Question: (22:10)  You said that seeds grow, do you grow? 
Answer1: (22:12)  Yes!!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Question: (22:15)  Do you grow? 
Answer 1: (22:17)  Yes!!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Question: (22:27)  Are you alive? 
Answer 1: (22:28)  Yes!!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Question: (22:30)  Does the seed grow? 
Answer1: (22:31)  Yes!!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Question: (22:32)  Is the seed alive? 
Answer1: (22:34)  Nooo!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Mr Naude shows the learners a pot plant 
Question: (22:42)  What is this? 
Answer 1: (22:44)  Flowers (Girl) 
Question: (22:48)  What can you do with flowers? 
Answer 1: (22:54)  You can take them and then you give your friend (Girl) 
Question: (22:59)  Why do you want to give flowers to your friend? 
Answer1: (23:03)   Because it’s her birthday (Girl)    
Answer 2: (23:09)  You can plant your flowers in your house.(Boy) 
Answer 3: (23: 15)  You can talk to your flowers (Boy) 
Question: (23:17)  You can talk to the flowers, are they going to listen? 
Answer1: (23:19)  Nooo!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Answer 2: (23:22)  You can give flowers to your friend because you love her. (Girl) 
Answer 3: (23:30)  You can decorate inside your house. (Girl) 
Question: (23:33)  Is the flower alive? 
Answer 1: (23:34)  Nooo!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Question: (23:36)  Why do you say so? 
Answer 1: (23:38)  It can’t listen (Boy) 
Answer 2: (23:40)  It can’t breathe (Girl) 
Answer1: (23:43)  Because it can’t talk (Boy) 
Answer2: (23:45)  Because it can’t walk (Boy)  
Answer3: (23:48)  Because it can’t speak (Girl) 
Answer4: (23:50)  Because it can’t drink (Boy) 
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Answer 5: (23:55)  Because it can’t see (Girl) 
Answer 6: (23:57)  Because it can’t speak (Girl) 
Answer 7: (23:59)  Because it can’t dance (Girl) 
Question: (24:02)  Why do we give flowers water? 
Answer 1: (24:08)  We give flowers water to grow. (Boy) 
Answer 2: (24:13)  To make fruits. (Girl) 
Question: (24:21)  So you say that flowers grow? 
Answer1: (24:22)  Yes!!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Question: (24:23)  And you, do you grow? 
Answer1: (24:24)  Yes!!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Question: (24:25)  Of course you said that, are you alive? 
Answer 1: (24:26)  Yes!!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Question: (24:28)  Are flowers alive? 
Answer 1: (24:29)  Nooo!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Mr Naude cuts a flower from the pot plant 
Question: (24:43)  What happened? 
Answer1: (24:50  The flower could never grow. (Boy) 
Question: (24:54)  Why won’t it grow? 
Answer1: (24:57)  Because you cut it. (Boy) 
Answer2: (25:03)  Because the flower will……(Boy) 
Answer 3: (25:16)  It can’t grow again because you cut it.(Girl) 
Answer4: (25:22)  The flower never grow again. (Girl) 
Question: (25:27)  Is this flower alive? 
Answer1: (25:29)  Nooo!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Mr Naude shows the learners a tree 
Question: (25:37)  What is this? 
Answer1: (25:41)  Is a tree (Boy) 
Answer 2: (25:47)  It’s a tree (Boy) 
Answer3: (25:49)  It’s a small tree (Boy) 
Answer4: (25:50)  It’s a garden (Boy) 
Question: (25:55)  Is the tree alive? 
Answer1: (25:57)  No!!!!/Yes!!!! (The learners shout out) 
Question: (26:01)  Why do you say yes? 
Answer1: (26:16)  Because it grows apples. (Boy) 
Answer 2: (26:24)  Me I say no because a tree you can’t talk to it (Boy) 
Answer3: (26:35)  I say no because the tree can’t listen (Girl) 
Question: (26:41)  Who says the tree is not alive? 
192 
Question: (26:44)  Why do you say the tree is not alive? 
Answer1: (26:47)  Because it don’t have feet. (Girl) 
Answer 2: (26:52)  You can’t talk with it (Boy) 
Answer 3: (26:57)  I say yes because the tree can move (Girl) 
Question: (27:04)  How does the tree move? 
Answer1: (27:07)  When the air is more (Boy) 
Answer2: (27:14)  When there’s windy (Girl) 
Mr Naude show the learners a bird 
Question: (27:57)  What do you see? 
Answer1: (28:00)  I see a bird. (Boy) 
Answer 2: (28:03)  I see wings (Girl) 
Answer3: (28:11)  I see a bird (Boy) 
Answer4: (28:15)  I see different colours (Girl) 
Answer5: (28:18)  I see a cage of a bird (Girl) 
Answer6: (28:20)  Eyes (Boy) 
Question: (28:23)  Do you hear anything? 
Answer1: (28:25)  Yes!! (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (28:27)  What do you hear? 
Answer1: (28:31)  I hear a bird sound (Boy) 
Answer2: (28:35)  I hear a noise (Boy) 
Answer3: (28:39)  I hear a bird sound (Girl makes a bird sound) 
Question: (28:40)  Is the bird alive? 
Answer1: (28:42)  Yes!! (Majority of the learners shout out)  
Question: (28:43)  Why do you say so? 
Answer1: (28:47)  It has a heart. (Girl)   
Answer2: (28:50)  It has eyes (Boy) 
Answer 3: (28:52)  Because it can eat (Girl) 
Answer4: (28:57)  It can breathe (Girl) 
Answer5: (29:00)  He can make his own house (Boy) 
Answer6: (29:07)  He can jump and move (Girl) 
Answer7: (29:10)  It can sing (Girl) 
Answer8: (29:15)  It can fly (Boy) 
Question: (29:20)  Who’s got birds at home? 
Long silence from the learners  
Question: (29:28)  Do your parents have birds at home? 
Answer1: (29:31)  Nooo!! (The whole class shouts out) 
Mr Naude shows the learners a picture of a dog 
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Question: (29:45)  What do you see? 
Answer1: (29:47)  Dog (Boy) 
Answer2: (29:50)  Picture of a dog (Girl) 
Answer3: (29:59)  I see different colours on a dog (Girl) 
Question: (30:04)  Do you have a dog at home? 
Answer1: (30:06)  Yes!! (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (30:07)  What type of dogs do you have at home? 
Answer1: (30:10)  Rodviders ooooooo 
Answer2: (30:14)  Snoopy (Girl) 
Answer3: (30:19)  Pit bulls (Boy) 
Answer4: (30:24)  Scratch (Boy) 
Answer5: (30:27)  Puppies (Girl) 
Answer6: (30:31)  China dog (Girl) 
Answer7: (30:33)  Smocky (Girl) 
Question: (30:36)  Tell me is your dog alive? 
Answer1: (30:40)  Yes!! (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (30:41)  Why do you say so? 
Answer1: (30:44)  Because it can breathe (Boy) 
Answer2: (30:48)  It can drink (Girl) 
Answer3: (30:52)  It can make babies (Boy) 
Answer4: (30:57)  It can eat (Boy) 
Answer5: (30:59)  It can run (Boy) 
Answer6: (31:01)  It has bones (Girl) 
Answer7: (31:03)  You can talk with your dog (Boy) 
Answer8: (31:08)  It has teeth and mouth (Boy) 
Answer9: (31:20)  It can run (Girl) 
Answer10: (31:22)  You can tell your dog what to do (Boy) 
Answer11 :( 31:25)  It can bite (Girl) 
Answer12: (31:28)  You can train it (Girl) 
Answer13: (31:31)    You can take your dog a walk (Boy) 
Section 3: Chemistry  
Demonstration: the reaction between vinegar and backing powder 
Mr Naude shows the learners white powder that he has put on the tea-spoon 
Question: (32:07)  Do you know what this powder is? 
Answer1: (32:10)  Bicarbonate (Girl) 
Question: (32:15)  What is bicarbonate of soda? 
Answer1: (32:20)  Something like a sweet aid (Girl) 
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Answer2: (32:27)  You can make a volcano (Boy) 
Answer3: (32:32)  You can cook (Boy) 
Answer 4: (32:35)  You can make sherbet (Girl) 
Answer 5: (32:39)  You can make a bomb (Boy) 
Answer 6: (32:40)  It’s something that is salt (Girl) 
Answer 7: (32:49) When the balloon is soft you going to put bicarbonate of soda) 
and….(Boy) 
Question: (32:59)  How do you know?    
Long silence from the learners 
Question: (33:05) You said you can use it to do a volcano, how can you do a 
volcano? 
Answer1: (33:13) You can take a stean (rock) and then you tie the stean to a 
balloon. (Boy) 
Mr Naude pours the bicarbonate of soda into the balloon using teaspoon. (1 teaspoon) 
Question: (33:45)  What is inside the balloon now? 
Answer1: (33:48)  Bicarbonate of soda (All the learners shout out) 
Question: (33:52)  What do I have here? 
Answer1: (33:53)  Vinegar (All the learners shout out) 
Answer2: (33:55)  Water (Girl) 
Question: (34:03)  What can you do with vinegar? 
Answer1: (34:07)  You can make beetroot (Girl) 
Answer2: (34:13)  You can eat with chips (Boy) 
Answer3: (34:24)  If your stomach is sore you can drink it with water (Girl) 
Question: (35:01)  What is going to happen if I put vinegar in the balloon? 
Answer1: (35:05)  Is going to be warm (Boy) 
Answer2: (35:14)  Inside the balloon it will be lot of steam. (Girl) 
Answer3: (35:20)  Is going to blow (Girl) 
Answer4: (35:27)  To fly (Girl) 
Mr Naude  puts the vinegar inside the balloon using a searing  
Question: (36:12)  What is happening? 
Answer 1: (36:15)  Is blowing up (Girl) 
Question: (36:20)  Why is it blowing up? 
Answer1: (36:24)  Because you put water (Boy) 
Answer2: (36:38)  Because you put vinegar and bicarbonate of soda (Boy) 
Question: (36:49)  What is happening inside the balloon? 
Answer1: (36:55)  It’s mixing (Boy) 
Question: (36:59)  Who said that the balloon is going to become warm? 
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Answer1:  (37:03)  Learner raises his hand 
Question: (37:04)  Do you want to feel it? 
Answer1: (37:05)  Yes (The boy stands up to feel the balloon) 
Question: (37:10)  Is it warm? 
Answer:  (37:11)  No (Boy nods his head) 
Question: (37:13)  What is it? 
Answer1: (37:14)  Cold (Boy) 
Question: (37:15)  Why is it cold? 
Answer1: (37:19)  Because the vinegar is cold (Boy) 
Mr Naude does the same experiment using another balloon and more bicarbonate soda. 
5 teaspoons 
Question: (38:07)  What’s going to happen if I put vinegar? 
Answer1: (38:11)  Its goner blow it when you put .(Boy) 
Answer2: (38:23)  Its goner bomb (Girl) 
Answer 3 (38:36)  Is going to say boom (Girl) 
Question: (38:42)  What do you think is going to happen? 
Answer1: (38:45)  Is going to sheeeeeeessh (The boy makes a sound) 
Answer2: (38:55)  The vinegar is going to blow the balloon (Boy) 
Question: (38:58) Is it going to be as big as this one comparing it to the previous 
balloon. 
Answer1: (38:59)  Noooo!!! (All the learners shout out) 
Answer 1: (39:08)  Is going to be bigger than this one (Boy) 
Mr Naude puts the vinegar inside the balloon using a searing 
Question: (40:27)  What is happening? 
Answer 1: (40:28)  I hear a sound (Boy) 
Question: (40:29)  Why do you hear that? 
Answer1: (40:37)  Because you are shacking it (Boy) 
Answer2: (40:40)  Because you added water/vinegar (Boy) 
Question: (40:47) If I shack this one (referring to the first balloon) what do you 
hear? 
Answer1: (40:52)  Nothing (All the learners shout out) 
Question: (40:54)  Why? 
Answer1: (41:00)  Because that one is small (Boy) 
Answer2: (41:06)  Many vinegar (Boy) 
Mr Naude does the same experiment using another balloon and more bicarbonate soda. 
5 teaspoons and more vinegar 
Question: (42:26)  What happened? 
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Answer1: (42:32)  This one is big and this one is small (Boy) 
Answer2: (42:37) This balloon is bigger than this one and this balloon is smaller 
than this one (Girl) 
Answer3: (42:44)  This balloon is bright (Boy) 
Answer4: (42:49) This one you didn’t put 5 teaspoons of bicarbonate soda and 
this one you did put 5 teaspoons 
Question: (43:01) So this one is bigger than this one? (referring to the first and last 
balloon) 
Answer1: (43:03)  Yes (All the learners shout out) 
Mr Naude uses a vas with a candle inside for his next experiment 
Question: (43:15)  What do you see? 
Answer1: (43:17)  I see a candle with a matches (Boy) 
Answer 2: (43:22)  I see a candle inside a bottle (Girl) 
He puts 6 teaspoons of bicarbonate soda at the bottom of the vas and lights the candle. 
Question: (45:25) If I put vinegar at the bottom of the vas without it touching the 
flame what is going to happen? 
Answer1: (45:40)  The bicarbonate of soda will be…..(Boy) 
Answer 2: (45:50)  The bicarbonate will boom (Boy) 
Question: (46:00)  So is there going to be big flame? 
Answer1: (46:03)  Yes!!!/No!!! (Learners shout out) 
Video 2 
Answer 3: (00:02)  The candle will go down (Boy) 
Answer4: (00:09)  The candle is going to be small (Girl) 
Question: (00:16)   Do you want to see what happens? 
Answer1: (00:17)  Yes (All the learners shout out) 
Question: (00:18)  Do you think you going to hear anything? 
Answer1: (00:20)  Yes (All the learners shout out) 
Question: (00:22)  What are you going to hear? 
Answer1: (00:23)  SHSSSSSSSSHHHH (All the learners make that sound) 
After he puts the vinegar in the vas 
Question: (00:51)  What happened? 
Answer1: (00:55)  The vinegar shut down the flame (Girl) 
Answer2: (01:07)  Is like Eno (Girl) 
Answer3: (01:10)  Is like magic (Boy) 
Answer4: (01:14)  The light disappeared (Girl) 
Question: (01:19)  Why did the flame go out? 
Answer1: (01:23)  Because the steam went up and it start to go off (Girl) 
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Answer2: (01:39)  Because the matches don’t like water (Boy) 
Answer3: (01:46)  Because the steam go up and the candle disappeared (Boy) 
Video 3: 
Absorption experiment  
Mr Naude pours water into a measuring cylinder 
Question: (00:01)  What color is the water? 
Answer1: (00:04)  Green (Boy) 
Answer2: (00:07)  Cream (Boy) 
Answer3: (00:09)  Silver (Boy) 
Answer5: (00:11)  White (Boy) 
Question: (00:14)  What do I have here? (Referring to a bottle of food coloring)  
Answer1: (00:20)  You have a baking, when you bake you bake with that (Girl) 
Answer2: (00:33)  Food coloring (Boy) 
Question: (00:36)   Is it food coloring, what does food colouring do? 
Answer1: (00:39)  We put it in veggies (Boy 
Answer2: (00:48)  It makes water dye (Girl) 
Answer3: (00:49)   It changes the water colour (Boy) 
Question: (00:55)  So if I put this in here what is going to happen?  
Answer1: (00:58)  The water will be red (Girl) 
Question: (01:01)  How quickly will the water become red? 
Answer1: (01:05)  When you are shaking it (Boy) 
Mr Naude pours the food colouring into the cylinder with water 
Question: (01:29)  What is happening? 
Answer1: (01:34)  The waters colour is changing (Boy) 
Answer2: (01:36)  The water is getting red (Girl) 
Answer3: (01:40)  The food colouring is going down (Girl) 
Mr Naude uses a green marker to indicate the measurement of the water  
Question: (02:00)  What does this line mean 
Answer1: (02:04)  It is where the water starts (Boy)  
Question: (02:17)  What do I have here? 
Answer1: (02:18)  Toilet paper (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (02:31)  Is this a big piece or a small piece? 
Answer1: (02:33)  Small piece (Majority of the learners shout out)  
Question: (02:35)  What colour is the toilet paper? 
Answer1: (02:38)  White (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (02:47)  What is going to happen if I put the toilet paper in the water? 
Answer1 :( 02:55)  The water is going to be white and red (Boy) 
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Answer2: (03:02)  The toilet paper will be red (Girl) 
Answer3 :( 03:08)  There will be white paper (Boy) 
Question: (03:12)  What else is going to happen? 
Answer1: (03: 20)  The toilet paper is going to be red (Girl) 
Question: (03:31)  How long should we keep it in the water? 
Answer1: (03:36)  5 seconds (Girl) 
After he puts the toilet paper in the water 
Question: (03:50)  What happened? 
Answer1: (03:54)  The tissue is red (Boy) 
Question: (03:58)  What else? 
Answer1: (04:02)  The toilet paper is (Long pause from the girl) 
Answer2: (04:16)  The water squash the toilet paper (Boy) 
Answer3: (04:21)  The toilet paper is like chicken skin (Girl) 
Question: (04:27)  Why is it like a chicken skin? 
Answer1: (04:33)  Because it has small things (Girl) 
Mr Naude uses a red marker to indicate the measurement of the water after putting the 
tissue 
Question: (04:51)  What does that red line say? 
Answer1: (04:56)  There is something red in the plastic bottle (Girl) 
Question: (05:03)  Where was the water when we started? 
Answer1: (05:08)  On the red line (Boy) 
Answer2: (05:11)  On the red line (Boy) 
Question: (05:14)  So where is the water now? 
Answer1: (05:17)  On the red line (Girl) 
Question: (05:19)  So why is there less water now? 
Answer1: (05:25)  Because you put the tissue inside the water (Boy) 
Question: (05:31)  And what did the tissue do? 
Answer1: (05:36)  The tissue is begin to become to be red (Girl) 
Answer2: (05:45) The tissue went out of the water and come out with some water 
(Girl) 
Question:(05:55)  The tissue took some of the water? 
Answer1: (05:57)  Yes !!! (Majority of the learners shout out) 
He refills the water in the cylinder and uses more tissue paper for the experiment 
Question: (06:46)  Is it a big piece or a small piece? 
Answer1: (06:49)  Big!!! (Majority of the learners shout out) 
Question: (06:52)  What is going to happen if I put this big piece in the water? 
Answer1: (06:56)  The water will be short (Girl) 
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 Answer2: (07:01)  The toilet paper will be small (Girl) 
Answer3: (07:06)  The toilet paper will be red (Boy) 
After he has put the tissue paper in and then out of the water 
Question: (08:08)  What happened? 
Answer1: (08:12)  The water is down (Boy) 
Answer2: (08:22)  The toilet paper take the water away (Boy) 
Question: (08:34)  Why did it take so much water? 
Answer1: (08:36)  Because there is too much tissue (Boy) 
Answer2: (08:51)  Because the tissue is small (Boy) 
Video 4 
Demonstration of propulsion using: The balloon, straw and gut      
Mr Naude shows the learners how the straw moves  
Question: (00:12)  What is this? 
Answer1: (00:14)   A balloon (All the learners shout out) 
He blows the balloon and attaches it to the straw 
Question: (00:37)  What is going to happen if I let go of the balloon? 
Answer1: (00:43)  The straw is going to move with the balloon (Boy) 
Question: (00:48)  In which direction will it move? 
Answer1: (00:51) That way (The majority of the learners point to the specific 
direction. 
Question: (01:01)  Why do you say so? 
Answer1: (01:04)  Because the balloon is facing that way (Boy) 
Answer2: (01:07)  Is going to go to the left hand side (Girl) 
Question: (01:21)  Which side show me with you finger which side? 
Answer1: (01:22)  All the learners point to their right hand side 
Question: (01:25) Who of you say the balloon will go that side? Pointing to his left? 
Answer1: (01:27)  Some learners raise their hands 
Question: (01:28) Who of you say the balloon will go that side? Pointing to his 
right? 
Answer1: (01:29)  Some learners raise their hands 
After he lets go off the balloon while on the gut 
Question: (01:45)  Who was right? 
Answer1: (01:47)  Some learners raise their hands 
Question: (01:49)  Why did the balloon go this way? 
Answer1: (01:58)  Because the mouth of the balloon is facing that way (Boy) 
Question: (02:03) Because the mouth of the balloon is facing this way the balloon 
went that way, but why? 
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Answer1: (02:12)  Because the line of the balloon was that way (Boy) 
Answer2: (02:33)  Because the balloon was in the middle (Girl 
Answer3: (02:45)  Because the string starts her and……..(Girl) 
Question: (03:03)  If I turn the balloon that way where is it going to go? 
Answer1: (03:22)  It will go that way pointing to the right (Boy) 
Question: (03:43) If we let nonkululeko stand on a chair and the string is up which 
way will the balloon go? 
Answer1: (04:12)  That way( Learners point to the specific direction) 
Question: (04:28)  Did you see it went up? 
Answer1: (04:29)  Yes!!! (All the learners shout out) 
Question: (04:31)  Why did it go up? 
Answer1: (04:34)  Because the string was up (Girl) 
Answer2: (04:40)  Because the string is facing up (Boy) 
Answer3: (04:47) Because the mouth was facing there (Boy pointing at the 
direction) 
Question: (05:03) Can you see the string is facing down which direction will the 
balloon move? 
Answer1: (05:12)  Learners use their fingers to show the direction  
Question: (05:31)  Why did it go that way? 
Answer1: (05:36)  Because the string was down (Girl) 
Answer2: (05:42)  Because the string was facing down (Girl) 
Answer3: (05:56)  Like a pencil when you put it there, the is goner go down (Boy) 
Answer4: (06:12) Because the string is facing down then the balloon go down 
(Girl) 
Question: (06:34) You said if I put the string up the balloon will go up and if I put it 
down it? 
Answer1: (06:36)  Down!!! (The majority of the class shouts out) 
The end 
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APPENDIX C: INDIVIDUAL TASK-BASED CLINICAL 
INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT DETAILS 
Date Participant 
Code 
Time 
start 
Time 
End 
Total Time 
06/03/2017 FF38 10:30 11:10 40 minutes 
06/03/2017 FM38 12:05 12:45 40 minutes 
06/03/2017 FF31 12:55 13:35 40 minutes 
09/03/2017 FF32 08:20 08:40 20 minutes 
09/03/2017 FF33 08:55 09:30 35 minutes 
09/03/2017 FF34 10:25 11:00 35 minutes 
09/03/2017 FF35 11:40 12:15 35 minutes 
09/03/2017 FM31 12:40 13:05 25 minutes 
09/03/2017 FM32 13:15 13:55 40 minutes 
13/03/2017 FM33 09:05 09:30 25 minutes 
13/03/2017 FM36 10:20 10:50 30 minutes 
13/03/2017 FM37 11:00 11:25 25 minutes 
20/04/2017 FFR4 08:20 08:45 25 minutes 
20/04/2017 FFR1 08:55 09:25 30 minutes 
20/04/2017 FFR2 10:20 11:50 30 minutes 
04/05/2017 FFR3 08:45 09:20 35 minutes 
04/05/2017 FFR5 09:30 10:10 40 minutes 
04/05/2017 FMR2 11:15 11:40 35 minutes 
04/05/2017 FMR3 12:00 12:35 35 minutes 
10/05/2017 FMR5 08:20 08:55 35 minutes 
10/05/2017 FMR6 09:05 09:35 30 minutes 
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APPENDIX D: VIDEO RECORDINGS AND 
TRANSLATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL TASK-BASED 
CLINICAL INTERVIEWS 
Videos have been placed on a cloud-based server to serve as example of the individual task-
based interviews. The following hyperlinks can be used to access these videos: 
 
Participant 
Code 
Video Recording Translated Recording 
FMR5 https://drive.google.com/open?id=1
GETPXLnUlsZkhfpmV9MhCYaBA
N483tYY  
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1P
UFf2aGHpryFnh-ejd8Z9wfaBE-0k4uh  
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APPENDIX E: DATA ANALYSIS: EXAMPLES OF 
CODING PROCESS 
The following document was placed on a cloud-based server as example of the initial data 
analysis process showing the raw codes as derived from the interviews: 
 
 
 
 
Meta data for Clinical interviews7: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1DX6USLj4-C85imEhJr8uaTtUY6EOAhrJ  
 
 
 
                                               
7 Copy and paste the URL into an internet browser search bar in the event that the link does not work. 
